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How does the framing of immigration influence support for the welfare state? Drawing on research from psychology, specifically the notion of negativity bias and the sequencing of negative and positive information, this article argues that negative immigration frames undermine welfare support, while positive frames have little or no effect. Individuals take less notice of positive frames, and the effect of such frames is further undermined by the previous exposure to negative frames, which tend to stick longer in people's minds. The findings, based on survey experiments on over 9,000 individuals in Germany, Sweden and the UK, show that negative framing of immigration has a strong and pervasive effect on support for welfare. The article also finds some evidence that this effect is further amplified for people who hold anti-immigrant and anti-welfare attitudes or feel economically insecure. The effect of positive framing is considerably weaker and does not strengthen welfare support in any of the three countries.

Should immigrants have the same access to welfare as the native population? Fuelled by the populist radical right, the notion of restricting access to benefits to native citizens – welfare chauvinism – has been increasingly prominent in political debates. But can welfare chauvinistic attitudes be induced (or attenuated) by the negative (or positive) information individuals receive about immigrants? Combining insights from research on negativity bias and motivated reasoning, we argue that negative frames which emphasize fiscal costs of immigration are more consequential than positive frames that emphasize fiscal benefits, but this effect is primarily visible among those whose ideological priors are congruent with the negative information. Since more extreme attitudes are associated with increased selective judgement, those who occupy a more extreme ideological position should be particularly affected. A survey experiment in Germany supports this argument and shows that while a negative frame is stronger than a positive frame, this effect is moderated by one’s ideology and is most evident among more extreme ideologues who hold frame-congruent attitudes. We also show that ideology, rather than economic circumstances, is a more important moderator of framing effects.

Why do some governments adopt unpopular reforms entailing far-reaching liberalization of the labor market, while others opt only for marginal adjustments or even regulatory reforms? This paper explains the likelihood of different types of reforms as an effect of different constellations of government partisanship and veto players. Combining the ‘blame avoidance’ and ‘veto players’ logics of politics, I argue that veto players have either a constraining or enabling effect depending on the partisan orientation of government. Liberalization is most likely to be adopted either by right parties facing few veto players, or by left parties in contexts with a high degree of power sharing. Regulatory reforms are most likely when left governments enjoy strong power concentration, but marginal regulation may also be adopted under external pressure by right governments facing many veto players. An analysis of employment protection reforms in 24 European Union countries during 1990–2007 supports the argument that the effect of political constraints and opportunities on the choice of reforms is shaped by partisan differences.

The paper offers an explanation for variations in the effectiveness of trade unions to obtain legislative & policy concessions in peak-level tripartite negotiations in post-communist East Central Europe. It shows that standard interpretations for such variations focused on structural legacies, modes of transition, political cycles, & institutional differences -- cannot account for the problem at hand. Instead, I argue that the sources of these variations are to be attributed to distinct paths of state-labor relations, which are the product of continuous strategic interactions that crucially depend on power dynamics. To present a mechanism through which these paths evolve, the paper sketches a model of government-union interactions that combines institutional & behavioral variables. I propose a set of hypotheses regarding the conditions that determine initial choice of strategies & factors that influence continuation or modification of these strategies later on. By analyzing the cases of the Czech Republic, Hungary, & Poland, the paper further illustrates how these interactions shape tripartite institutions in such a way that they start reflecting accentuated power disparities between the contending actors, thereby limiting future choice sets for weaker actors. 46 References. Adapted from the source document.

Against the background of the changing relationships between trade unions and political parties in Western Europe, this paper examines the nature and outcomes of union-party alliances in East Central Europe. The paper advances two interrelated arguments. First, the nature of union-party ties in postcommunism is significantly different and can be best described as an inverse dependency relationship in which political parties have always been the stronger partner. Second, contrary to the conventional assumptions based on the experience of Western Europe, strong union-party ties have worked to the detriment of labor in East Central Europe. This paradox is explained by poor reserves of loyalty, which are a direct consequence of the absence of a long history of close ties and mutually beneficial exchanges. The way in which such new alliances respond to economic imperatives is not likely to be affected by commitment concerns, but rather by the balance of power in the relationship. Given the fact that the balance of power is tilted towards parties, disloyal behavior is more likely to occur on the side of political parties than on that of the unions. In particular, in the context of pervasive economic constraints and limited party competition over economic policy issues, strong ties with the unions increase parties' incentives to co-opt union leaders in the task of communicating the necessity of reforms to their constituencies. Vor dem Hintergrund des sich in Westeuropa vollziehenden Wandels der Beziehungen zwischen Gewerkschaften und politischen Parteien untersucht das Papier Ausprägung und Auswirkungen der Allianzen zwischen Parteien und Gewerkschaften in Mittel- und Osteuropa. Das Papier entwickelt zwei zentrale Argumente. (1) Die Beziehungen zwischen Gewerkschaften und Parteien im Postkommunismus unterscheiden sich entscheidend von den westeuropäischen Erfahrungen und können am treffendsten als Beziehungen \"umgekehrter Abhängigkeit\" beschrieben werden, in denen die politischen Parteien immer die stärkeren Partner sind. (2) Im Gegensatz zu den Erfahrungen Westeuropas haben starke Bindungen zwischen Gewerkschaften und Parteien den Arbeitnehmerinteressen in Mittel- und Osteuropa geschadet. Dieses Paradox ist mit mangelnden Loyalitätsreserven zu erklären, die wiederum durch das Fehlen einer Tradition enger und auf gegenseitigem Nutzen beruhenden Beziehungen begründet sind. Die Art und Weise, wie solch neue Allianzen auf wirtschaftliche Notwendigkeiten antworten, wird weniger von Loyalitätsüberlegungen als vielmehr von dem in den Beziehungen herrschenden Machtverhältnis beeinflusst. Da die Macht der Parteien größer ist, neigen sie eher zu Loyalitätsbrüchen als die Gewerkschaften. In Anbetracht der extremen wirtschaftlicher Zwänge und des geringen Parteienwettbewerbs in wirtschaftspolitischen Fragen im Postkommunismus bieten starke Verbindungen zu den Gewerkschaften einen Anreiz für die Parteien, die Gewerkschaftsführer zu kooptieren, um ihrer Wählerschaft die Notwendigkeit von Reformen zu vermitteln.

