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Metaphysical underdetermination arises when we are not able to decide, by purely theoretical criteria, between competing interpretations of scientific theories with different metaphysical commitments. This is the case in which non-relativistic quantum mechanics (QM) founds itself in. Among several available interpretations, there is the interpretation which states that the interaction with the conscious mind of a human observer causes a change in the dynamics of quantum objects undergoing from indefinite to definite states. This is, in a nutshell, the received view of the consciousness causes the collapse hypothesis (CCCH), which is the basis for a set of interpretations known as subjectivistic interpretations of QM. Here we propose a further distinction between three levels of metaphysical underdetermination within the discussion related to the interpretations of QM: the first level, described above, concerns the general framework of interpretations of QM (where CCCH is a option among several others, and which is not addressed here); the second one emerges within a particular set of interpretations (namely, CCCH), and the third one from two possible approaches to a particular branch of this set of interpretations. We suggest breaking the last two using metaphysical arguments. As a general result, we have been able to rule out the dualist approach of CCCH (though we cannot rule it out empirically) and to realize that the only viable phenomenological approach to CCCH is the eidetic one.

It is sometimes argued that, given its detachment from our current most successful science, analytic metaphysics has no epistemic value because it contributes nothing to our knowledge of reality. Relatedly, it is also argued that metaphysics properly constrained by science can avoid that problem. In this paper we argue, however, that given the current understanding of the relation between science and metaphysics, metaphysics allegedly constrained by science suffers the same fate as its unconstrained sister; that is, what is currently thought of as scientifically respectful metaphysics may end up also being without epistemic value. The core of our claim is that although much emphasis is put on the supposed difference between unconstrained analytic metaphysics, in opposition to scientifically constrained metaphysics, it is largely forgotten that no clear constraining relation of metaphysics by science is yet available.

This paper presents and critically discusses the “logos approach to quantum mechanics” from the point of view of the current debates concerning the relation between metaphysics and science. Due to its alleged direct connection with quantum formalism, the logos approach presents itself as a better alternative for understanding quantum mechanics than other available views. However, we present metaphysical and methodological difficulties that seem to clearly point to a different conclusion: the logos approach is on an epistemic equal footing among alternative realist approaches to quantum mechanics.

Philosophers of science commonly connect ontology and science, stating that these disciplines maintain a two-way relationship: on the one hand, we can extract ontology from scientific theories; on the other hand, ontology provides the realistic content of our scientific theories. In this article, we will critically examine the process of naturalizing ontology, i.e., confining the work of ontologists merely to the task of pointing out which entities certain theories commit themselves to. We will use non-relativistic quantum mechanics as a case study. We begin by distinguishing two roles for ontology: the first would be characterized by cataloging existing entities according to quantum mechanics; the second would be characterized by establishing more general ontological categories in which existing entities must be classified. We argue that only the first step is available for a naturalistic approach; the second step not being open for determination or anchoring in science. Finally, we also argue that metaphysics is still a step beyond ontology, not contained in either of the two tasks of ontology, being thus even farther from science. Los filósofos de la ciencia suelen conectar ontología y ciencia, afirmando que estas dos disciplinas mantienen una relación en dos direcciones: por un lado, podemos extraer ontología de las teorías científicas; por otro lado, la ontología proporciona el contenido realista de nuestras teorías científicas. En este artículo examinamos críticamente el proceso de naturalizar la ontología, i.e. de confinar el trabajo de la ontología meramente a la tarea de señalar con qué entidades se comprometen ciertas teorías. Usaremos la mecánica cuántica no relativista como un caso de estudio. Comenzamos distinguiendo dos funciones de la ontología. La primera consistiría en catalogar entidades existentes de acuerdo con la mecánica cuántica. La segunda consistiría en establecer categorías ontológicas más generales, en las que las entidades existentes deben clasificarse. Argumentamos que el enfoque naturalista solamente puede ocuparse de la primera función; la segunda función no estáabierta a ser determinada por o anclada en la ciencia. Finalmente, argumentamos que la metafísica se sitúa todavía un paso más allá de la ontología, y no queda contenida por ninguna de las dos funciones de la ontología, por lo que se halla aún más distante de la ciencia.

