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"global financial governance"
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At the frontiers of digitization and the financialization of risk: The global politics of InsurTech
Digital innovations in insurance, ‘InsurTech’, bring together two transformational forces in our contemporary world – risk and digitization. InsurTech has been celebrated and criticized. A literature on the social studies of insurance provides valuable and more nuanced insights into the social, cultural, and technological properties of InsurTech but it tends to analyze these at the firm level. This article brings together themes from assemblage and international political economy theories to integrate analysis of the structure of the global industry and the role of cross-border regulatory arrangements with the firm-level insights of the social studies of insurance literature. The article examines differentiation in the industry structure between stages of the insurance value chain, between incumbent and start-up insurers and Big Tech, and across jurisdictions and regions. It also examines the most globally significant regulatory responses to InsurTech: from the International Association of Insurance Supervisors, the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority, the China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission, and the US National Association of Insurance Commissioners. It shows that the nuance and ethical content that is evident at the firm level in the social studies of insurance literature is interacting with similar nuance and ethical content in global regulatory arrangements.
Journal Article
What happened to Goldman Sachs? : an insider's story of organizational drift and its unintended consequences
\"A banker, investor, and Columbia Business School professor offers an insider's take on what happened to Goldman Sachs, informed by his own experience, interviews with others who worked at or with the firm, and previously unreleased research\"-- Provided by publisher.
Book
Noncompliant : a lone whistleblower exposes the giants of Wall Street
\"In 2011, Carmen Segarra took a job as at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York supervising for Goldman Sachs. It was an opportunity, she believed, to monitor the big bank's behavior in order to avoid another financial crisis. Segarra was shocked to discover, however, the full extent of the relationship between Goldman and the Fed. She began making secret recordings that later became the basis of a This American Life episode that exposed the Fed's ineffectiveness in holding banks accountable. In Noncompliant, Segarra chronicles her experience blowing open the doors on the relationship between the big banks and the government bodies set up to regulate them. As we mark the tenth anniversary of the 2008 financial crisis, Noncompliant shows us how little has changed, and offers an urgent call for real reforms\"--Amazon.com.
Book
Limits to the BRICS' challenge: credit rating reform and institutional innovation in global finance
Although many scholars have analyzed the BRICS' creation of the New Development Bank (NDB) and the Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA), less attention has been paid to other - less successful - BRICS efforts to challenge the dominant global financial order through institutional innovation. This paper examines the case of BRICS' discussions to create their own credit rating agency (CrRA) which began in 2012 around the same time as the initiatives to establish the NDB and CRA. These discussions have been driven by discontent with US-based CrRAs which act as key authorities in global finance, but BRICS institutional innovation has been slower to emerge than in the NDB and CRA cases because the BRICS have shared less of a common social purpose on this issue. Even if a BRICS CrRA was created, this institution would be very unlikely to challenge the dominant order any time soon because of the enduring structural power of US and its CrRAs in this sector. The case shows how a wider case selection than the NDB and CRA reveals that the BRICS' capacity to transform the global financial order through collective institutional innovation is dependent on specific conditions: the strength of their common social purpose and the degree of the structural power of established authorities.
Journal Article
Innovation and deadlock in global financial governance: transatlantic coordination failure in OTC derivatives regulation
The institutional arrangement chosen by the leading nations in order to address financial regulatory reform in the wake of the 2007-2009 crisis exhibits two key features of global economic governance innovation. First, it employs a minilateral approach, restricting the participants that negotiate new regulatory standards to a few, highly involved stakeholders. Second, it relies heavily on government networks that operate on the basis of soft law. The arrangement circumvents the traditional intergovernmental model that has proven overly rigid and ineffective in addressing the problems that arise from highly interconnected and fast-changing global markets. Current theories of global economic governance predict that this twofold innovation enhances the effectiveness of financial regulatory reform. Yet a study of the evolution in over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives regulation shows that this is not the case. The paper then exposes three obstacles to cross-border regulatory cooperation between the two dominant players, the European Union and the United States. Authorities on both sides of the Atlantic are concerned about the distributive consequences of regulation, legislators and legislation hinder cross-border harmonization, and government networks are weak and incomplete. The paper concludes with suggestions of how to overcome coordination failure and theoretical implications for the political economy of networked governance.
Journal Article
The Politics of Regulatory Design in the Sovereign Debt Restructuring Regime
Abstract
This article looks at two recent initiatives aimed at improving sovereign debt restructuring processes and asks why one initiative succeeded while the other failed. It argues that the success or failure of a reform initiative in the debt restructuring regime depends primarily on the legal-institutional design of the mechanism it is advancing. Hard law mechanisms face enormous political obstacles that make their realization unlikely. Several of these obstacles have been identified by previous studies, but this article highlights additional barriers. It also shows that, in contrast to hard law arrangements, private law contracts provide politically useful mechanisms for regulating debt restructuring, especially for powerful states with major influence over reform outcomes-namely, the United States. The article also argues that the historical legacy of earlier reform initiatives matters, but mainly through its ability to further enhance or diminish the political prospects of mechanisms whose utility has already been determined by their design features.
Journal Article
The Institute of International Finance: From Poacher to Gamekeeper?
The Institute of International Finance (IIF) is a key actor in global finance, mixing private-interest representation and market governance roles. Analyzing the historical development of the IIF offers important insights into the interaction between state and business and the resulting patterns of public and private governance. Based on archive sources and a unique set of interviews with elite policymakers spanning three decades, I argue that market structures, interest groups, and public policymaking processes stand in a recursive relationship. Secondly, I argue that interest groups take on private governance roles with the aim to remain the focal point of public policymakers vis-à-vis competing interest groups. This has important implications for the study of interest groups and global financial governance. The analysis of interest groups should be extended to the way they shape markets through private governance mechanisms and how that recursively feeds back into interest group advocacy and public policymaking processes to fully grasp lobbying dynamics. The study of global governance should include analysis of interest group competition within the opportunities and constraints emanating from public policymaking processes so as to understand the emergence of private patterns of governance and their interaction with public governance mechanisms.
Journal Article