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China's three-decade infrastructure investment boom shows few signs of abating. Is China's economic growth a consequence of its purposeful investment? Is China a prodigy in delivering infrastructure from which rich democracies could learn? The prevalent view in economics literature and policies derived from it is that a high level of infrastructure investment is a precursor to economic growth. China is especially held up as a model to emulate. Politicians in rich democracies display awe and envy of the scale of infrastructure Chinese leaders are able to build. Based on the largest dataset of its kind, this paper punctures the twin myths that (i) infrastructure creates economic value, and that (ii) China has a distinct advantage in its delivery. Far from being an engine of economic growth, the typical infrastructure investment fails to deliver a positive risk-adjusted return. Moreover, China's track record in delivering infrastructure is no better than that of rich democracies. Investing in unproductive projects results initially in a boom, as long as construction is ongoing, followed by a bust, when forecasted benefits fail to materialize and projects therefore become a drag on the economy. Where investments are debt-financed, overinvesting in unproductive projects results in the build-up of debt, monetary expansion, instability in financial markets, and economic fragility, exactly as we see in China today. We conclude that poorly managed infrastructure investments are a main explanation of surfacing economic and financial problems in China. We predict that, unless China shifts to a lower level of higher-quality infrastructure investments, the country is headed for an infrastructure-led national financial and economic crisis, which is likely also to be a crisis for the international economy. China's infrastructure investment model is not one to follow for other countries but one to avoid.

How do large companies buy infrastructure (e.g. electricity, gas or rail)? Mainstream economics literature proposes that in the absence of an intermediating government, the bargaining power of large customers in procuring infrastructure will be weak. Drawing on a spatial, temporal and relational framework, this article critiques this proposition through a case study of a large manufacturing firm, ThyssenKrupp (TK) AG, which recently invested €7 billion in steel processing facilities in Brazil and USA. I find that prior to making durable and immobile investments large firms—like TK—can exert symmetric bargaining power against sellers of infrastructure, provided the firm has competitive alternatives available in making a location decision. TK exerted strong bargaining power by doing extensive analysis; keeping its commitment to any given location alternative low; inducing a ‘relational auction’ among alternatives it found desirable and by demanding tailored infrastructure services, rather than off-the-shelf commodities. Public sector infrastructure megaprojects, built without active co-development with lead users, are likely to be wasteful investments.

More than a hundred hydropower dams have already been built in the Amazon basin and numerous proposals for further dam constructions are under consideration. The accumulated negative environmental effects of existing dams and proposed dams, if constructed, will trigger massive hydrophysical and biotic disturbances that will affect the Amazon basin's floodplains, estuary and sediment plume. We introduce a Dam Environmental Vulnerability Index to quantify the current and potential impacts of dams in the basin. The scale of foreseeable environmental degradation indicates the need for collective action among nations and states to avoid cumulative, far-reaching impacts. We suggest institutional innovations to assess and avoid the likely impoverishment of Amazon rivers.

How should government and business solve big problems? In bold leaps or in many smaller moves? We show that bespoke, one-off projects are prone to poorer outcomes than projects built on a repeatable platform. Repeatable projects are cheaper, faster, and scale at lower risk of failure. We compare evidence from 203 space missions at NASA and SpaceX, on cost, speed-to-market, schedule, and scalability. We find that SpaceX's platform strategy was 10X cheaper and 2X faster than NASA's bespoke strategy. Moreover, SpaceX's platform strategy was financially less risky, virtually eliminating cost overruns. Finally, we show that achieving platform repeatability is a strategically diligent process involving experimental learning sequences. Sectors of the economy where governments find it difficult to control spending or timeframes or to realize planned benefits - e.g., health, education, climate, defence - are ripe for a platform rethink.

How should government and business solve big problems? In bold leaps or in many smaller moves? We show that bespoke, one-off projects are prone to poorer outcomes than projects built on a repeatable platform. Repeatable projects are cheaper, faster, and scale at lower risk of failure. We compare evidence from 203 space missions at NASA and SpaceX, on cost, speed-to-market, schedule, and scalability. We find that SpaceX's platform strategy was 10X cheaper and 2X faster than NASA's bespoke strategy. Moreover, SpaceX's platform strategy was financially less risky, virtually eliminating cost overruns. Finally, we show that achieving platform repeatability is a strategically diligent process involving experimental learning sequences. Sectors of the economy where governments find it difficult to control spending or timeframes or to realize planned benefits - e.g., health, education, climate, defence - are ripe for a platform rethink.

