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Research on global programs to regulate labor standards has emphasized interactions between transnational and state regulatory institutions. If transnational initiatives can make state institutions more relevant, they have the potential to reinforce, rather than displace, state labor regulation. Through a study of the Indonesia-based program of a leading initiative to improve working conditions in the garment industry, Better Work, this article identifies the conditions under which transnational regulations reinforce domestic ones. Drawing on two case studies comparing regulations governing fixed-term contracts and minimum wage renegotiations in four Indonesian districts, the authors find that reinforcement is likely when two conditions jointly occur: unions mobilize to activate state institutions, and transnational regulators have support to resolve ambiguities in formal rules in ways that require firms to engage with constraining institutions. The authors further test the findings through a quantitative analysis of factory participation in state-supervised wage renegotiations. The findings reveal opportunities and constraints to designing global programs that can both improve factory-level standards and support the functioning of state labor market institutions.

Collective perceptions of harm and impropriety channel the evolution of capitalism, as shown by research on the moral boundaries of markets. But how are boundaries perceived when harms are distant and observers face competing claims from advocacy organizations and corporations? These conditions are particularly salient in global supply chains, where private voluntary initiatives have been formed to address labor exploitation and environmental degradation. We argue that state intervention is now on the rise and that popular judgments about state intervention carry new insights for the sociology of markets, morality, policy, and globalization. Analyzing data from a conjoint survey experiment, we find that distant labor and environmental problems (e.g., forced labor, natural resource depletion) provoke varied levels of interest in state intervention as well as different justifications for state intervention. We also find an asymmetry of influence by strategic actors: transnational advocacy frames shape judgments to some degree, but they fall flat or backfire among conservatives. Corporate promises of reform reduce the perceived importance of state intervention—across political-ideological divides and regardless of credibility. Moving beyond stylized pro-/anti-trade attitudes, these findings reveal implicit logics of a contested moral field and the legitimacy of state intervention at a formative moment.

Do purchasing practices support or undermine the regulation of labor standards in global supply chains? This study offers the first analysis of the full range of supply chain regulatory efforts, integrating records of factory labor audits with purchase order microdata. Studying an apparel and equipment retailer with a strong reputation for addressing labor conditions in its suppliers, the authors show that the retailer persuaded factories to improve and terminated factories with poor labor compliance. However, the authors also find that purchase orders did not increase when labor standards improved. If anything, factories whose standards worsened tended to see their orders increase. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, this “missing middle” in incentives for compliance appears unrelated to any cost advantage of noncompliant factories. Instead, lack of flexibility in supplier relationships created obstacles to reallocating orders in response to compliance findings.

Public pressure is essential for providing multinational enterprises (MNEs) with motivation to follow the standards of human rights conduct set in soft-law instruments, such as the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. But how does the public judge MNE involvement in human rights violations? We empirically answer this question drawing on an original survey of American adults. We asked respondents to judge over 12,000 randomly generated scenarios in which MNEs may be considered to have been involved in human rights violations. Our findings reveal substantial gaps between public judgments and the standards set in soft law and the normative literature. We identify the attributes of episodes of human rights violations involving MNEs that influence public judgments, including the relationship between the MNE and the perpetrator, the practice of due diligence, and the type of abuse. These results provide insights as to when we might expect public pressure to drive MNE compliance with soft-law instruments, and they direct attention to specific standards that will likely require stronger, ‘hard’ law approaches or broader efforts to shift the public’s view.

Regulations essential for improving labor standards are often ignored to the detriment of workers. In many countries, the agencies charged with enforcement lack resources and are subject to political interference. How can inspectors in flawed bureaucracies overcome these barriers and enforce labor regulations? In this article, based on case studies of subnational variation in Argentina, the author develops a theory to explain enforcement in places with weak and politicized labor inspectorates. The framework focuses on two factors: the strength of linkages between bureaucrats and allied civil society organizations, and the level of administrative resources in the bureaucracy. Linkages facilitate routinized resource sharing and the construction of pro-enforcement coalitions, and administrative resources determine whether bureaucrats use societal resources passively or strategically. By identifying pathways to enforcement that are obscured by dominant approaches to studying labor inspection, this research opens up new possibilities for crafting strategies to improve labor standards.

Developing the capacity for states to enforce labor law is a key challenge to regulating decent work. Dominant accounts of state capacity, however, suggest that the principal components of state enforcement capacity are relative stable and, consequently, difficult to reform in the short- term. This article traces the arc of enforcement in the garment industry of Buenos Aires from 2001-2009. In the beginning of the period, there was little reaction from the state to extreme violations of labor law. Then, in 2006, enforcement increased drastically and was sustained for nearly two years. After 2008, however, enforcement levels dropped once again. Why did the state's capacity to respond to widespread violations of labor laws in the garment industry change so dramatically over just a few years? In contrast with arguments that focus primarily in the stable organizational features of the bureaucracy, this article shows that a key, and often overlooked, component of capacity is the ability of labor inspectors to mobilize resources from society for enforcement. Since this ability is contingent on the structure of state-society linkages, it tends to be highly unstable and it shifts as political coalitions change. This finding suggests that developing a better understanding of the formation of state-society linkages can lead to new opportunities for regulators to promote decent work, even in places where inspectorates are highly constrained. Adapted from the source document.

