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"Acheson, James"
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John Fowles
\"John Fowles (1926-2005) has the distinction of being both a best-selling novelist and one whose work has earned the respect of academic critics. This vibrant collection of original essays sheds new critical light on all of Fowles's writings, with a special focus on The French Lieutenant's Woman as the most widely studied of his works. The stellar cast of contributors offers an outstanding range of expertise on Fowles, providing fresh reassessments and new perspectives on his fiction and non-fiction\"-- Provided by publisher.
Book
Private Land and Common Oceans
In the literature on property rights, there is general consensus framed by people such as Boserup and Demsetz that common property regimes will change to private property regimes when resources are scarce and population increases. This is mostly correct where land tenure is concerned. However, there are many cases where common property regimes continue even though the population has grown and resources have become scarcer. Ocean areas are almost always held as common property. This article analyzes property regimes that develop for land and ocean and the conditions under which they do so. The analysis is based on worldwide ethnographic case studies. I argue that the form property regimes take is determined by economic defendability. Many variables influence economic defendability, ranging from technical change and physical attributes of the resource to government action and cultural factors. That arable land is usually held privately suggests this solution is adaptive for land with high economic defendability. However, the fact that many ocean areas, forests, pastures, and swidden lands are held as common property suggests that this type of tenure may be an optimal solution when the value of resources are low relative to defense costs.
Journal Article
The last emperor revisited : behind-the-scenes
In July 1986, Basil Pao joined the multi-national cast and crew in Beijing for the filming of Bernardo Bertolucci's The Last Emperor. His principal role in the production was to appear as the young emperor Pu Yi's father Prince Chun. But he also served as a 3rd Assistant Director and Special Stills Photographer. This book is a true behind-the scenes look at the making of the epic, now legendary film through the exquisite eye of a photographer who had unlimited access to everyone and everything everywhere. The images feature an international cast of characters contributing to the creation of the masterpiece, from the director, the filmmakers and actors, to the farmers, workers and students from in and around Beijing who had been recruited as extras because they had interesting, often striking faces. It contains over 250 photographs, including some of Pao's most stunning and iconic images of the film, along with a treasure trove of never-been-seen' pictures captured during the filming in Beijing and in Italy. In Pao's own words: “It is the chronicle of a truly extraordinary experience that completely changed my life.”
Book
Institutional Failure in Resource Management
Many of the world's natural resources are in a state of crisis. The solution to this crisis is to develop effective management institutions, but there is no consensus on what those institutions are. Some economists favor solving resource-management problems through the institution of private property; others advocate central government control; and many anthropologists see local-level management as the solution. In this review, I argue that all these governance structures fail under certain conditions. However, the factors contributing to failure in each of these institutional forms differ radically, and the causes of that failure are not always predicted on the basis of existing theory. This chapter contains a review of the literature on the factors identified as causing the failure of private-property regimes, government-controlled resources, and local-level management. We will have to learn to match the resource problems with governance institutions and specific management techniques if we are to manage resources effectively. We also will have to understand the complex biosocial factors influencing sustainability.
Journal Article
Moving beyond panaceas in fisheries governance
In fisheries management—as in environmental governance more generally—regulatory arrangements that are thought to be helpful in some contexts frequently become panaceas or, in other words, simple formulaic policy prescriptions believed to solve a given problem in a wide range of contexts, regardless of their actual consequences. When this happens, management is likely to fail, and negative side effects are common. We focus on the case of individual transferable quotas to explore the panacea mindset, a set of factors that promote the spread and persistence of panaceas. These include conceptual narratives that make easy answers like panaceas seem plausible, power disconnects that create vested interests in panaceas, and heuristics and biases that prevent people from accurately assessing panaceas. Analysts have suggested many approaches to avoiding panaceas, but most fail to conquer the underlying panacea mindset. Here, we suggest the codevelopment of an institutional diagnostics toolkit to distill the vast amount of information on fisheries governance into an easily accessible, open, on-line database of checklists, case studies, and related resources. Toolkits like this could be used in many governance settings to challenge users’ understandings of a policy’s impacts and help them develop solutions better tailored to their particular context. They would not replace the more comprehensive approaches found in the literature but would rather be an intermediate step away from the problem of panaceas.
