Journal Article

Grounding evaluative concepts

Fingerhut, Joerg, Prinz, Jesse J.

2018

Overview

Evaluative concepts qualify as abstract because they seem to go beyond what is given in experience. This is especially clear in the case of moral concepts. Justice, for example, has no fixed appearance. Less obviously, aesthetic concepts may also qualify as abstract. The very same sensory input can be regarded as beautiful by one person and ugly by another. Artistic success can also transcend sensory accessible features. Here, we focus on moral badness and aesthetic goodness and argue that both can be grounded in emotional responses. Emotions, in turn, are grounded in bodily perceptions, which correspond to action tendencies. When we conceptualize something as good or bad (whether in the moral or aesthetic domain), we experience our bodily responses to that thing. The moral and aesthetic domains are distinguished by the emotions that they involve. This article is part of the theme issue 'Varieties of abstract concepts: development, use and representation in the brain'.

• Publisher: Royal Society