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Allocation of very scarce medical interventions such as organs and vaccines is a persistent ethical challenge. We evaluate eight simple allocation principles that can be classified into four categories: treating people equally, favouring the worst-off, maximising total benefits, and promoting and rewarding social usefulness. No single principle is sufficient to incorporate all morally relevant considerations and therefore individual principles must be combined into multiprinciple allocation systems. We evaluate three systems: the United Network for Organ Sharing points systems, quality-adjusted life-years, and disability-adjusted life-years. We recommend an alternative system—the complete lives system—which prioritises younger people who have not yet lived a complete life, and also incorporates prognosis, save the most lives, lottery, and instrumental value principles.

Following endorsement by WHO,1,2 the World Bank,3 and the UN's Sustainable Development Goals,4 the drive towards universal health coverage (UHC) is now one of the most prominent global health policies. As countries progress towards UHC, they are forced to make difficult choices about how to prioritise health issues and expenditure: which services to expand first, whom to include first, and how to shift from out-of-pocket payment towards prepayment.

How should scarce healthcare resources be distributed? This is a contentious issue that became especially pressing during the pandemic. It is often emphasised that studies exploring public views about this question provide valuable input to the issue of healthcare priority setting. While there has been a vast number of such studies it is rarely articulated, more specifically, what the results from these studies would mean for the justification of principles for priority setting. On the one hand, it seems unreasonable that public values would straightforwardly decide the ethical question of how resources should be distributed. On the other hand, in a democratic society, it seems equally unreasonable that they would be considered irrelevant for this question. In this paper we draw on the notion of reflective equilibrium and discuss the relevance and roles that empirical studies may plausibly have for justification in priority setting ethics. We develop a framework for analysing how different kinds of empirical results may have different kinds of implications for justification.

With services overburdened, healthcare professionals are having to decide who should receive treatment. Dave Archard says this is no excuse for wandering blindly into discrimination, but Arthur Caplan argues age is a valid criterion when supported by data

The American Society of Nephrology, the European Renal Association–European Dialysis and Transplant Association and the International Society of Nephrology Joint Working Group on Ethical Issues in Nephrology have identified ten broad areas of ethical concern as priority challenges that require collaborative action. Here, we describe these challenges — equity in access to kidney failure care, avoiding futile dialysis, reducing dialysis costs, shared decision-making in kidney failure care, living donor risk evaluation and decision-making, priority setting in kidney disease prevention and care, the ethical implications of genetic kidney diseases, responsible advocacy for kidney health and management of conflicts of interest — with the aim of highlighting the need for ethical analysis of specific issues, as well as for the development of tools and training to support clinicians who treat patients with kidney disease in practising ethically and contributing to ethical policy-making.Here, the ASN-ERA-EDTA-ISN Joint Working Group on Ethical Issues in Nephrology highlights ten areas of ethical concern as priority challenges that require collaborative action and discusses the need for development of ethical training and guidance tools to manage these issues.

As the USA contends with another surge in COVID-19 cases, hospitals may soon need to answer the unresolved question of who lives and dies when ventilator demand exceeds supply. Although most triage policies in the USA have seemingly converged on the use of clinical need and benefit as primary criteria for prioritisation, significant differences exist between institutions in how to assign priority to patients with identical medical prognoses: the so-called ‘tie-breaker’ situations. In particular, one’s status as a frontline healthcare worker (HCW) has been a proposed criterion for prioritisation in the event of a tie. This article outlines two major grounds for reconsidering HCW prioritisation. The first recognises trust as an indispensable element of clinical care and mistrust as a hindrance to any public health strategy against the virus, thus raising concerns about the outward appearance of favouritism. The second considers the ways in which proponents of HCW prioritisation deviate from the very ‘ethics frameworks’ that often preface triage policies and serve to guide resource allocation—a rhetorical strategy that may undermine the very ethical foundations on which triage policies stand. By appealing to trust and consistency, we re-examine existing arguments in favour of HCW prioritisation and provide a more tenable justification for adjudicating on tie-breaker events during crisis standards of care.