Infrastructure—communications, energy, transport, waste, and water networks—is critical for economic activity and social well-being. Practitioners, politicians, and economists advocate high levels of investment in infrastructure under the rubric of 'planning for growth' (or the 'push' paradigm). This paradigm relies on complex public-private arrangements in the name of public interest. These seemingly reasonable arrangements are, however, not delivering their promise. Evidence shows that the needs of infrastructure users in rich and poor countries are not being met, many private providers of infrastructure earn rich returns, assets are rarely built in time or on budget, and there is tremendous waste in the operation of many infrastructure industries. No other sector could survive the profligacy and slack common in infrastructure. I distil the following primary propositions of the accepted wisdom, which is inspired by mainstream economics: First, infrastructure assets necessarily entail high sunk costs and large economies of scale. Consequently, assets last for very long periods of time, and they cannot be readily moved. Second, infrastructure outputs are homogeneous. Third, one network fits all users (large and small). Fourth, infrastructure users, even large ones, are likely to have weak bargaining power in procurement of infrastructure outputs. I challenge these four propositions of the conventional wisdom by putting forward alternative hypotheses. First, instead of being monolithic and costly, infrastructures can be assembled (and disassembled) as flexible modules for specific users in specific places. Drawing on option pricing theory in quantitative finance, I recast infrastructures as 'portfolios of real options'. Second, infrastructure outputs are, in fact, heterogeneous and differentiated services. Third, one infrastructure network cannot fit all users, either today or in the future. Users are remarkably heterogeneous, not only in terms of unique user preferences but also in terms of spatial location. Infrastructure networks need to evolve in tandem with user needs or risk spatial, temporal, and relational obsolescence. Finally, users, large and small, are adept at exerting strong bargaining power in procuring infrastructure both prior to and after rendering durable and immobile investments. Users also strategically deploy intermediaries, e.g. futures and Over-the-Counter (OTC) exchanges, and real estate developers, to negotiate private contracts for infrastructure services. These findings are supported by two case studies. The first case study details the process by which ThyssenKrupp, a large steel company, bargained for its infrastructure by locating to a manufacturing site in the U.S. The second case study focuses on residents of Lavasa, one of the largest property developments in India. Here, small users of infrastructure exert strong bargaining power with the aid of intermediaries—the real estate developer and the property asset manager. New departures in infrastructure provision are urgently needed at a practical level. Poor investments rendered today—particularly if costly, inflexible, and durable—will suffocate tomorrow’s possibilities. The spatial, temporal, and relational approach proposed in this dissertation begins to offer an alternative account of how tomorrow can be modularly shaped.

In this paper we characterise the propensity of big capital investments to systematically deliver poor outcomes as \"fragility,\" a notion suggested by Nassim Taleb. A thing or system that is easily harmed by randomness is fragile. We argue that, contrary to their appearance, big capital investments break easily - i.e. deliver negative net present value - due to various sources of uncertainty that impact them during their long gestation, implementation, and operation periods. We do not refute the existence of economies of scale and scope. Instead we argue that big capital investments have a disproportionate (non-linear) exposure to uncertainties that deliver poor or negative returns above and beyond their economies of scale and scope. We further argue that to succeed, leaders of capital projects need to carefully consider where scaling pays off and where it does not. To automatically assume that \"bigger is better,\" which is common in megaproject management, is a recipe for failure.

The prevalent view in the economics literature is that a high level of infrastructure investment is a precursor to economic growth. China is especially held up as a model to emulate. Based on the largest dataset of its kind, this paper punctures the twin myths that, first, infrastructure creates economic value, and, second, China has a distinct advantage in its delivery. Far from being an engine of economic growth, the typical infrastructure investment fails to deliver a positive risk adjusted return. Moreover, China's track record in delivering infrastructure is no better than that of rich democracies. Where investments are debt-financed, overinvesting in unproductive projects results in the buildup of debt, monetary expansion, instability in financial markets, and economic fragility, exactly as we see in China today. We conclude that poorly managed infrastructure investments are a main explanation of surfacing economic and financial problems in China. We predict that, unless China shifts to a lower level of higher-quality infrastructure investments, the country is headed for an infrastructure-led national financial and economic crisis, which is likely also to be a crisis for the international economy. China's infrastructure investment model is not one to follow for other countries but one to avoid.

A brisk building boom of hydropower mega-dams is underway from China to Brazil. Whether benefits of new dams will outweigh costs remains unresolved despite contentious debates. We investigate this question with the \"outside view\" or \"reference class forecasting\" based on literature on decision-making under uncertainty in psychology. We find overwhelming evidence that budgets are systematically biased below actual costs of large hydropower dams - excluding inflation, substantial debt servicing, environmental, and social costs. Using the largest and most reliable reference data of its kind and multilevel statistical techniques applied to large dams for the first time, we were successful in fitting parsimonious models to predict cost and schedule overruns. The outside view suggests that in most countries large hydropower dams will be too costly in absolute terms and take too long to build to deliver a positive risk-adjusted return unless suitable risk management measures outlined in this paper can be affordably provided. Policymakers, particularly in developing countries, are advised to prefer agile energy alternatives that can be built over shorter time horizons to energy megaprojects.