This paper offers an explanation for variations in the effectiveness of trade unions to obtain legislative and policy concessions in peak-level tripartite negotiations in post-communist East Central Europe. I examine the usefulness of some standard interpretations for such variations, namely economic-structural arguments, arguments originating in democratization literature, political cycle arguments, and neo-institutionalist arguments (particularly from the corporatist literature). I argue that none of them offers a fully satisfactory explanation for the problem at hand. Standard explanations mostly offer static accounts which either neglect the importance of key actors' strategies or assume that these strategies are predetermined. Instead, I argue that the sources of these variations are to be attributed to distinct paths of state-labor relations which are the product of continuous strategic interactions within the general framework of tripartite institutions. To present a mechanism through which these paths evolve, this paper sketches a model of government-union interactions that combines institutional and behavioral variables. I propose a set of hypotheses with respect to the conditions that determine initial choice of strategies and factors that influence continuation or modification of these strategies later on. The paper further illustrates how these interactions shape tripartite institutions in such a way that they start reflecting accentuated power disparities between the contending actors, thereby limiting the scope of future choices for weaker actors. I demonstrate how the interplay of the proposed variables has shaped distinct paths of statelabor relations, and influenced the effectiveness of unions, in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. Das vorliegende Discussion Paper bietet eine Erklärung für den unterschiedlichen Erfolg, mit dem Gewerkschaften in Mittel- und Osteuropa in tripartistischen Verhandlungen legislative und politische Konzessionen erlangt haben. Hierzu gibt es bereits eine Reihe von gängigen Erklärungen, etwa der Verweis auf die Demokratisierungsliteratur, die Betonung von politischen Zyklen oder unterschiedlichen Wirtschaftsstrukturen, aber auch neoinstitutionalistische Argumente insbesondere aus der Korporatismustheorie. Keiner dieser Ansätze bietet aber eine wirklich zufrieden stellende Erklärung für das vorliegende Problem. Die gängigen Erklärungen sind meist statisch und messen entweder den von den zentralen Akteuren verfolgten Strategien keine große Bedeutung bei oder sehen diese als weitgehend prädeterminiert an. Der Aufsatz erklärt Unterschiede im gewerkschaftlichen Erfolg hingegen mit unterschiedlichen Entwicklungspfaden der Staat - Gewerkschaftsbeziehungen. Sie sind das Ergebnis fortwährender strategischer Interaktionen innerhalb tripartistischer Institutionen. Ein Modell der strategischen Interaktionen zwischen Regierungen und Gewerkschaften erklärt, wie sich diese Pfade entwickeln. Das Modell kombiniert institutionelle und Verhaltensvariablen und setzt diese in Verhältnis zu einer Anzahl von Hypothesen über die Faktoren, die die anfängliche Strategiewahl und spätere Strategiewechsel beeinflussen. Dabei spiegeln tripartistische Institutionen die veränderten Machtverhältnisse zwischen den zentralen Akteuren wider, und begrenzen damit auch die Bandbreite zukünftiger Handlungsoptionen schwächerer Akteure. Der Aufsatz zeigt, wie sich durch diese Interaktionen spezifische Entwicklungspfade der Staat - Gewerkschaftsbeziehungen ausbilden, die die Unterschiede in der Durchsetzungsfähigkeit der Gewerkschaften in der Tschechischen Republik, Ungarn und Polen erklären.

The paper offers an explanation for variations in the effectiveness of trade unions to obtain legislative and policy concessions in peak-level tripartite negotiations in post-communist East Central Europe. It shows that standard interpretations for such variations – focused on structural legacies, modes of transition, political cycles, and institutional differences – cannot account for the problem at hand. Instead, I argue that the sources of these variations are to be attributed to distinct paths of state-labor relations, which are the product of continuous strategic interactions that crucially depend on power dynamics. To present a mechanism through which these paths evolve, the paper sketches a model of government-union interactions that combines institutional and behavioral variables. I propose a set of hypotheses regarding the conditions that determine initial choice of strategies and factors that influence continuation or modification of these strategies later on. By analyzing the cases of the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland, the paper further illustrates how these interactions shape tripartite institutions in such a way that they start reflecting accentuated power disparities between the contending actors, thereby limiting future choice sets for weaker actors.

Using new data, the paper examines the effect of employment protection legislation (EPL) on aggregate and youth unemployment in advanced OECD economies and in Central and Eastern Europe during 1980-2009. The analysis assesses both the direct and indirect effects of EPL on levels of unemployment, as well as the short-term and long-term effects of changes in EPL on changes in unemployment. The results offer no clear support for the argument that EPL is a cause of either aggregate or youth unemployment. While EPL reaches statistical significance at conventional levels in some models, the results are sensitive to small changes in the sample or the use of alternative estimators. The only finding that appears robust concerns the interaction between EPL and the tax wedge, which suggests some scope for reform complementarity in tackling youth labour market problems. On the whole, the analysis suggests that government efforts to tackle unemployment by deregulating EPL alone may well be unwarranted.