Healthcare priority-setting institutions have good reason to want to demonstrate that their decisions are morally justified—and those who contribute to and use the health service have good reason to hope for the same. However, finding a moral basis on which to evaluate healthcare priority-setting is difficult. Substantive approaches are vulnerable to reasonable disagreement about the appropriate grounds for allocating resources, while procedural approaches may be indeterminate and insufficient to ensure a just distribution. In this paper, we set out a complementary, coherence-based approach to the evaluation of healthcare priority-setting. Drawing on Rawls, we argue that an institutional priority-setter’s claim to moral justification can be assessed, in part, based on the extent to which its many normative commitments are mutually supportive and free from dissonance; that is, on the ability to establish narrow reflective equilibrium across the normative content of a priority-setter’s policy and practice. While we do not suggest that the establishment of such equilibrium is sufficient for moral justification, we argue that failure to do so might—like the proverbial canary in the coalmine—act as a generalised warning that something is awry. We offer a theoretical argument in support of this view and briefly outline a practical method for systematically examining coherence across priority-setting policy and practice.

BackgroundMany hospitalized adults do not have the capacity to make their own health care decisions and thus require a surrogate decision-maker. While the ethical standard suggests that decisions should focus on a patient’s preferences, our study explores the principles that surrogates consider most important when making decisions for older hospitalized patients.ObjectivesWe sought to determine how frequently surrogate decision-makers prioritized patient preferences in decision-making and what factors may predict their doing so.Design and ParticipantsWe performed a secondary data analysis of a study conducted at three local hospitals that surveyed surrogate decision-makers for hospitalized patients 65 years of age and older.Main MeasuresSurrogates rated the importance of 16 decision-making principles and selected the one that was most important. We divided the surrogates into two groups: those who prioritized patient preferences and those who prioritized patient well-being. We analyzed the two groups for differences in knowledge of patient preferences, presence of advance directives, and psychological outcomes.Key ResultsA total of 362 surrogates rated an average of six principles as being extremely important in decision-making; 77.8% of surrogates selected a patient well-being principle as the most important, whereas only 21.1% selected a patient preferences principle. Advance directives were more common to the patient preferences group than the patient well-being group (61.3% vs. 44.9%; 95% CI: 1.01–3.18; p = 0.04), whereas having conversations with the patient about their health care preferences was not a significant predictor of surrogate group identity (81.3% vs. 67.4%; 95% CI: 0.39–1.14; p = 0.14). We found no differences between the two groups regarding surrogate anxiety, depression, or decisional conflict.ConclusionsWhile surrogates considered many factors, they focused more often on patient well-being than on patient preferences, in contravention of our current ethical framework. Surrogates more commonly prioritized patient preferences if they had advance directives available to them.

In this paper we explore the relation between health-care needs and patients’ desires within shared decision-making (SDM) in a context of priority setting in health care. We begin by outlining some general characteristics of the concept of health-care need as well as the notions of SDM and desire. Secondly we will discuss how to distinguish between needs and desires for health care. Thirdly we present three cases which all aim to bring out and discuss a number of queries which seem to arise due to the double focus on a patient’s need and what that patient desires. These queries regard the following themes: the objectivity and moral force of needs, the prediction about what kind of patients which will appear on a micro level, implications for ranking in priority setting, difficulties regarding assessing and comparing benefits, and implications for evidence-based medicine.

Priority setting in health care is ubiquitous and health authorities are increasingly recognising the need for priority setting guidelines to ensure efficient, fair, and equitable resource allocation. While cost-effectiveness concerns seem to dominate many policies, the tension between utilitarian and deontological concerns is salient to many, and various severity criteria appear to fill this gap. Severity, then, must be subjected to rigorous ethical and philosophical analysis. Here we first give a brief history of the path to today’s severity criteria in Norway and Sweden. The Scandinavian perspective on severity might be conducive to the international discussion, given its long-standing use as a priority setting criterion, despite having reached rather different conclusions so far. We then argue that severity can be viewed as a multidimensional concept, drawing on accounts of need, urgency, fairness, duty to save lives, and human dignity. Such concerns will often be relative to local mores, and the weighting placed on the various dimensions cannot be expected to be fixed. Thirdly, we present what we think are the most pertinent questions to answer about severity in order to facilitate decision making in the coming years of increased scarcity, and to further the understanding of underlying assumptions and values that go into these decisions. We conclude that severity is poorly understood, and that the topic needs substantial further inquiry; thus we hope this article may set a challenging and important research agenda.