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A biosecurity panel met, expecting to approve recommendations, but myriad concerns complicated the proceedings. A biosecurity panel met, expecting to approve recommendations, but myriad concerns complicated the proceedings. Credit: Patrick Semansky/AP/Shutterstock A sign on the door of a Biosafety Level 4 laboratory at the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases.

This study conducted human factors risk analyses of a doffing protocol for Ebola-level personal protective equipment to identify and quantify the risk of errors made by healthcare workers, marked with surrogate viruses, while doffing and to predict rates of self-contamination.

In simulations of Ebola-level personal protective equipment doffing with experienced healthcare workers, hands, inner gloves, and scrubs are contaminated with nonenveloped viruses and, infrequently, with enveloped viruses.

ObjectiveProcedure-intense specialties, such as surgery or endoscopy, are a major contributor to the impact of the healthcare sector on the environment. We aimed to measure the amount of waste generated during endoscopic procedures and to understand the impact on waste of changing from reusable to single use endoscopes in the USA.DesignWe conducted a 5-day audit (cross-sectional study) of all endoscopies performed at two US academic medical centres with low and a high endoscopy volume (2000 and 13 000 procedures annually, respectively). We calculated the average disposable waste (excluding waste from reprocessing) generated during one endoscopic procedure to estimate waste of all endoscopic procedures generated in the USA annually (18 million). We further estimated the impact of changing from reusable to single-use endoscopes taking reprocessing waste into account.Results278 endoscopies were performed for 243 patients. Each endoscopy generated 2.1 kg of disposable waste (46 L volume). 64% of waste was going to the landfill, 28% represented biohazard waste and 9% was recycled. The estimated total waste generated during all endoscopic procedures performed in the USA annually would weigh 38 000 metric tons (equivalent of 25 000 passenger cars) and cover 117 soccer fields to 1 m depth. If all endoscopic procedures were performed with single-use endoscopes and accounting for reprocessing, the net waste mass would increase by 40%. Excluding waste from ancillary supplies, net waste generated from reprocessing and endoscope disposal would quadruple with only using single-use endoscopes.ConclusionThis quantitative assessment of the environmental impact of endoscopic procedures highlights that a large amount of waste is generated from disposable instruments. Transitioning to single-use endoscopes may reduce reprocessing waste but would increase net waste.

Standard precautions to minimize the risk of SARS-CoV-2 transmission implies that infected cell cultures and clinical specimens may undergo some sort of inactivation to reduce or abolish infectivity. We evaluated three heat inactivation protocols (56 °C-30 min, 60 °C-60 min and 92 °C-15 min) on SARS-CoV-2 using (i) infected cell culture supernatant, (ii) virus-spiked human sera (iii) and nasopharyngeal samples according to the recommendations of the European norm NF EN 14476-A2. Regardless of the protocol and the type of samples, a 4 Log10 TCID50 reduction was observed. However, samples containing viral loads > 6 Log10 TCID50 were still infectious after 56 °C-30 min and 60 °C-60 min, although infectivity was < 10 TCID50. The protocols 56 °C-30 min and 60 °C-60 min had little influence on the RNA copies detection, whereas 92 °C-15 min drastically reduced the limit of detection, which suggests that this protocol should be avoided for inactivation ahead of molecular diagnostics. Lastly, 56 °C-30 min treatment of serum specimens had a negligible influence on the results of IgG detection using a commercial ELISA test, whereas a drastic decrease in neutralizing titers was observed.

Laboratory-acquired infections due to a variety of bacteria, viruses, parasites, and fungi have been described over the last century, and laboratory workers are at risk of exposure to these infectious agents. However, reporting laboratory-associated infections has been largely voluntary, and there is no way to determine the real number of people involved or to know the precise risks for workers. In this study, an international survey based on volunteering was conducted in biosafety level 3 and 4 laboratories to determine the number of laboratory-acquired infections and the possible underlying causes of these contaminations. The analysis of the survey reveals that laboratory-acquired infections have been infrequent and even rare in recent years, and human errors represent a very high percentage of the cases. Today, most risks from biological hazards can be reduced through the use of appropriate procedures and techniques, containment devices and facilities, and the training of personnel.

The fast‐paced field of synthetic biology is fundamentally changing the global biosecurity framework. Current biosecurity regulations and strategies are based on previous governance paradigms for pathogen‐oriented security, recombinant DNA research, and broader concerns related to genetically modified organisms (GMOs). Many scholarly discussions and biosecurity practitioners are therefore concerned that synthetic biology outpaces established biosafety and biosecurity measures to prevent deliberate and malicious or inadvertent and accidental misuse of synthetic biology's processes or products. This commentary proposes three strategies to improve biosecurity: Security must be treated as an investment in the future applicability of the technology; social scientists and policy makers should be engaged early in technology development and forecasting; and coordination among global stakeholders is necessary to ensure acceptable levels of risk. Graphical Abstract Biosecurity policies and practices must be updated to accommodate the novel challenges associated with synthetic biology and to maximize technological benefits while minimizing its dual‐use potential. This Commentary proposes three strategies to improve biosecurity.

Cotton gauze is a widely used topical hemostatic material for bleeding control, but its high blood absorption capacity tends to cause extra blood loss. Therefore, development of rapid hemostatic cotton gauze with less blood loss is of great significance. Here, we develop an efficient hemostatic cotton gauze whose surface is slightly modified with a catechol compound which features a flexible long hydrophobic alkyl chain terminated with a catechol group. Its hemostatic performance in animal injuries is superior to standard cotton gauze and Combat Gauze TM . Its biosafety is similar to cotton gauze and rebleeding hardly occurs when the gauze is removed. Here, we show its hemostatic capability is attributable to the rapid formation of big and thick primary erythrocyte clots, due to its effective controlling of blood movement through blocking effect from tissue adhesion by catechol, blood wicking in cotton, and the hydrophobic effect from long alkyl chains. Cotton gauze is widely used as haemostatic material for bleeding control, but its high blood absorption capacity can to cause extra blood loss. Here, the authors develop a cotton gauze whose surface is modified with a catechol compound featuring a flexible long hydrophobic alkyl chain which demonstrates excellent haemostatic performance.

SARS-CoV-2 enters cells using its Spike protein, which is also the main target of neutralizing antibodies. Therefore, assays to measure how antibodies and sera affect Spike-mediated viral infection are important for studying immunity. Because SARS-CoV-2 is a biosafety-level-3 virus, one way to simplify such assays is to pseudotype biosafety-level-2 viral particles with Spike. Such pseudotyping has now been described for single-cycle lentiviral, retroviral, and vesicular stomatitis virus (VSV) particles, but the reagents and protocols are not widely available. Here, we detailed how to effectively pseudotype lentiviral particles with SARS-CoV-2 Spike and infect 293T cells engineered to express the SARS-CoV-2 receptor, ACE2. We also made all the key experimental reagents available in the BEI Resources repository of ATCC and the NIH. Furthermore, we demonstrated how these pseudotyped lentiviral particles could be used to measure the neutralizing activity of human sera or plasma against SARS-CoV-2 in convenient luciferase-based assays, thereby providing a valuable complement to ELISA-based methods that measure antibody binding rather than neutralization.