استكشف المجموعة الواسعة من العناوين المتاحة.

La réglementation comptable relative aux fusions et opérations assimilées instaurée en 2004, pour les comptes sociaux, cherchait une cohérence avec les valeurs retenues en consolidation en adoptant le principe de revalorisation des actifs et passifs apportés uniquement si des valeurs réelles étaient également constatées dans les comptes consolidés, c’est-à-dire uniquement en cas d’entrée dans le groupe. Pour assurer cette cohérence, il a donc été nécessaire d’introduire, dans les comptes sociaux, la notion de contrôle définie en consolidation. C’est ainsi que cette notion a pris toute son importance dans les règles édictées par le Plan Comptable Général (PCG) sur ces opérations.

In this study I examine how the degree and duration of overvaluation affect management's use of alternative within-GAAP earnings management, restrictions on further exploitation of within-GAAP accruals management, and subsequent non-GAAP earnings management. Further, I examine how one type of earnings management segues into another type as overvaluation persists. I present evidence that the longer the firm is overvalued, the greater is the amount of total earnings management. I also find that managers engage in accruals management in the early stages of overvaluation before moving to real transactions management, in order to sustain their overvalued equity. Finally, I find that the longer a firm is overvalued, the more likely it is to engage in one of the most egregious forms of earnings management, non-GAAP earnings management. Collectively, the results suggest that the duration of firm overvaluation is an important determinant of managements' choice of alternative earnings management mechanisms.

This study examines the role of the external audit in management's decision about the amount of GAAP financial statement information to disclose in the annual earnings announcement. The earnings announcement is a key disclosure provided by public companies. Yet, there is no requirement that earnings announcements contain audited GAAP numbers; in fact, recent trends indicate that a majority of companies release earnings before the completion of year-end audit fieldwork. I predict and find that companies that wait until the audit is more complete at the earnings announcement date and receive higher quality audits provide more detailed balance sheet, cash flow statement, and overall GAAP disclosures. I also provide evidence that complete audits and higher quality audits impact the information content of the earnings announcement. The combined results indicate that audit completeness and quality help facilitate more detailed earnings announcement disclosures and have implications for the equity market.