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76 result(s) for "Steinhoff, Uwe"
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Border Coercion and ‘Democratic Legitimacy’: On Abizadeh’s Argument Against Current Regimes of Border Control
Arash Abizadeh claims that ‘[a]nyone accepting the democratic theory of political legitimation domestically is thereby committed to rejecting the unilateral domestic right to control state boundaries’. He bases this conclusion on the premise that ‘to be democratically legitimate, a state’s regime of border control must result from political processes in which those subject to it—including foreigners—have a right of democratic participation’. I shall argue that this premise, even if it were correct, does not support the conclusion since ‘democratic legitimacy’ (in Abizadeh’s sense) is morally irrelevant: that something is ‘democratically illegitimate’ in no way suggests, let alone implies, that it is also morally impermissible or contravenes a moral right. I shall consider counter-arguments advanced against this objection by Maxime Lepoutre and Abizadeh himself and argue that they fail. Thus there is no valid democratic argument against border coercion.
Magnetorelaxometry Assisting Biomedical Applications of Magnetic Nanoparticles
Due to their biocompatibility and small size, iron oxide magnetic nanoparticles (MNP) can be guided to virtually every biological environment. MNP are susceptible to external magnetic fields and can thus be used for transport of drugs and genes, for heat generation in magnetic hyperthermia or for contrast enhancement in magnetic resonance imaging of biological tissue. At the same time, their magnetic properties allow one to develop sensitive and specific measurement methods to non-invasively detect MNP, to quantify MNP distribution in tissue and to determine their binding state. In this article, we review the application of magnetorelaxometry (MRX) for MNP detection. The underlying physical properties of MNP responsible for the generation of the MRX signal with its characteristic parameters of relaxation amplitude and relaxation time are described. Existing single and multi-channel MRX devices are reviewed. Finally, we thoroughly describe some applications of MRX to cellular MNP quantification, MNP organ distribution and MNP-based binding assays. Providing specific MNP signals, a detection limit down to a few nanogram MNP, in-vivo capability in conscious animals and measurement times of a few seconds, MRX is a valuable tool to improve the application of MNP for diagnostic and therapeutic purposes.
SELF-DEFENSE AS CLAIM RIGHT, LIBERTY, AND ACT-SPECIFIC AGENT-RELATIVE PREROGATIVE
This paper is not so much concerned with the question under which circumstances self-defense is justified (I use the term self-defense to include otherdefense), but rather with other normative features of self-defense as well as with the source of the self-defense justification. I will argue (as has been done before) that the aggressor's rights-forfeiture alone - and hence the liberty-right of the defender to defend himself - cannot explain the intuitively obvious fact that a prohibition on self-defense would wrong victims of attack. This can only be explained by conceiving of self-defense also as a claim-right. However, I will also argue (more innovatively) that a claim-right cannot ground the self-defense justification either. Rather, what grounds the self-defense justification and its particular strength and scope is the fact that self-defense is an act-specific agentrelative prerogative: a defender is allowed to give particularly grave weight to his interest in engaging in self-defense, which distinguishes self-defense from most other acts. This is not the same as saying that he has a right or a liberty to engage in self-defense. Thus, self-defense, understood as a normative concept, is a claimright, a liberty-right, and an act-specific agent-relative prerogative.
Whither Magnetic Hyperthermia? A Tentative Roadmap
The scientific community has made great efforts in advancing magnetic hyperthermia for the last two decades after going through a sizeable research lapse from its establishment. All the progress made in various topics ranging from nanoparticle synthesis to biocompatibilization and in vivo testing have been seeking to push the forefront towards some new clinical trials. As many, they did not go at the expected pace. Today, fruitful international cooperation and the wisdom gain after a careful analysis of the lessons learned from seminal clinical trials allow us to have a future with better guarantees for a more definitive takeoff of this genuine nanotherapy against cancer. Deliberately giving prominence to a number of critical aspects, this opinion review offers a blend of state-of-the-art hints and glimpses into the future of the therapy, considering the expected evolution of science and technology behind magnetic hyperthermia.
Optimizing Excitation Coil Currents for Advanced Magnetorelaxometry Imaging
Magnetorelaxometry imaging is a highly sensitive technique enabling noninvasive, quantitative detection of magnetic nanoparticles. Electromagnetic coils are sequentially energized, aligning the nanoparticles’ magnetic moments. Relaxation signals are recorded after turning off the coils. The forward model describing this measurement process is reformulated into a severely ill-posed inverse problem that is solved for estimating the particle distribution. Typically, many activation sequences employing different magnetic fields are required to obtain reasonable imaging quality. We seek to improve the imaging quality and accelerate the imaging process using fewer activation sequences by optimizing the applied magnetic fields. Minimizing the Frobenius condition number of the system matrix, we stabilize the inverse problem solution toward model uncertainties and measurement noise. Furthermore, our sensitivity-weighted reconstruction algorithms improve imaging quality in lowly sensitive areas. The optimization approach is employed to real measurement data and yields improved reconstructions with fewer activation sequences compared to non-optimized measurements.
