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This paper seeks to extend discussion of monetary policy instruments to the situation of a country faced with major capital inflows when the process of domestic financial liberalization is incomplete. It briefly summarizes the recent usage of traditional monetary instruments, discusses the practical limits to classic sterilization measures as well as the pros and cons of using other supplementary measures including tax-based controls on capital inflows. It also examines the efficacy of such measures in Chile, Colombia, Indonesia, Korea, Spain, and Thailand. The conclusion is that, for a time and as a transitional measure, a country may find it opportune to supplement the traditional instruments with certain \"belt and braces\" measures including, in some instances, indirect (tax-based) capital controls.

When turmoil strikes world monetary and financial markets, leaders invariably call for 'a new Bretton Woods' to prevent catastrophic economic disorder and defuse political conflict. The name of the remote New Hampshire town where representatives of forty-four nations gathered in July 1944, in the midst of the century's second great war, has become shorthand for enlightened globalization. The actual story surrounding the historic Bretton Woods accords, however, is full of startling drama, intrigue, and rivalry, which are vividly brought to life in Benn Steil's epic account. Upending the conventional wisdom that Bretton Woods was the product of an amiable Anglo-American collaboration, Steil shows that it was in reality part of a much more ambitious geopolitical agenda hatched within President Franklin D. Roosevelt's Treasury and aimed at eliminating Britain as an economic and political rival. At the heart of the drama were the antipodal characters of John Maynard Keynes, the renowned and revolutionary British economist, and Harry Dexter White, the dogged, self-made American technocrat. Bringing to bear new and striking archival evidence, Steil offers the most compelling portrait yet of the complex and controversial figure of White--the architect of the dollar's privileged place in the Bretton Woods monetary system, who also, very privately, admired Soviet economic planning and engaged in clandestine communications with Soviet intelligence officials and agents over many years. A remarkably deft work of storytelling that reveals how the blueprint for the postwar economic order was actually drawn,The Battle of Bretton Woodsis destined to become a classic of economic and political history.

In Locke’s philosophy money is ‘naturalised’ and thus ostensibly removed from political contestation. Locke has been criticised for marginalising monetary politics, and thus downplaying the conventional character of money that could potentially allow for democratic monetary reform. Drawing on Marx’s writings, this paper shows that money is indeed a social convention, but its inherent economic functioning restricts its susceptibility to political contestation. There are limits to the democratic reform of money in a capitalist economy that spring from money’s own nature. Specifically, the politics of money is rooted in the tension between money as measure of value and money as unit of account. The state draws political power from setting the unit of account, but the measurement of value occurs spontaneously among commodity producers, thereby generating tension that curbs monetary politics. In contemporary conditions, this is typified by central banks having the freedom to manage the unit of account but subject to heavy economic constraints rooted in value measurement. In this light, democratic monetary reform requires restricting the spontaneous measurement of value, thus intervening at the heart of the capitalist economy. For money to be democratic it needs to have a much narrower range of economic functioning.

Following its revival in the 1980s, the idea of endogenous money became increasingly widely accepted. Indeed the 2008 global financial crisis was widely blamed on the untrammelled power of banks to create credit. As a result, among the ideas for reforming the monetary system are proposals designed to eliminate that power, that is, to make the money supply exogenous. The purpose of this paper is to go back to the theory of endogenous money in order to assess these proposals, in terms of what is desirable, but also crucially what is feasible. Central to this discussion is a consideration of the range of meanings given to money and endogeneity. It is argued that what is regarded as money under different conditions is an important element in money endogeneity, and is particularly relevant for the monetary reform debate.

This paper advances five linked and controversial propositions that have both deep historical roots and urgent contemporary relevance. These are: (a) the rebound effects from energy efficiency improvements are significant and limit the potential for decoupling energy consumption from economic growth; (b) the contribution of energy to productivity improvements and economic growth has been greatly underestimated; (c) the pursuit of improved efficiency needs to be complemented by an ethic of sufficiency; (d) sustainability is incompatible with continued economic growth in rich countries; and (e) a zero-growth economy is incompatible with a fractional reserve banking system. These propositions run counter to conventional wisdom and each highlights either a \"blind spot\" or \"taboo subject\" that deserves closer scrutiny. While accepting one proposition reinforces the case for accepting the next, the former is neither necessary nor sufficient for the latter.

The Boxer uprising in China (1900) killed quite a number of foreigners and missionaries, which induced the armies of eight Western powers to invade China and they imposed an indemnity of 400 million silver taels. The international silver price around the 1900s was slumping, and these indemnity-treaty powers (e.g. France, UK, Germany, and Belgium) strongly wished China to establish a silver monetary system that would be maintained at parity with gold. Professor Jeremiah Jenks (1856-1929) of Cornell University was mandated to establish a gold-exchange standard for China. This paper begins with Jenks's life and work and the background of his mission to China. Section 2 presents the basic principle of this reform project and its specific designs. Section 3 assesses reactions and criticisms on Jenks's proposal.Possible arbitrage activities between gold and silver are analyzed in Sections 4 in order to evaluate the sustainability of Jenks's system. We conclude that: (1) Jenks's new system might have been stable in 1904-16 and 1928-30; (2) technically speaking, this was a remarkable design.

The economic crisis that broke out in 2007–2008 and the ongoing crisis in the Eurozone has given a new urgency to discussions about alternatives to capitalism, and a new salience to proposals for monetary reform and for grassroots economic alternatives. Using Marx and Engel's concept of Utopianism as an analytical tool to distinguish between what is the work of 'cranks', and what of 'brave heretics', the paper examines four monetary responses to the crisis: (1) Positive Money's call for a state monopoly on money issuance; (2) the reintroduction of national currencies, in particular the drachma; (3) proposals for state-issued parallel currencies; and (4) grassroots or subaltern money networks of various types. The paper argues that the dominance of neoliberal ideology at a European Union level means that proposals for monetary reform at the international and national level are unlikely to be taken seriously by elites and consequently seem Utopian in Marxian terms. There seems to be litde political will to engage with the complexities of and potential opportunities of a more diverse monetary architecture within the Eurozone, and a perceived need to 'discipline' potentially 'irresponsible' governments like Greece's SYRIZA, although 'responsible' actors in the north of the Eurozone get more leeway. The potential of grassroots alternatives is also too often overstated. While alternative currency networks developed as part of the Greek crisis are not particularly well developed, alternative currency networks could work as sites of innovation, normalising the idea that there are progressive alternatives to Eurozone breakup.

Proposals to reform money and banking in the wake of the recent crisis appeal to populist politics on the left and the right: if banks caused the crisis, then their power must be curtailed to prevent a recurrence. Many of these proposals echo ideas which gained attention in the wake of the Great Depression. The purpose of this paper is to consider proposals for reform of money and banking current in Canada in the 1930s, in particular plans for social credit and for social reconstruction, some of which were translated into policy. While both sets of ideas involved a markedly increased role for the state in money and banking, the underlying ontology, political philosophy and theoretical rationale were rather different. The result was different views as to the nature of the problem and the feasibility of different policy solutions.