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We show that supply-side financial shocks have a large impact on firms’ investment. We develop a new methodology to separate firm borrowing shocks from bank supply shocks using a vast sample of matched bank-firm lending data. We decompose aggregate loan movements in Japan for the period 1990–2010 into bank, firm, industry, and common shocks. The high degree of financial institution concentration means that individual banks are large relative to the size of the economy, which creates a role for granular shocks as in Gabaix’s (2011) study. We show that idiosyncratic granular bank supply shocks explain 30–40 percent of aggregate loan and investment fluctuations.

How strong are strategic complementarities in price setting across firms? In this article, we provide a direct empirical estimate of firms’ price responses to changes in competitor prices. We develop a general theoretical framework and an empirical identification strategy, taking advantage of a new micro-level dataset for the Belgian manufacturing sector. We find strong evidence of strategic complementarities, with a typical firm adjusting its price with an elasticity of 0.4 in response to its competitors’ price changes and with an elasticity of 0.6 in response to its own cost shocks. Furthermore, we find evidence of substantial heterogeneity in these elasticities across firms. Small firms exhibit no strategic complementarities in price setting and complete cost pass-through. In contrast, large firms exhibit strong strategic complementarities, responding to both competitor price changes and their own cost shocks with roughly equal elasticities of around 0.5. We show that this pattern of heterogeneity in markup variability across firms is important for explaining the aggregate markup response to international shocks and the observed low exchange rate pass-through into domestic prices.

Large exporters are simultaneously large importers. We show that this pattern is key to understanding low aggregate exchange rate pass-through as well as the variation in pass-through across exporters. We develop a theoretical framework with variable markups and imported inputs, which predicts that firms with high import shares and high market shares have low exchange rate pass-through. We test and quantify the theoretical mechanism using Belgian firm-product-level data on imports and exports. Small nonimporting firms have nearly complete pass-through, while large import-intensive exporters have pass-through around 50 percent, with the marginal cost and markup channels contributing roughly equally.

This paper estimates the productivity gains from reducing tariffs on final goods and from reducing tariffs on intermediate inputs. Lower output tariffs can increase productivity by inducing tougher import competition, whereas cheaper imported inputs can raise productivity via learning, variety, and quality effects. We use Indonesian manufacturing census data from 1991 to 2001, which include plant-level information on imported inputs. The results show that a 10 percentage point fall in input tariffs leads to a productivity gain of 12 percent for firms that import their inputs, at least twice as high as any gains from reducing output tariffs.

We examine conventional approaches to evaluating the economic impact of protectionist trade policies. We illustrate these conventional approaches by applying them to the tariffs introduced by the Trump administration during 2018. In the wake of this increase in trade protection, the United States experienced substantial increases in the prices of intermediates and final goods, dramatic changes to its supply-chain network, reductions in availability of imported varieties, and the complete pass-through of the tariffs into domestic prices of imported goods. Therefore, the full incidence of the tariffs has fallen on domestic consumers and importers so far, and our estimates imply a reduction in aggregate US real income of $1.4 billion per month by the end of 2018. We see similar patterns for foreign countries that have retaliated with their own tariffs against the United States, which suggests that the trade war has also reduced the real income of these other countries.

The COVID-19 pandemic amplified the risk environment for people who inject drugs (PWID), making continued access to harm reduction services imperative. Research has shown that some harm reduction service providers were able to continue to provide services throughout the pandemic. Most of these studies, however, focused on staff perspectives, not those of PWID. Our study examines changes in perceptions of access to harm reduction services (e.g., participant reported difficulty in accessing syringes and naloxone) among PWID participating in a longitudinal study conducted through the University of Illinois-Chicago's Community Outreach Intervention Projects field sites during the COVID-19 pandemic. A COIVD-19 survey module was administered from March 2020-February 2022 to participants of an ongoing longitudinal study of PWID ages 18-30, who were English-speaking, and were residing in the Chicago Metropolitan Area. Responses to the COVID-19 survey module were analyzed to understand how study participants' self-reported access to harm reduction services changed throughout the pandemic. Baseline responses to the survey were analyzed to compare participant-reported drug use behaviors and perceived access to harm reduction services across COIVD-19 time periods. Mixed effects logistic regression was used to examine difficulty in syringe access as an outcome of COVID-19 time period. Participants had significantly lower odds (AOR = 0.28; 95% CI 0.12-0.65) of reporting difficulty in accessing syringes later in the pandemic. However, the majority of participants reported access to syringes and naloxone remained the same as before the pandemic. The lack of perceived changes in harm reduction access by PWID and the decrease in those reporting difficulty accessing syringes as the pandemic progressed suggests the efficacy of adaptations to harm reduction service provision (e.g., window and mobile service) during the pandemic. Further research is needed to understand how the COVID-19 pandemic may have impacted PWIDs' engagement with harm reduction services.

