Search Results Heading

MBRLSearchResults

mbrl.module.common.modules.added.book.to.shelf
Title added to your shelf!
View what I already have on My Shelf.
Oops! Something went wrong.
Oops! Something went wrong.
While trying to add the title to your shelf something went wrong :( Kindly try again later!
Are you sure you want to remove the book from the shelf?
Oops! Something went wrong.
Oops! Something went wrong.
While trying to remove the title from your shelf something went wrong :( Kindly try again later!
    Done
    Filters
    Reset
  • Discipline
      Discipline
      Clear All
      Discipline
  • Is Peer Reviewed
      Is Peer Reviewed
      Clear All
      Is Peer Reviewed
  • Reading Level
      Reading Level
      Clear All
      Reading Level
  • Content Type
      Content Type
      Clear All
      Content Type
  • Year
      Year
      Clear All
      From:
      -
      To:
  • More Filters
      More Filters
      Clear All
      More Filters
      Item Type
    • Is Full-Text Available
    • Subject
    • Publisher
    • Source
    • Donor
    • Language
    • Place of Publication
    • Contributors
    • Location
226 result(s) for "Arquilla, John"
Sort by:
Afghan Endgames
The United States and its allies have been fighting the Taliban and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan for a decade in a war thateitherside could still win. While a gradual drawdown has begun, significant numbers of US combat troops will remain in Afghanistan until at least 2014, perhaps longer, depending on the situation on the ground and the outcome of the US presidential election in 2012. Given the realities of the Taliban's persistence and the desire of US policymakers-and the public-to find a way out, what can and should be the goals of the US and its allies in Afghanistan?Afghan Endgamesbrings together some of the finest minds in the fields of history, strategy, anthropology, ethics, and mass communications to provide a clear, balanced, and comprehensive assessment of the alternatives for restoring peace and stability to Afghanistan. Presenting a range of options-from immediate withdrawal of all coalition forces to the maintenance of an open-ended, but greatly reduced military presence-the contributors weigh the many costs, risks, and benefits of each alternative. This important book boldly pursues several strands of thought suggesting that a strong, legitimate central government is far from likely to emerge in Kabul; that fewer coalition forces, used in creative ways, may have better effects on the ground than a larger, more conventional presence; and that, even though Pakistan should not be pushed too hard, so as to avoid sparking social chaos there, Afghanistan's other neighbors can and should be encouraged to become more actively involved. The volume's editors conclude that while there may never be complete peace in Afghanistan, a self-sustaining security system able to restore order swiftly in the wake of violence is attainable.
Perils of the Gray Zone
In the long years since the 9/11 attacks on America, the wide-ranging war on terror has morphed into terror's war on the world. Terrorist incidents have increased seven-fold, with the casualties caused by such attacks more than quintupling. Just as troubling, since the start of the current decade the overall number of wars under way has increased nearly a third--from 31 to 41. There is much overlap between the worst of these conflicts and the number of terrorist incidents, with Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, and Yemen heading the list in recent years. Paradoxically, the first two of the countries listed have seen extended, very expensive, yet problematic American invasions and occupations. The American military footprint has been light in Syria and Yemen, but these wars have also proved vexing. Mention of Beijing is a reminder of the rise of China, and of its increasingly bumptious policies and actions--from reef enhancement to edgy sea patrols--in the East and South China Seas.
To Build a Network
In the elegant phrasing of David Weinberger, co-author of a key contribution to the emerging information-age canon, The Cluetrain Manifesto, networks, particularly web-enabled ones, are comprised of small pieces loosely joined. Weinberger's language offers a particularly apt description of al-Qaeda today, as the group's original concentrated core, formed around Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, has long since given way to a far flatter, much more widely dispersed set of relatively independent cells and nodes. Thus has the world's premier terrorist network survived over a dozen years of major efforts aimed at its eradication. Indeed, far from being on the verge of strategic defeat, as former defense secretary Leon Panetta was wont to say, al-Qaeda has thrived by redesigning itself away from any serious reliance on central leadership. In this way, the targeted killings of any number of high-value targets, including of course bin Laden himself, have had little effect on the organization's viability and vitality.