Journal Article
Individual transferable quotas and conservation
Individual transferable quotas (ITQs) have become a popular management tool for fisheries. They have been promoted in some quarters and seriously criticized in others because of their social and economic impacts. A more serious problem is that ITQs provide exclusive access to public resources presumably in return for some public benefit, namely conservation; however, in a high percentage of cases they do not conserve fish stocks. In this article, we focus on the reasons that ITQs do not conserve stocks. We point to a number of phenomena identified in the literature as affecting stocks of fish, including problems with total allowable catch (TAC), ecological hierarchy theory,randK species, the Allee effect, scale and metapopulation structure, the need to have selective gear, and the continuation of roving bandit incentives. Despite their growing popularity with managers, ITQs do not solve any of these problems. We argue there may be better ways to manage. One possibility is what we call parametric management.
Journal Article
Ostrom for anthropologists
Elinor Ostrom has devoted much of her career to understanding the conditions under which people have incentives to conserve or over-exploit common-pool resources (e.g. oceans, air, irrigation, unowned forests and grassland). While a growing number of anthropologists have taken an interest in this critically important topic, her work is not well known to many anthropologists. This paper describes three different aspects of Ostrom’s work which should be of interest to anthropologists. First is her analysis of collective action problems and the conditions under which people in local communities have devised rules and institutions to solve those dilemmas to conserve resources. Second is Ostrom’s discussion and classification of the complex rules used to manage resources. Third is her analysis of four kinds of goods (i.e. public goods, common-pool resources, toll goods and private goods) and the property regimes that produce them in different combinations. Last, I outline several directions in which her work seems to be going.
Journal Article
Bilateral optic neuritis as a first presentation of lymph node tuberculosis
Tuberculosis (TB) may affect the nervous system in many ways. We describe an immunocompetent teenage girl with lymph node TB who had first presented with bilateral optic neuritis. Detailed history identified features inconsistent with immune-mediated optic neuritis. Several unusual features prompted further investigation, including transient visual obscurations without raised intracranial pressure, prominent disc swelling and absence of laboratory findings to support an immune-mediated cause. Whole body PET/MR imaging identified widespread mediastinal and supraclavicular lymphadenopathy. Despite no known TB contacts, a negative interferon gamma release assay and a normal chest X-ray, a targeted lymph node biopsy confirmed TB.
Journal Article
Co-management in the Maine Lobster Industry
One of the most promising mechanisms to conserve fi sh stocks is co-management, a type of ICCA (Indigenous Peoples’ and Community Conserved Territories and Area), in which responsibilities are shared by resource users and the government. In Maine, the lobster co-management system, established in 1995, divides the coast into seven zones. It permits license holders in each zone to recommend rules on four issues to the commissioner of the Department of Marine Resources. This article describes the history of the Maine lobster co-management system, emphasising the role of factional politics in determining the development of policies and rules. In the Maine co-management system, political outcomes depend on the power of factions of fishermen and the coalitions of those factions with government units at higher scales. Cross-scale cooperation is necessary. In the cases where such a cross-scale coalition existed, rules were passed and policies went into effect. In those cases where no such coalition existed, gridlock reigned. If we wish to understand the production of rules for the lobster industry, we must focus not only on the actions of different industry factions, but also on the byzantine relationships between lower levels of management (i.e., the zone councils and the Lobster Advisory Council) and higher scale institutions (i.e., legislature, Maine Department of Marine Resources, etc.). In this paper, special attention is paid to the reasons that stricter trap limits have not been devised, despite the fact that such limits would solve a variety of serious problems.
Journal Article