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Kiev 1941
In just four weeks in the summer of 1941 the German Wehrmacht wrought unprecedented destruction on four Soviet armies, conquering central Ukraine and killing or capturing three quarters of a million men. This was the Battle of Kiev - one of the largest and most decisive battles of World War II and, for Hitler and Stalin, a battle of crucial importance. In this book, David Stahel charts the battle's dramatic course and aftermath, uncovering the irreplaceable losses suffered by Germany's 'panzer groups' despite their battlefield gains, and the implications of these losses for the German war effort. He illuminates the inner workings of the German army as well as the experiences of ordinary soldiers, showing that with the Russian winter looming and Soviet resistance still unbroken, victory came at huge cost and confirmed the turning point in Germany's war in the East.
eBook
Managing Defense Transformation
Why are some military organizations more adept than others at reinventing themselves? Why do some efforts succeed rapidly while others only gather momentum over time or become sidetracked or even subverted? This book explicates the conditions under which military organizations have both succeeded and failed at institutionalizing new ideas and forms of warfare. Through comparative analysis of some classic cases - US naval aviation during the interwar period; German and British armour development during the same period; and the US Army's experience with counter-insurgency during the Vietnam War - the authors offer a novel explanation for change rooted in managerial strategies for aligning service incentives and norms. With contemporary policy makers scrambling to digest the lessons of recent wars in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as to meet the unfolding challenges of the new revolution in military affairs (RMA), understanding the sources and impediments to transformation has become critical.
eBook
Through Mobility We Conquer
The U.S. Cavalry, which began in the nineteenth century as
little more than a mounted reconnaissance and harrying force,
underwent intense growing pains with the rapid technological
developments of the twentieth century. From its tentative
beginnings during World War I, the eventual conversion of the
traditional horse cavalry to a mechanized branch is arguably one of
the greatest military transformations in history. Through Mobility
We Conquer recounts the evolution and development of the U.S.
Army's modern mechanized cavalry and the doctrine necessary to use
it effectively. The book also explores the debates over how best to
use cavalry and how these discussions evolved during the first half
of the century. During World War I, the first cavalry theorist
proposed combining arms coordination with a mechanized force as an
answer to the stalemate on the Western Front. Hofmann brings the
story through the next fifty years, when a new breed of cavalrymen
became cold war warriors as the U.S. Constabulary was established
as an occupation security-police force. Having reviewed thousands
of official records and manuals, military journals, personal
papers, memoirs, and oral histories-many of which were only
recently declassified-George F. Hofmann now presents a detailed
study of the doctrine, equipment, structure, organization, tactics,
and strategy of U.S. mechanized cavalry during the changing
international dynamics of the first half of the twentieth century.
Illustrated with dozens of photographs, maps, and charts,
Through Mobility We Conquer examines how technology
revolutionized U.S. forces in the twentieth century and
demonstrates how perhaps no other branch of the military underwent
greater changes during this time than the cavalry.
eBook
The quest for operational maneuver in the Normandy campaign: Simonds and Montgomery attempt the armoured breakout
Mechanization signaled the end of the cavalry but the renaissance of heavy cavalry doctrine. The tank heralded the return of breakthrough operations and maneuver warfare. Initially, the western cavalries refused doctrinal revision and chose instead to fight bitter rear guard actions against Fullerist zealots. The Canadian Cavalry, prompted by Blitzkrieg's triumphs, effortlessly evolved into a tank force—virtually overnight. Canadian doctrine, however, was ersatz. Denied its own vast training areas, the RCAC was sandwiched into southern England and saddled with British warfighting techniques developed in the Western Desert. In Normandy, Canadian operational art was driven by Generals Simonds and Crerar, both gunners, who had neither the skill nor experience to conduct armoured warfare. Hampered by General Montgomery's inability to reproduce a strategic offensive comparable to that demonstrated on the Russian front, Allied armoured forces were squandered in mismanaged frontal attacks. In the United States, the attempts to protect the horse forced a praetorian's revolt that ended with General Chaffee garroting the US Cavalry, eliminating it from future battlefields. The doctrinal dominance of the American Armored Force was subsequently threatened by a cabal under artillery General Leslie McNair who imposed the Tank Destroyer philosophy. Internecine squabbles and economic nationalism prevented America from producing a tank capable of meeting German panzers on even terms. Though failing technically, the US Armored force succeeded doctrinally via the Louisiana maneuvers and produced a balanced Armored Division. General Bradley's 12th Army Group arrived in France with a purposeful dogma that had been further refined at the Combat Command, Divisional, and Corps level in North Africa and Sicily. American armour maneuvered during Operation Cobra but it did not fight massed panzers; this was soon redressed in Lorraine where American armoured doctrine reached tactical maturity. Canadian armour fought tank battles throughout Operations Spring, Totalize and Tractable, but it did not maneuver. American and Canadian armour's best opportunity for strategic victory occurred in Normandy. The Canadians, despite better tanks and favourable terrain, failed operationally and received no second chance.
Dissertation
Indonesia: My Part in Its Beginning
Warning! This article is based on no serious scholarship or research. It rests wholly on my memory of events three-quarters of a century ago -- flimsy foundations indeed. Experts (and pedants) may well find a howler in every paragraph, and will measure out the medicine of their rebukes by the tablespoon. These I shall just have to swallow.
Magazine Article