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230,223 نتائج ل "Antitrust"
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Antitrust Law
This book is an effort to consolidate several different perspectives on antitrust law. First, Professor Hylton presents a detailed description of the law as it has developed through numerous judicial opinions. Second, the author presents detailed economic critiques of the judicial opinions, drawing heavily on the literature in law and economics journals. Third, Professor Hylton integrates a jurisprudential perspective into the analysis that looks at antitrust as a vibrant field of common law. This last perspective leads the author to address issues of certainty, stability, and predictability in antitrust law, and to examine the pressures shaping its evolution. The combination of these three perspectives offers something new to every student of antitrust law. Specific topics covered include perfect competition versus monopoly, enforcement, cartels, section 1 doctrine, rule of reason, agreement, boycott, power, vertical restraints, tying and exclusive dealing, horizontal mergers, and conglomerates.
The Regulation of Transnational Mergers in International and European Law
The major problem associated with the regulation of transnational mergers, which affect several national markets, is the allocation of jurisdiction. Each country concerned may wish to exert jurisdiction and apply its national competition law to regulate the anti-competitive effects a merger may have in its territory. However, this approach may lead to risks of inconsistent decisions regarding the legality of mergers. Indeed, the national competition laws applied by the regulating authorities may diverge in several aspects, which raise the likelihood of inconsistency. Therefore it is desirable to opt for regulatory approaches which are more sensitive to the transnational nature of mergers and which allow cooperation between competition authorities. A possible solution may be bilateral cooperation agreements through which two countries coordinate the enforcement activities of their national competition authorities. However, the benefits of these agreements are enjoyed only by the signatory parties. The sole reliance upon bilateral agreements does not appear to be the optimal regulatory approach towards transnational mergers.
Competition law and economic regulation : making and managing markets
\"Niamh Dunne undertakes a systematic exploration of the relationship between competition law and economic regulation as legal mechanisms of market control. Beginning from a theoretical assessment of these legal instruments as discrete mechanisms, the author goes on to address numerous facets of the substantive interrelationship between competition law and economic regulation. She considers, amongst other aspects, the concept of regulatory competition law; deregulation, liberalisation and 'regulation for competition'; the concurrent application of competition law in regulated markets; and relevant institutional aspects including market study procedures, the distribution of enforcement powers between competition agencies and sector regulators, and certain legal powers that demonstrate a 'hybridised' quality lying between competition law and economic regulation. Throughout her assessment, Dunne identifies and explores recurrent considerations that inform and shape the optimal relationship between these legal mechanisms within any jurisdiction\"-- Provided by publisher.
Antitrust Enforcement Against Platform MFNs
Antitrust enforcement against anticompetitive platform most favored nations (MFN) provisions (also termed pricing parity provisions) can help protect competition in online markets. An online platform imposes a platform MFN when it requires that providers using its platform not offer their products or services at a lower price on other platforms. These contractual provisions may be employed by a variety of online platforms offering, for example, hotel and transportation bookings, consumer goods, digital goods, or handmade craft products. They have been the subject of antitrust enforcement in Europe but have drawn only limited antitrust scrutiny in the United States. Our Feature explains why MFNs employed by online platforms can harm competition by keeping prices high and discouraging the entry of new platform rivals, through both exclusionary and collusive mechanisms, notwithstanding the possibility that some MFNs may facilitate investment by limiting customer freeriding. We discuss ways by which government enforcers in the United States and private plaintiffs could potentially reach anticompetitive platform MFNs under the Sherman Act, and the litigation challenges such cases present.
Research handbook on the economics of antitrust law
One might mistakenly think that the long tradition of economic analysis in antitrust law would mean there is little new to say. Yet the field is surprisingly dynamic and changing. The specially commissioned chapters in this volume offer a rigorous analysis of the field's most current and contentious issues.
Multisided Platforms and Antitrust Enforcement
Multisided platforms are ubiquitous in today's economy. Although newspapers demonstrate that the platform business model is scarcely new, recent economic analysis has explored more deeply the manner of its operation. Drawing upon these insights, we conclude that enforcers and courts should use a multiple-markets approach in which different groups of users on different sides of a platform belong in different product markets. This approach appropriately accounts for cross-market network effects without collapsing all of a platform's users into a single product market. Furthermore, we advocate the use of a separate-effects analysis, which rejects the view that anticompetitive conduct harming users on one side of a platform can be justified so long as that harm funds benefits for users on another side. Courts should consider the price structure of a platform, and not simply the net price, in assessing competitive effects. This approach in turn supports our final conclusion: that antitrust plaintiffs should not be required to prove as part of their prima facie case more than occurrence of competitive harm in a properly-defined market; thereafter, the burden to produce procompetitive justifications should shift to defendants.
The curse of bigness : antitrust in the new gilded age
\"From the man who coined the term 'net neutrality,' ... comes a warning about the dangers of excessive corporate and industrial concentration for our economic and political future\"--Provided by publisher.
Greening EU Competition Law and Policy
One of the fundamental challenges currently facing the EU is that of reconciling its economic and environmental policies. Nevertheless, the role of environmental protection in EU competition law and policy has often been overlooked. Recent years have witnessed a shift in environmental regulation from reliance on command and control to an increased use of market-based environmental policy instruments such as environmental taxes, green subsidies, emissions trading and the encouragement of voluntary corporate green initiatives. By bringing the market into environmental policy, such instruments raise a host of issues that competition law must address. This interdisciplinary treatment of the interaction between these key EU policy areas challenges the view that EU competition policy is a special case, insulated from environmental concerns by the overriding efficiency imperative, and puts forward practical proposals for achieving genuine integration.