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"Achinstein, Peter, author"
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Speculation : within and about science
Scientific speculation: scientific assumptions without evidence.
The book of evidence
2001,2003
What is required for a fact to be evidence for a hypothesis? In this book Achinstein introduces four concepts of evidence, which he calls potential, veridical, epistemic‐situation, and subjective. He defines the last three by reference to the first, and then characterizes potential evidence using a new objective epistemic interpretation of probability. The resulting theory is used to provide solutions to four ”paradoxes of evidence” (grue, ravens, lottery, and old evidence) and to a series of questions, including whether explanations or predictions furnish more evidential weight; whether individual hypotheses or only entire theoretical systems can receive evidential support (the Duhem‐Quine problem); and what counts as a scientific discovery and what evidence it requires. Two historical scientific cases are examined using the theory of evidence developed: Jean Perrin's argument for molecules (did he have noncircular evidence for their existence?), and J.J. Thomson's argument for electrons (what sort of evidence did this argument provide?).
Particles and waves : historical essays in the philosophy of science
1991,1992
This volume brings together six published and two new essays by the noted philosopher of science, Peter Achinstein. It represents the culmination of his examination of methodological issues that arise in nineteenth-century physics. He focuses on the philosophical problem of how, if at all, is it possible to confirm scientific hypotheses that postulate `unobservables’ such as light waves, molecules, and electrons? This question is one that not only was of great interest to nineteenth-century physicists and methodologists, but continues to occupy philosophers of science up to the present day.
The nature of explanation
1983,1985
A new approach to the definition of scientific explanation. Unlike standard theories, it focuses initially on the explaining act itself, to which reference must be made in order to understand what an explanation is and how it can be evaluated in the sciences.