Catalogue Search | MBRL
Are you sure you want to remove the book from the shelf?
{{itemTitle}}
28
result(s) for
"Allott, Nicholas"
Sort by:
Key terms in pragmatics
Pragmatics is a core discipline within linguistics, but is without an introduction organised by key terms'' until now.'Key Terms In Pragmatics succeeds in tackling this problem by giving students clear, explanatory definitions of over 300 key terms in the field.' There are short intellectual biographies of key thinkers, and a list of key works for further reading. This book is essential reading for students on introductory and intermediate courses'on'linguistics and language and communication, especially those studying pragmatics and logic and meaning. It'is also useful to more advanced students of pragmatics who are looking for clear definitions and for guidance on topics outside of their specialist area.
eBook
Lexical Modulation without Concepts
We argue against the dominant view in the literature that concepts (understood as the standing meanings of general terms) are modulated in lexical modulation. We also argue against the alternative view that 'grab bags' of information that don't determine extensions are the starting point for lexical modulation. In response to the problems with these views we outline a new model for lexical modulation that dispenses with the assumption that there is a standing meaning of a general term that is modified in the cases under consideration. In applying general terms we intend to conform with our linguistic ancestors and in doing so we take facts about the referents of these terms for granted. In cases of lexical modulation we become aware of facts we took for granted and we need to change the facts we take for granted in order to see ourselves as continuing in a practice. These changes result in utterances of the general term referring to different properties. In general, concepts are neither the starting point for lexical modulation nor the standing meanings of words.
Journal Article
Classical logic, conditionals and “nonmonotonic” reasoning
Reasoning with conditionals is often thought to be non-monotonic, but there is no incompatibility with classical logic, and no need to formalise inference itself as probabilistic. When the addition of a new premise leads to abandonment of a previously compelling conclusion reached by modus ponens, for example, this is generally because it is hard to think of a model in which the conditional and the new premise are true.
Journal Article
SoK: How Not to Architect Your Next-Generation TEE Malware?
Besides Intel's SGX technology, there are long-running discussions on how trusted computing technologies can be used to cloak malware. Past research showed example methods of malicious activities utilising Flicker, Trusted Platform Module, and recently integrating with enclaves. We observe two ambiguous methodologies of malware development being associated with SGX, and it is crucial to systematise their details. One methodology is to use the core SGX ecosystem to cloak malware; potentially affecting a large number of systems. The second methodology is to create a custom enclave not adhering to base assumptions of SGX, creating a demonstration code of malware behaviour with these incorrect assumptions; remaining local without any impact. We examine what malware aims to do in real-world scenarios and state-of-art techniques in malware evasion. We present multiple limitations of maintaining the SGX-assisted malware and evading it from anti-malware mechanisms. The limitations make SGX enclaves a poor choice for achieving a successful malware campaign. We systematise twelve misconceptions (myths) outlining how an overfit-malware using SGX weakens malware's existing abilities. We find the differences by comparing SGX assistance for malware with non-SGX malware (i.e., malware in the wild in our paper). We conclude that the use of hardware enclaves does not increase the preexisting attack surface, enables no new infection vector, and does not contribute any new methods to the stealthiness of malware.
Paper
How Memory-Safe is IoT? Assessing the Impact of Memory-Protection Solutions for Securing Wireless Gateways
The rapid development of the Internet of Things (IoT) has enabled novel user-centred applications, including many in safety-critical areas such as healthcare, smart environment security, and emergency response systems. The diversity in IoT manufacturers, standards, and devices creates a combinatorial explosion of such deployment scenarios, leading to increased security and safety threats due to the difficulty of managing such heterogeneity. In almost every IoT deployment, wireless gateways are crucial for interconnecting IoT devices and providing services, yet they are vulnerable to external threats and serve as key entry points for large-scale IoT attacks. Memory-based vulnerabilities are among the most serious threats in software, with no universal solution yet available. Legacy memory protection mechanisms, such as canaries, RELRO, NX, and Fortify, have enhanced memory safety but remain insufficient for comprehensive protection. Emerging technologies like ARM-MTE, CHERI, and Rust are based on more universal and robust Secure-by-Design (SbD) memory safety principles, yet each entails different trade-offs in hardware or code modifications. Given the challenges of balancing security levels with associated overheads in IoT systems, this paper explores the impact of memory safety on the IoT domain through an empirical large-scale analysis of memory-related vulnerabilities in modern wireless gateways. Our results show that memory vulnerabilities constitute the majority of IoT gateway threats, underscoring the necessity for SbD solutions, with the choice of memory-protection technology depending on specific use cases and associated overheads.
Paper