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"Agrell, Wilhelm"
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Mrs Petrova's shoe : the true story of a KGB defection
\"On 19 April 1954 the world was gripped by an unfolding drama at Sydney Airport. A small, seemingly fragile woman, was being aggresively marched to an awaiting plane by two burly men. Evdokia Petrova was the wife of Soviet diplomat Vladimir Petrov who, two weeks earlier, had defected from the embassy in Canberra after a prolonged 'cultivation' by the Australian Security Service, supported by MI5. Evdokia was now being hurried back to Moscow by the KGB. The subsequent intervention by Australian Prime Minister Robert Menzies kept the world's media on tenterhooks ... After the defection it turned out that Evdokia was, in fact, an even bigger catch than her husband. With a background both in cryptological work in Moscow and in field operations, she was able to supply Western intelligence with a wealth of information and insight into the workings of the Soviet intelligence system\"-- Amazon.com.
Book
Offensive versus Defensive: Military Strategy and Alternative Defence
Since the early 1980s the concept of non-offensive defence has gained considerable support in peace movements as well as among peace researchers in Western Europe. The debate has, however, become a 'for' and 'against' argument, while fundamental analytical questions have been left aside. This article deals with the nature of the premises for the implementation of defence policy alternatives based on specific technologies with assumed political and strategic effects. The distinction between offensive and defensive appears, in a historical perspective, as far more complex than assumed in the current debate. The concept of non-offensive defence presupposes that these distinctions can be handled through conscious and rational choices. Research in the interaction between technological change and military strategy and in the determining factors for the development of military technology and weapons systems provides very little support for such a conclusion. The concept of non-offensive defence, as presently developed, therefore appears as an attempted short-cut past the basic problems involved in the control of the development of military technology, and the debate therefore runs the risk of ending as just another 'single-weapon concept', soon to be forgotten.
Journal Article
Pre-Empt, Balance or Intercept?
From where did the concept of missile defence emanate? And why has missile defence been and continues to be a controversial issue and not, as so many other inventions in the continuous chain of measures and countermeasures, just another self-evident instrument in a defence posture? The purpose of this chapter is to look more closely at these questions and search for the specific aspects of missile defence not so much as a technological system but as a strategic option. Missile defence is here discussed in the broader context of active air defence from the world wars to the present. The evolution of strategies of missile defence is a predominately, but not exclusive, US phenomenon. The Soviet and Russian experience is dealt with in another chapter.
Book Chapter
Behind the Submarine Crisis: Evolution of the Swedish Defence Doctrine and Soviet War Planning
In the 1980s Sweden has experienced a number of serious incidents involving foreign submarines. This 'submarine crisis' has affected Swedish foreign policy and Swedish-Soviet relations, but also the relevance of the defence policy and the flexibility of longterm planning. The submarine crisis can thus be regarded as a test of vital elements in policy and planning. Historically, the Swedish defence doctrine in the post-war period has been characterized by considerable inertia, only giving way to strong pressure from the formal or informal power-groups controlling various aspects of defence policy. New planning procedures have not made the system more sensitive to changes in the external premisses. A close analysis of alien underwater activity in Swedish waters indicates a turning point in the latter half of the 1970s with large coordinated penetrations being carried out deep into the archipelagoes. This indicates a major shift in Soviet war planning concerning Scandinavia, especially concerning operations against Sweden, on the outbreak of a conflict. Thus, the submarine crisis reveals a gap between the strategic assumptions forming the intellectual basis of the Swedish defence doctrine and the pattern in Soviet military activity and military preparations. The reaction of the Swedish planning system, and the historical experiences lead, however, to the conclusion that presently there are no internal conditions for a change in the doctrine.
Journal Article
Soviet Baltic Strategy and the Swedish Submarine Crisis
Stranding of a Soviet submarine in Swedish waters, Oct. 1981.
Journal Article
Small but Not Beautiful
Alternative military defence can be regarded both as a concept for a general change in military structures and as a possible strategy for small and medium-size countries. The general concept is vague and far away from any political implementation. Several models of alternative military defence have been discussed for small and medium-size countries, mainly in Europe. Of these, a high technology territorial defence appears to offer an optimal compromise between a defensive deterrence and the abandonment of elements that could be regarded as provocative. The article investigates the possibilities to implement a high-technology defence, with the operational task to absorb an attack by offensive forces of a super-power. The basic principles for such a defence must be to avoid the main capacity of these forces, their weapon systems, intelligence systems and electronic warfare systems. PGM technology has created some opportunities for this model, but also for new offensive systems. A continuous development of systems adapted to territorial defence is therefore a necessity. The idea of small independent units is hardly feasible in this context. The organization of defence must be dispersed and decentralized but still coordinated in very deep defensive zones. The model therefore can only be employed by a well-trained and professionally led citizen army.
Journal Article