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19,016 result(s) for "Skepticism"
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Sceptical paths : enquiry and doubt from antiquity to the present
Sceptical Paths offers a fresh look at key junctions in the history of scepticism. Throughout this collection, key figures are reinterpreted, key arguments are reassessed, lesser-known figures are reintroduced, accepted distinctions are challenged, and new ideas are explored. The historiography of scepticism is usually based on a distinction between ancient and modern. The former is understood as a way of life which focuses on enquiry, whereas the latter is taken to be an epistemological approach which focuses on doubt. The studies in Sceptical Paths not only deepen the understanding of these approaches, but also show how ancient sceptical ideas find their way into modern thought, and modern sceptical ideas are anticipated in ancient thought. Within this state of affairs, the presence of sceptical arguments within Medieval philosophy is reflected in full force, not only enriching the historical narrative, but also introducing another layer to the sceptical discourse, namely its employment within theological settings. The various studies in this book exhibit the rich variety of expression in which scepticism manifests itself within various context and set against various philosophical and religious doctrines, schools, and approaches.
Moore on Scepticism and Certainty
In this paper, I would like to present G.E. Moore’s view on Scepticism and certainty with reference to his papers “Defence of common sense” “Proof of an external world” and “Certainty”. In section I following Moore’s “Proof of an External World” the distinction between empirical objects like paper, human hand, shoes and socks and private objects like images in dreams, double images, after images, and toothache have been highlighted. It has been pointed out that according to Moore, no example of private objects in place of “these are my two hands” could have successfully refuted scepticism; and that Moore does follow Kant’s definition of external objects in order to prove the existence of the external world. The second section emphasizes two points; i) the example of these are my two hands is not a frivolous activity and ii) Moore does recognize the point of Descartes’ dream argument at least to the extent that de does recognize that knowing that P is different from Proving that P. In section III Moore’s attribution of certainty to empirical propositions has been highlighted by responding to the remarks made by Wittgenstein and Malcolm against Moore. In Section IV following Moore’s certainty, a logical explanation of Moore’s thesis that contingent propositions can be certain has been carried out. In addition to that an explanation of how Moore has weakened the dream argument by finding it incoherent. Finally, it has been concluded that Moore’s refutation of scepticism is quite successful in so far as scepticism has no place in common sense.
The
Recent years have not only seen growing public distrust in science, but also in the people conducting science. Yet, attitudes toward scientists remain largely unexplored, and the limited body of literature that exists points to an interesting ambivalence. While survey data suggest scientists to be positively evaluated (e.g., respected and trusted), research has found scientists to be perceived as capable of immoral behavior. We report two experiments aimed at identifying what contributes to this ambivalence through systematic investigations of stereotypical perceptions of scientists. In these studies, we particularly focus on two potential sources of inconsistencies in previous work: divergent operationalizations of morality (measurement effects), and different specifications of the broad group of scientists (framing effects). Results show that scientists are generally perceived as more likely to violate binding as opposed to individualizing moral foundations, and that they deviate from control groups more strongly on the latter. The extent to which different morality measures reflect the differentiation between binding and individualizing moral foundations at least partially accounts for previous contradictory findings. Moreover, the results indicate large variation in perceptions of different types of scientists: people hold more positive attitudes toward university-affiliated scientists as compared to industry-affiliated scientists, with perceptions of the 'typical scientist' more closely resembling the latter. Taken together, the findings have important academic ramifications for science skepticism, morality, and stereotyping research as well as valuable practical implications for successful science communication.
Senses of Scepticism in Nietzsche's Middle Writings : How He Becomes a Sceptic
This thesis explores the multiple senses of scepticism in Nietzsche's middle writings, arguing that starting from Human, All Too Human Nietzsche becomes a sceptic, albeit of an idiosyncratic kind, for he consistently defines the task of his developing philosophical projects in alliance with various sceptical practices, which he selects, appropriates, and transforms from both ancient and modern traditions for his philosophical ends. There are two major failings in the secondary literature on Nietzsche and scepticism. First, commentators have largely neglected the importance that scepticism assumes in Nietzsche's middle writings. Second, they have frequently overlooked the plurality of senses or forms that scepticism takes in these writings, as well as their roles in Nietzsche's philosophical projects. In contrast, this thesis is intended to show how and why Nietzsche becomes a sceptic in the turn from his early writings to Human, All Too Human; to appreciate the multiple senses of scepticism and of sceptical practice, especially in his middle writings; and to illuminate the essential roles that various forms of scepticism play in his middle philosophy. First and foremost, then, this work is an attempt to make sense of Nietzsche as a sceptic and of his multifarious sceptical practice. Its main contention is that appreciating the senses of scepticism in Nietzsche's writings is of key importance for an understanding of Nietzsche's identity - or identities - as a philosopher.