Economic models that do not incorporate financial frictions only explain about 70 to 80 percent of the decline in world trade that occurred in the 2008–2009 crisis. We review evidence that shows financial factors also contributed to the great trade collapse and uncover two new stylized facts in support of it. First, we show that the prices of manufactured exports rose relative to domestic prices during the crisis. Second, we show that US seaborne exports and imports, which are likely to be more sensitive to trade finance problems, saw their prices rise relative to goods shipped by air or land.

Background The interplay of human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) knowledge and self-perception of risk for HIV among people who inject drugs is complex and understudied, especially among temporary migrant workers who inject drugs (MWID) while in a host country. In Russia, Tajik migrants make up the largest proportion of Moscow’s foreign labor. Yet, HIV knowledge and self-perceived risk in association with sexual risk behavior among male Tajik MWID in Moscow remains unknown. Objective This research examines knowledge about HIV transmission, self-perception of HIV risk, and key psychosocial factors that possibly contribute to sexual risk behaviors among male Tajik labor MWID living in Moscow. Methods Structured interviews were conducted with 420 male Tajik labor MWID. Modified Poisson regression models investigated possible associations between major risk factors and HIV sexual risk behavior. Results Of the 420 MWID, 255 men (61%) reported sexual activity in the last 30 days. Level of HIV knowledge was not associated in either direction with condom use or risky sexual partnering, as measured by sex with multiple partners or female sex workers (FSW). Lower self-perceived HIV risk was associated with a greater likelihood of sex with multiple partners (aPR: 1.79, 95% CI: 1.34, 2.40) and FSW (aPR: 1.28, 95% CI: 1.04, 1.59), but was not associated with condom use. Police-enacted stigma was associated with sex with multiple partners (aPR: 1.22, 95% CI: 1.01, 1.49) and FSW (aPR: 1.32, 95% CI: 1.13, 1.54). While depression and lower levels of loneliness were associated with condomless sex (aPR: 1.14, 95% CI: 1.05, 1.24; aPR: 0.79, 95% CI: 0.68, 0.92, respectively), only depression was associated with condomless sex with FSW (aPR: 1.26, 95% CI: 1.03, 1.54). Conclusions HIV prevention programing for male Tajik MWID must go beyond solely educating about factors associated with HIV transmission to include increased awareness of personal risk based on engaging in these behaviors. Additionally, psychological services to counter depression and police-enacted stigma are needed.

Progress toward hepatitis C virus (HCV) elimination in the United States is not on track to meet targets set by the World Health Organization, as the opioid crisis continues to drive both injection drug use and increasing HCV incidence. A pragmatic approach to achieving this is using a microelimination approach of focusing on high-risk populations such as people who inject drugs (PWID). Computational models are useful in understanding the complex interplay of individual, social, and structural level factors that might alter HCV incidence, prevalence, transmission, and treatment uptake to achieve HCV microelimination. However, these models need to be informed with realistic sociodemographic, risk behavior and network estimates on PWID. We conducted a meta-analysis of research studies spanning 20 years of research and interventions with PWID in metropolitan Chicago to produce parameters for a synthetic population for realistic computational models (e.g., agent-based models). We then fit an exponential random graph model (ERGM) using the network estimates from the meta-analysis in order to develop the network component of the synthetic population.

Using another year of data including significant escalations in the trade war, we find that the costs of the US tariffs continue to be almost entirely borne by US firms and consumers. We show that the response of import values to the tariffs increases in absolute magnitude over time, consistent with the idea that it takes time for firms to reorganize supply chains. We find heterogeneity in the responses of some sectors, such as steel, where tariffs have caused foreign exporters to drop their prices substantially, enabling them to export relatively more than in sectors where tariff pass-through was complete.