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Globalization transforms workforces of transnational corporation from predominantly home countrydominated workforces into foreign-dominated, multinational workforces. Thus, the national grounding of trade unions as the key form of labor organizing is challenged by new multinational compositions and cross-border relocations of corporate employment affecting working conditions of employees and trade unions in local places. We assume that economic globalization is characterized by expanding global corporate network of vertically and horizontally integrated (equity-based) and disintegrated (nonequity-based) value chains. We also assume that globalization can both impede and enable labor empowerment. Based on these premises the key question is, how can labor leverage effective power against management in global corporate networks? This question is split into two subquestions: a) How can labor theoretically reorganize from national unions and industrial relations institutions into global labor networks that allow prolabor improvement in global workplaces? b) How and why has labor in a globalized economy secured the core International Labor Organization (ILO) international labor right to organize companies and conduct collective bargaining? The Global Labor Network perspective is adopted as an analytical framework. Empirically, a comparative case methodology is applied comprising four more or less successful industrial disputes where labor achieved the right to organize and undertake collective bargaining. The disputes took place in affiliated factories of foreign transnational corporations located in Malaysia, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, and Turkey. The conclusion is that the combination of global labor capabilities and global labor strategizing must generate strategic labor power that adequately matches the weaknesses of the counterpart’s global corporate network in order to achieve prolabor outcomes. The most efficient solidarity action was leveraged by a cross-border alliance of workplace collectives, national industrial unions, and a global union federation using global framework agreements (GFAs) with key customers of the employer. The least efficient campaign relied primarily on domestic developing country state institutions supported by a foreign labor nongovernmental organization (NGO).

Sural presents information on the evolving structure of collective bargaining in Turkey from 1990 to 2005. Collective labor law regulates collective labor relations, i.e. relations between an employer--a private person or legal entity--and a trade union, the organized labor.

Partnership in coercion is defined as cooperation between trade unions and employers at the expense of workers' interests. It differs from coercive partnership by trade unions' not mandatory but willing participation for furtherance of their own interests that are detached from those of their members. The legal changes after 1980 in Turkey created the basic conditions for both of these partnerships patterns. The analysis of the metal industry bargaining system reveals that there are three additional factors which rendered partnership in coercion possible in this sector: employers' needs, weak trade union internal democracy and competition among trade unions. However the examination of some other industries in Turkey shows that partnership patterns in the metal sector cannot be easily used to make generalizations.