ABSTRACT IN SPANISH: El desarrollo de la capacidad del Estado para hacer cumplir las leyes laborales es clave, si se pretende controlar que el trabajo que realizan los individuos sea decente. No obstante, las descripciones prevalecientes sobre dicha capacidad sugieren que sus principales elementos son estables y difífilmente modificables en el corto plazo. Este artículo recorre la trayectoria de aplicación de las normas laborales en la industria de prendas de vestir en Buenos Aires desde 2001 hasta 2009. En los primeros años el Estado casi no reaccionó frente a las violaciones extremas de dichas normas. Luego, a partir de 2006, la aplicación de las normas se incrementó drásticamente durante casi dos años; pero desde 2008 volvió a menguar. ¿Por qué cambió tan drásticamente, en tan breve lapso, la capacidad del Estado para reaccionar frente a violaciones de las leyes laborales? Este articulo revela que un elemento clave de dicha capacidad es la aptitud de los inspectores laborales para movilizar recursos de la sociedad con vistas a la aplicación de tales normas. Dado que esta aptitud depende de la estructura de los vínculos Estado-sociedad, tiende a ser muy inestable y cambia cuando se modifican las coaliciones políticas. Por lo tanto, una mejor comprensión de los vínculos entre el Estado y la sociedad podría permitir a los entes reguladores promover el trabajo legal aun en lugares donde la acción de los inspectores se ve muy limitada. // ABSTRACT IN ENGLISH: Developing the ability for states to enforce labor law is a key challenge to regulating that the work carried out by individuals is proper. The main accounts of state ability, however, suggest that the principal components of state enforcement ability are relatively stable and, consequently, difficult to reform in the short-term. This article traces the arc of enforcement in Buenos Aires' garment industry from 2001-2009. At the beginning of the period, there was little reaction from the state to extreme breaches of labor law. Then, in 2006, enforcement increased drastically and was sustained for nearly two years. After 2008, however, enforcement levels dropped once again. Why did the state's capacity to respond to widespread breaches of labor laws in the garment industry change so dramatically over just a few years? In contrast with arguments that focus primarily in the stable organizational features of bureaucracy, this article shows that a key, and often overlooked, component of capacity is the ability of labor inspectors to mobilize resources from society for enforcement. Since this ability is contingent on the structure of state-society linkages, it tends to be highly unstable and it shifts as political coalitions change. This finding suggests that developing a better understanding of the formation of state-society linkages can lead to new opportunities for regulators to promote decent work, even in places where inspectorates are highly constrained.

El desarrollo de la capacidad del Estado para hacer cumplir las leyes laborales es clave, si se pretende controlar que el trabajo que realizan los individuos sea decente. No obstante, las descripciones prevalecientes sobre dicha capacidad sugieren que sus principales elementos son estables y difícilmente modificables en el corto plazo. Este artículo recorre la trayectoria de aplicación de las normas laborales en la industria de prendas de vestir en Buenos Aires desde 2001 hasta 2009. En los primeros años el Estado casi no reaccionó frente a las violaciones extremas de dichas normas. Luego, a partir de 2006, la aplicación de las normas se incrementó drásticamente durante casi dos años; pero desde 2008 volvió a menguar. ¿Por qué cambió tan drásticamente, en tan breve lapso, la capacidad del Estado para reaccionar frente a violaciones de las leyes laborales? Este articulo revela que un elemento clave de dicha capacidad es la aptitud de los inspectores laborales para movilizar recursos de la sociedad con vistas a la aplicación de tales normas. Dado que esta aptitud depende de la estructura de los vínculos Estado-sociedad, tiende a ser muy inestable y cambia cuando se modifican las coaliciones políticas. Por lo tanto, una mejor comprensión de los vínculos entre el Estado y la sociedad podría permitir a los entes reguladores promover el trabajo legal aun en lugares donde la acción de los inspectores se ve muy limitada. Developing the capacity for states to enforce labor law is a key challenge to regulating decent work. Dominant accounts of state capacity, however, suggest that the principal components of state enforcement capacity are relative stable and, consequently, difficult to reform in the shortterm. This article traces the arc of enforcement in the garment industry of Buenos Aires from 2001-2009. In the beginning of the period, there was little reaction from the state to extreme violations of labor law. Then, in 2006, enforcement increased drastically and was sustained for nearly two years. After 2008, however, enforcement levels dropped once again. Why did the state's capacity to respond to widespread violations of labor laws in the garment industry change so dramatically over just a few years? In contrast with arguments that focus primarily in the stable organizational features of the bureaucracy, this article shows that a key, and often overlooked, component of capacity is the ability of labor inspectors to mobilize resources from society for enforcement. Since this ability is contingent on the structure of state-society linkages, it tends to be highly unstable and it shifts as political coalitions change. This finding suggests that developing a better understanding of the formation of state-society linkages can lead to new opportunities for regulators to promote decent work, even in places where inspectorates are highly constrained.