This paper introduces the Special Issue of Theoria entitled “Quantum mechanics and reality”. We first comment on its origins related to the VIII International Workshop on Quantum Mechanics and Quantum Information, promoted by the International Network on Foundations of Quantum Mechanics and Quantum Information. We then briefly introduce each contribution individually, bringing the papers together under the Special Issue’s topic. Este artículo introduce el número especial de Theoria titulado “Mecánica cuántica y realidad”. En primer lugar, se explican sus origenes en relación con el VIII Taller Internacional sobre Mecánica Cuántica e Información Cuántica, promovido por la Red Internacional sobre los Fundamentos de la Mecánica Cuántica e Información Cuántica. A continuación, se presenta brevemente cada contribución de manera individual, agrupándolas en torno al tema del número especial.

A pesar de décadas de debate sobre el realismo científico, nos sentimos confundidos por lo que exactamente diferentes filósofos parecen pensar que es esto. ¿Requiere algún tipo de creencia en teorías científicas y, de ser así, de qué tipo? ¿Está tipificado anteriormente por una cierta comprensión de la racionalidad de tales creencias? En el siguiente diálogo, exploramos estas preguntas con la esperanza de aclarar algunas creencias sobre qué es el realismo científico y qué podría o debería ser. En el camino, encontramos algunos puntos de vista profundamente divergentes sobre la naturaleza de la ciencia y la filosofía

Carnap's conception of linguistic frameworks is widespread; however, it is not entirely clear nor consensual to pinpoint what is the influence in his stance within the traditional realist/anti-realist debate. In this paper, we place Carnap as a proponent of a scientific realist stance, by presenting what he called \"linguistic realism\". Some possible criticisms are considered, and a case study is offered with wave function realism, a popular position in the philosophy of quantum mechanics.

According to scientific realism, science gives us an approximately true description of what the world is like. But what does it mean? In this chapter, we focus on the ontological and metaphysical aspects of this discussion. That is, we are concerned with the following questions: what there is, according to our best scientific theories? And how are these things that theories say exist? We start from the assumption that a genuine scientific realism must deal with these issues. Taking non-relativistic quantum mechanics as a case study, we discuss some of the challenges currently faced by a genuinely realistic stance. We argue, first, that in the ontological aspect, realists are in the same boat as science, that is, without sufficient epistemic justification to adopt the belief in the entities postulated by a single quantum theory, given that experience (currently) is not able to decide between rival theories; in the metaphysical aspect, realists also encounter problems with theory choice, given the possibility of associating more than one metaphysical theory with the description of the entities postulated by each quantum theory. The same goes for structuralist alternatives, since, even if we accept that scientific theories are committed to the existence of structures, but not objects, we still do not know what structures are, metaphysically. Finally, we move forward in the discussion with the meta-Popperian method, which serves to reduce the metaphysical alternatives associated with the ontological postulates of scientific theories. We may not know what the correct alternative is, but we have been able to progressively check which metaphysical alternatives are incompatible with each scientific theory.

In this review, I specify the metametaphysical background against which Alastair Wilson’s “The Nature of Contingency” (Oxford University Press, 2020) should be properly understood. Metaphysics, as a philosophical discipline, is standing on thin ice. The caricature of the situation is polarized, and is often presented as follows: metaphysics is either entirely extracted from science or it is entirely independent of science. There is a recent trend that focuses on the middle ground between these extremes, searching the philosophical literature for metaphysical theories that can fill the gap, i.e., leaving metaphysics as a free discipline to produce spoils for the eventual needs of philosophers of science. We can appreciate it better with the following distinction between the tasks of ontology and metaphysics, as complementary disciplines. If, on the one hand, we understand ontology as dealing with what exists, we can somehow extract the entities that are existentially postulated by scientific theories. Metaphysics, on the other hand, would be located as an extra layer, in charge of investigating questions about the nature of the entities obtained in this “naturalized ontology”. As a tailor, Wilson adjusts a metaphysical theory in order to perfectly dress the physical and ontological nuances of Everettian quantum mechanics, thus creating a metaphysical theory that gives us intelligibility, with the concept of modality, in two areas: in quantum mechanics, and analytic metaphysics.