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Highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) viruses of the A/Goose/Guangdong/1/1996 lineage (GsGd), which threaten the health of poultry, wildlife and humans, are spreading across Asia, Europe, Africa and North America but are currently absent from South America and Oceania. In December 2021, H5N1 HPAI viruses were detected in poultry and a free-living gull in St. John’s, Newfoundland and Labrador, Canada. Our phylogenetic analysis showed that these viruses were most closely related to HPAI GsGd viruses circulating in northwestern Europe in spring 2021. Our analysis of wild bird migration suggested that these viruses may have been carried across the Atlantic via Iceland, Greenland/Arctic or pelagic routes. The here documented incursion of HPAI GsGd viruses into North America raises concern for further virus spread across the Americas by wild bird migration.

Passive surveillance for lyssaviruses in UK bats has been ongoing since 1987 and has identified 13 cases of EBLV-2 from a single species; Myotis daubentonii. No other lyssavirus species has been detected. Between 2005 and 2015, 10 656 bats were submitted, representing 18 species, creating a spatially and temporally uneven sample of British bat fauna. Uniquely, three UK cases originate from a roost at Stokesay Castle in Shropshire, England, where daily checks for grounded and dead bats are undertaken and bat carcasses have been submitted for testing since 2007. Twenty per cent of Daubenton's bats submitted from Stokesay Castle since surveillance began, have tested positive for EBLV-2. Phylogenetic analysis reveals geographical clustering of UK viruses. Isolates from Stokesay Castle are more closely related to one another than to viruses from other regions. Daubenton's bats from Stokesay Castle represent a unique opportunity to study a natural population that appears to maintain EBLV-2 infection and may represent endemic infection at this site. Although the risk to public health from EBLV-2 is low, consequences of infection are severe and effective communication on the need for prompt post-exposure prophylaxis for anyone that has been bitten by a bat is essential.

ABSTRACT A brain homogenate derived from a rabid dog in the district of Tojikobod, Republic of Tajikistan, was applied to a Flinders Technology Associates (FTA) card. A full-genome sequence of rabies virus (RABV) was generated from the FTA card directly without extraction, demonstrating the utility of these cards for readily obtaining genetic data.

In addition to the 12 cases above detected via passive surveillance (dead bats), EBLV-2 RNA was detected in the saliva of a healthy Daubenton's bat in Scotland as part of an active surveillance programme ( McElhinney and others 2013 ). [...]EBLV-2 has persisted in the UK Daubenton's bat population for at least two decades and presents a low but real risk of a fatal zoonotic disease to people.

Several Bunyavirales families have been listed as being of high pandemic or epidemic risk by the WHO R&D Blueprint. To support pandemic preparedness and the 100 Days Mission, along with rapid provision of vaccines and therapeutics, the development of tools to assess the immune response is required. Pseudotyped viruses (PV) have been shown to be a suitable alternative to authentic infectious virus to measure virus-neutralising activity, a key component of the immune response. They alleviate the need to acquire and amplify viral isolates and do not require high containment facilities. Generating PV of some families within the class Bunyaviricetes is challenging because of a lack of co-localisation of viral glycoproteins at the vector budding site. Here, we describe a versatile plug-and-play system focusing on two prototype viruses for the family Phenuiviridae , Rift Valley fever virus (RVFV) and for the family Nairoviridae , Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever virus (CCHFV). Shared key parameters for the production of RVFV and CCHFV PV were identified and optimised on a single-cycle, recombinant vesicular stomatitis virus vector (VSV), which allowed for the successful and rapid production of PV for Dabie bandavirus and Oropouche virus. We propose that this system could be successfully applied to other high-consequence bunyaviruses, including those yet unknown, which may emerge in the future. Assessment of the novel bunyavirus PV generated here demonstrated a good correlation with traditional neutralisation assays with infectious virus. This system offers an adaptable and widely accessible platform that can be rapidly developed in response to emerging viral threats.

Rabies is one of the most deadly infectious diseases, with a case-fatality rate approaching 100%. The disease is established on all continents apart from Antarctica; most cases are reported in Africa and Asia, with thousands of deaths recorded annually. However, the estimated annual figure of almost 60 000 human rabies fatalities is probably an underestimate. Almost all cases of human rabies result from bites from infected dogs. Therefore, the most cost-effective approach to elimination of the global burden of human rabies is to control canine rabies rather than expansion of the availability of human prophylaxis. Mass vaccination campaigns with parenteral vaccines, and advances in oral vaccines for wildlife, have allowed the elimination of rabies in terrestrial carnivores in several countries worldwide. The subsequent reduction in cases of human rabies in such regions advocates the multidisciplinary One Health approach to rabies control through the mass vaccination of dogs and control of canine populations.

