Asset Details
Do you wish to reserve the book?
Principal-principal-agency relationships and the role of external governance
Hey, we have placed the reservation for you!
By the way, why not check out events that you can attend while you pick your title.
Oops! Something went wrong.
Looks like we were not able to place the reservation. Kindly try again later.
Are you sure you want to remove the book from the shelf?
Principal-principal-agency relationships and the role of external governance
Do you wish to request the book?
Principal-principal-agency relationships and the role of external governance
Please be aware that the book you have requested cannot be checked out. If you would like to checkout this book, you can reserve another copy
We have requested the book for you!
Your request is successful and it will be processed during the Library working hours. Please check the status of your request in My Requests.
Oops! Something went wrong.
Looks like we were not able to place your request. Kindly try again later.
Journal Article
Principal-principal-agency relationships and the role of external governance
2010
Overview
This paper explores agency problems associated with mutual and joint stock organizational forms. It examines whether the independent mode of distribution acts as a governance factor that reduces principal-agent and principal-principal costs. By analyzing a 1990-1997 panel of life insurance companies this paper provides evidence that mutuals have higher principal-agent costs, but lower principal-principal costs, compared with stocks. Independent distribution mitigates both agency problems by reducing managerial expenses while safeguarding interests of policy holders. These relationships are positively moderated by product complexity and free cash flow. This is consistent with the assumption that companies that use independent agents exhibit lower levels of manager and shareholder opportunism. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