The end of war as we knew it? Insurgency, counterinsurgency and lessons from the forgotten history of early terror networks
The growing potency of networked organisations has manifested itself over the past decade in the fresh energy evident among terrorists and insurgents-most notably al-Qaida and Hezbollah. Networks have even shown a capacity to wage war toe-to-toe against nation-states-with some success, as can be seen in the outcome of the First Russo-Chechen War (1994 - 96). The range of choices available to networks thus covers an entire spectrum of conflict, posing the prospect of a significant blurring of the lines between insurgency, terror and war. While history provides some useful examples to stimulate strategic thought about such problems, coping with networks that can fight in so many different ways-sparking myriad, hybrid forms of conflict-is going to require some innovative thinking to go along with more traditional introspection about the relevant lessons of history.
Realities of War: global development, growing destructiveness and the coming of a new Dark Age?
This contribution traces the connection between theories about the utility of violence as a tool of development and practical efforts to craft policies based on such beliefs. The basic finding is that the use of force in the name of societal development (eg the Bush Doctrine of waging war to effect 'regime change') has proven problematic. Indeed, viewed from the perspective of the past two centuries, such uses of force have often turned out to be profoundly 'anti-developmental'. In particular, there are some troubling shifts in conflict, apparent since the late 19th century, but which have accelerated in recent decades. First, major warfare has migrated from the developed to the developing world. Second, there is a clearly observable growth trend towards 'big kill' wars in which at least one million people die (often in small nation-states where significant percentages of the population are killed). More, and more deadly, wars are thus occurring amid those least able to cope with conflict, providing stark rebuttal to recent studies that argue war is generally on the wane. To the contrary, the 'barriers to entry' for waging highly destructive wars have fallen sharply, and it is this trend that poses the greatest threat to political, social and economic progress since the last Dark Age.
Pre-empting terror: take a networked approach
Both President Bush and Prime Minister Howard have articulated a shared vision about how to improve security by means of pre-emptive attacks. There are three main objections raised to pre-emption. First, some see a slippery slope, where disrupting an impending attack can evolve into full-blown preventive wars against those who aren't planning an assault, but whose capability to do so is growing. A second concern about pre-emption is that it erodes sovereignty, in that it seems inevitable that the pre-emptor will have to strike against terrorists located on foreign soil. The third objection to pre-emption is more a general concern that a doctrine of pre-emption fosters dangerous unilateralism, leading to actions that might undermine international amity. Policy-makers must now focus on thinking their way through these objections, the goal being to set a new strategy that takes the initiative militarily and yet still strengthens the global coalition of nations allied in the fight against terror networks
The Computer Mouse that Roared: Cyberwar in the Twenty-First Century
Scholars have long sought to understand the persistence and prevalence of conflict in world affairs. They have theorized that wars arise from imbalances of power, challenges to declining empires or nations, ethnic or religious antipathy, and even attempts to divert attention from troubles at home. Now into the mix comes cyberwar: an emergent mode of conflict enabled by and primarily waged with advanced information systems, which are in themselves both tools and targets. It may be that this new way of war is showing the world that outbreaks of conflict may be primarily driven by the state of play in technology. The emerging picture of a world bedeviled by cyberwars is a dark one. However, it can be brightened by good sense and circumspection, and by the willingness to work toward the behavior-based cyberarms control regime.
In Athena's Camp
The information revolution--which is as much an organizational as a technological revolution--is transforming the nature of conflict across the spectrum: from open warfare, to terrorism, crime, and even radical social activism. The era of massed field armies is passing, because the new information and communications systems are increasing the lethality of quite small units that can call in deadly, precise missile fire almost anywhere, anytime. In social conflicts, the Internet and other media are greatly empowering individuals and small groups to influence the behavior of states. Whether in military or social conflicts, all protagonists will soon be developing new doctrines, strategies, and tactics for swarming their opponents--with weapons or words, as circumstances require. Preparing for conflict in such a world will require shifting to new forms of organization, particularly the versatile, hardy, all-channel network. This shift will prove difficult for states and professional militaries that remain bastions of hierarchy, bound to resist institutional redesign. They will make the shift as they realize that information and knowledge are becoming the key elements of power. This implies, among other things, that Mars, the old brute-force god of war, must give way to Athena, the well-armed goddess of wisdom. Accepting Athena as the patroness of this information age represents a first step not only for preparing for future conflicts, but also for preventing them.