The Case against compulsory vaccination: the failed arguments from risk imposition, tax evasion, ‘social liberty’, and the priority of life
Arguments for mandatory or compulsory vaccination must justify the coercive infringement of bodily integrity via the injection of chemicals that permanently affect a body’s inner constitution. Four arguments are considered. The allegedly libertarian argument declares unvaccinated persons a threat; accordingly, vaccination could take the form of justifiable defence of self and others. This argument conflates material and statistical threats. The harsh coercive measures permissible in defence against the former are not permissible in prevention of the latter. The argument from tax evasion claims that people can be permissibly coerced into bearing their fair financial burdens of community life and likens this to sharing burdens in the face of a viral threat. The argument fails to demonstrate that vaccination would be fair, permissible in spite of potential lethal side-effects, and sufficiently similar to taxation despite the categorical difference between temporary deprivation of money and permanent deprivation of one’s original inner bodily constitution. The argument from ‘social liberty’ claims that the loss of freedom due to mandatory vaccination is only apparent, namely outweighed by corresponding gains in freedom. This argument conflates freedom as the absence of coercion with freedom as the presence of options for action. It fails to give the former its due weight and to demonstrate that persons may be coerced into increasing the options of others. The argument from the priority of life elevates the protection of life to an absolute value. This is unwarranted and leads to counterintuitive implications. Without better arguments, mandatory vaccination must be rejected.
On the Ethics of Torture
The question of when, and under what circumstances, the practice of torture might be justified has received a great deal of attention in the last decade in both academia and in the popular media. Many of these discussions are, however, one-sided with other perspectives either ignored or quickly dismissed with minimal argument. In On the Ethics of Torture , Uwe Steinhoff provides a complete account of the philosophical debate surrounding this highly contentious subject. Steinhoff's position is that torture is sometimes, under certain narrowly circumscribed conditions, justified, basing his argument on the right to self-defense. His position differs from that of other authors who, using other philosophical justifications, would permit torture under a wider set of conditions. After having given the reader a thorough account of the main arguments for permitting torture under certain circumstances, Steinhoff explains and addresses the many objections that have been raised to employing torture under any circumstances. This is an indispensible work for anyone interested in one of the most controversial subjects of our times.
Wild Goose Chase: Still No Rationales for the Doctrine of Double Effect and Related Principles
I focus on the question as to what rationale could possibly underlie the doctrine of double effect (DDE) or related principles. I first briefly review the correct critiques of the claim that people who intend some evil as a means to a good must be “guided by evil,” and that this is allegedly always wrong. I then argue that Quinn’s claim that violations of the DDE express certain negative attitudes of the agent and that agents violating the DDE must make an additional morally problematic presumption regarding their victims is mistaken. Tadros claims that an agent violating the means principle must force his victims to adopt his goals. I demonstrate that the difference Tadros tries to construe between an agent inflicting intended harm and an agent inflicting merely foreseen harm is non-existent. Sarch’s official rationale for the DDE also fails to distinguish harming as a means from side-effect harming, and reformulations of his rationale that suggest themselves run into severe problems. Walen’s defense of the means principle in terms of the “restricting claims principle” and Øverland’s appeal to “moral obstacles” are susceptible to counter-examples and appear to be question-begging. Recently, Walen has offered a revised formulation of his Restricting Claims Principle, claiming that it overcomes counter-examples and explains the means principle. I will argue that it contradicts the means principle and does not overcome the counter-examples. Thus I conclude that so far we are still left without a reasonable rationale for the DDE or related principles.
The Secret to the Success of the Doctrine of Double Effect (and Related Principles): Biased Framing, Inadequate Methodology, and Clever Distractions
There are different formulations of the doctrine of double effect (DDE), and sometimes philosophers propose \"revisions\" or alternatives, like the means principle, for instance. To demonstrate that such principles are needed in the first place, one would have to compare cases in which all else is equal and show that the difference in intuitions, if any, can only be explained by the one remaining difference and thus by the principle in question. This is not the methodology defenders of the DDE and of related principles use, however. I will discuss how they actually proceed, focusing on their preferred four pairs of examples. While these examples might have rhetorical force, they are nevertheless philosophically and methodologically useless (since they do not keep all else equal). As a corrective, I shall offer examples that do keep all else equal. These examples undermine the DDE and related principles. I then argue that while the Loop case and the \"closeness\" problem in the context of Jonathan Bennett's Sophisticated Bomber example might once have been an embarrassment of sorts for defenders of the DDE, meanwhile their discussion serves as a convenient distraction from the many clear examples disproving the DDE and related principles. I conclude that there is simply no sufficient intuitive support for the DDE or related principles. Instead of looking for their \"rationales,\" they should be abandoned.