Until recent events, the Antarctic was the only major geographical region in which high pathogenicity avian influenza virus (HPAIV) had never previously been detected. Here we report on the detection of clade 2.3.4.4b H5N1 HPAIV in the Antarctic and sub-Antarctic regions of South Georgia and the Falkland Islands, respectively. We initially detected H5N1 HPAIV in samples collected from brown skuas at Bird Island, South Georgia on 8th October 2023. Since this detection, mortalities were observed in several avian and mammalian species at multiple sites across South Georgia. Subsequent testing confirmed H5N1 HPAIV across several sampling locations in multiple avian species and two seal species. Simultaneously, we also confirmed H5N1 HPAIV in southern fulmar and black-browed albatross in the Falkland Islands. Genetic assessment of the virus indicates spread from South America, likely through movement of migratory birds. Critically, genetic assessment of sequences from mammalian species demonstrates no increased risk to human populations above that observed in other instances of mammalian infections globally. Here we describe the detection, species impact and genetic composition of the virus and propose both introductory routes and potential long-term impact on avian and mammalian species across the Antarctic region. We also speculate on the threat to specific populations following recent reports in the area. High pathogenicity avian influenza virus has a wide host range and has been detected across a large geographic area. Here, the authors present evidence of spread to the Antarctic and sub-Antarctic regions, with signs of clinical infection and positive virus detection in birds and elephant seals.

Peste-des-petits ruminants virus (PPRV) is a viral pathogen that causes a devastating plague of small ruminants. PPRV is an economically significant disease that continues to be a major obstacle to the development of sustainable agriculture across the developing world. The current understanding of PPRV pathogenesis has been heavily assumed from the closely related rinderpest virus (RPV) and other morbillivirus infections alongside data derived from field outbreaks. There have been few studies reported that have focused on the pathogenesis of PPRV and very little is known about the processes underlying the early stages of infection. In the present study, 15 goats were challenged by the intranasal route with a virulent PPRV isolate, Côte d'Ivoire '89 (CI/89) and sacrificed at strategically defined time-points post infection to enable pre- and post-mortem sampling. This approach enabled precise monitoring of the progress and distribution of virus throughout the infection from the time of challenge, through peak viraemia and into a period of convalescence. Observations were then related to findings of previous field studies and experimental models of PPRV to develop a clinical scoring system for PPRV. Importantly, histopathological investigations demonstrated that the initial site for virus replication is not within the epithelial cells of the respiratory mucosa, as has been previously reported, but is within the tonsillar tissue and lymph nodes draining the site of inoculation. We propose that virus is taken up by immune cells within the respiratory mucosa which then transport virus to lymphoid tissues where primary virus replication occurs, and from where virus enters circulation. Based on these findings we propose a novel clinical scoring methodology for PPRV pathogenesis and suggest a fundamental shift away from the conventional model of PPRV pathogenesis.

Since October 2021, Europe has experienced the largest avian influenza virus (AIV) epizootic, caused by clade 2.3.4.4b H5N1 high pathogenicity AIV (HPAIV), with over 284 poultry infected premises (IPs) and 2480 dead H5N1-positive wild birds detected in Great Britain alone. Many IPs have presented as geographical clusters, raising questions about the lateral spread between premises by airborne particles. Airborne transmission over short distances has been observed for some AIV strains. However, the risk of airborne spread of this strain remains to be elucidated. We conducted extensive sampling from IPs where clade 2.3.4.4b H5N1 HPAIVs were confirmed during the 2022/23 epizootic, each representing a major poultry species (ducks, turkeys, and chickens). A range of environmental samples were collected inside and outside houses, including deposited dust, feathers, and other potential fomites. Viral RNA (vRNA) and infectious viruses were detected in air samples collected from inside and outside but in close proximity to infected houses, with vRNA alone being detected at greater distances (≤10 m) outside. Some dust samples collected outside of the affected houses contained infectious viruses, while feathers from the affected houses, located up to 80 m away, only contained vRNA. Together, these data suggest that airborne particles harboring infectious HPAIV can be translocated short distances (<10 m) through the air, while macroscopic particles containing vRNA might travel further (≤80 m). Therefore, the potential for airborne transmission of clade 2.3.4.4b H5N1 HPAIV between premises is considered low. Other factors, including indirect contact with wild birds and the efficiency of biosecurity, represent greater importance in disease incursion.