Asset Details
MbrlCatalogueTitleDetail
Do you wish to reserve the book?
A theory of financing constraints and firm dynamics
by
Hopenhayn, Hugo A
, Clementi, Gian Luca
in
Access to credit
/ Asymmetric information
/ Business economics
/ Capital formation
/ Economic dynamics
/ Economic models
/ Economic performance
/ Firm theory
/ Growth rates
2006
Hey, we have placed the reservation for you!
By the way, why not check out events that you can attend while you pick your title.
You are currently in the queue to collect this book. You will be notified once it is your turn to collect the book.
Oops! Something went wrong.
Looks like we were not able to place the reservation. Kindly try again later.
Are you sure you want to remove the book from the shelf?
Oops! Something went wrong.
While trying to remove the title from your shelf something went wrong :( Kindly try again later!
Do you wish to request the book?
A theory of financing constraints and firm dynamics
by
Hopenhayn, Hugo A
, Clementi, Gian Luca
in
Access to credit
/ Asymmetric information
/ Business economics
/ Capital formation
/ Economic dynamics
/ Economic models
/ Economic performance
/ Firm theory
/ Growth rates
2006
Please be aware that the book you have requested cannot be checked out. If you would like to checkout this book, you can reserve another copy
We have requested the book for you!
Your request is successful and it will be processed during the Library working hours. Please check the status of your request in My Requests.
Oops! Something went wrong.
Looks like we were not able to place your request. Kindly try again later.
Journal Article
A theory of financing constraints and firm dynamics
2006
Request Book From Autostore
and Choose the Collection Method
Overview
There is widespread evidence supporting the conjecture that borrowing constraints have important implications for firm growth and survival. In this paper we model a multiperiod borrowing/lending relationship with asymmetric information. We show that borrowing constraints emerge as a feature of the optimal long-term lending contract, and that such constraints relax as the value of the borrower's claim to future cash flows increases. We also show that the optimal contract has interesting implications for firm dynamics. In agreement with the empirical evidence, as age and size increase, mean and variance of growth decrease, and firm survival increases. Reprinted by permission of the MIT Press
This website uses cookies to ensure you get the best experience on our website.