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Explains the functions and history of world banking systems and their involvement with the 2007 credit crunch.
Book
Recovery from Financial Crises: Evidence from 100 Episodes
We examine the evolution of real per capita GDP around 100 systemic banking crises. Part of the costs of these crises owes to the protracted nature of recovery. On average, it takes about 8 years to reach the pre-crisis level of income; the median is about 6.5 years. Five to six years after the onset of crisis, only Germany and the United States (out of 12 systemic cases) have reached their 2007-2008 peaks in real income. Forty-five percent of the episodes recorded double dips. Post-war business cycles are not the relevant comparator for the recent crises in advanced economies.
Journal Article
Interbank Liquidity Crunch and the Firm Credit Crunch: Evidence from the 2007-2009 Crisis
We study the credit supply effects of the unexpected freeze of the European interbank market, using exhaustive Portuguese loan-level data. We find that banks that rely more on interbank borrowing before the crisis decrease their credit supply more during the crisis. The credit supply reduction is stronger for firms that are smaller, with weaker banking relationships. Small firms cannot compensate the credit crunch with other sources of debt. Furthermore, the
impact of illiquidity on the credit crunch is stronger for less solvent banks. Finally, there are no overall positive effects of central bank liquidity, but higher hoarding of liquidity.
Journal Article
Systemic Banking Crises Database
The paper presents a comprehensive database on systemic banking crises during 1970-2011. It proposes a methodology to date banking crises based on policy indices, and examines the robustness of this approach. The paper also presents information on the costs and policy responses associated with banking crises. The database on banking crises episodes is further complemented with dates for sovereign debt and currency crises during the same period. The paper contrasts output losses across different crises and finds that sovereign debt crises tend to be more costly than banking crises, and these in turn tend to be more costly than currency crises. The data also point to significant differences in policy responses between advanced and emerging economies.
Journal Article
Crisis Resolution and Bank Liquidity
What is the effect of financial crises and their resolution on banks' choice of liquidity? When banks have relative expertise in employing risky assets, the market for these assets clears only at fire-sale prices following a large number of bank failures. The gains from acquiring assets at fire-sale prices make it attractive for banks to hold liquid assets. The resulting choice of bank liquidity is countercyclical, inefficiently low during economic booms but excessively high during crises. We present evidence consistent with these predictions. While interventions to resolve banking crises may be desirable ex post, they affect bank liquidity in subtle ways: Liquidity support to failed banks or unconditional support to surviving banks reduces incentives to hold liquidity, whereas support to surviving banks conditional on their liquid asset holdings has the opposite effect.
Journal Article
Failure and Rescue in an Interbank Network
This paper is concerned with systemic risk in an interbank market, modelled as a directed graph of interbank obligations. This builds on the modelling paradigm of Eisenberg and Noe [Eisenberg L, Noe TH (2001) Systemic risk in financial systems.
Management Sci.
47(2):236-249] by introducing costs of default if loans have to be called in by a failing bank. This immediately introduces novel and realistic effects. We find that, in general, many different clearing vectors can arise, among which there is a greatest clearing vector, arrived at by letting banks fail in succession until only solvent banks remain. Such a collapse should be prevented if at all possible. We then study situations in which consortia of banks may have the means and incentives to rescue failing banks. This again departs from the conclusions of the earlier work of Eisenberg and Noe, where in the absence of default losses there would be no incentive for solvent banks to rescue failing banks. We conclude with some remarks about how a rescue consortium might be constructed.
This paper was accepted by Wei Xiong, finance.
Journal Article