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We ask whether the productivity advantage of internationalized firms documented by the international trade literature can be interpreted most accurately in terms of proximity to the “technological frontier”. We answer in the affirmative using a methodology (based on mixture models) of unbundling technology and total factor productivity (TFP) by estimating “technology-specific” production function parameters. Exploiting detailed data provided by the EFIGE database (a sample of firms distributed across Austria, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Spain, and the UK), we find technology gaps (with respect to the frontier) more than three times larger than the TFP gaps on average. We also find sizable technology advantages for firms undertaking foreign direct investment and/or exporting to other European Union countries or to China, for importers of materials, and for firms with competitors in China and the USA. Medium and large firms feature a higher technology premium, which is even higher for firms operating in country-sectors that are more exposed to import competition from China. Younger firms use better technologies but less effectively.

A very well-established economic literature maintains that state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are inefficient as compared to privately owned ones (POEs). In this paper, I argue that SOEs' inefficiency is not due to state ownership per se, but is rather caused conditions other than ownership, to which SOEs often - though not necessarily always - relate. In particular, I focus on dynamic efficiency - specifically, the production of technological innovation - of SOEs in manufacturing industries, where SOEs should contend with POEs in a competitive environment. I suggest that targeted measures, which are aimed at increasing managers' commitment to long-term investment strategies and at reducing corruption and political interference - albeit complex and difficult to implement - can be much more (positively) impactful on long-run technical progress than the simple privatization of companies. This leaves room for exploration and implementation of policies that might reconcile state ownership and market competition in industrial sectors.

We analyse how institutional complementarities between employee representation laws and dismissal restrictions influence aggregate innovation outcomes. We argue that greater employee voice, due to improved employee representation legislations, may spur innovative effort by employees only when shareholders cannot renegotiate ex-ante agreements with workers over revenue sharing, by threatening dismissal. We perform a panel regression analysis, exploiting country-sector panel data over the 1977–2005 period, and find that stronger employee representation laws in the presence of stricter firing restrictions are in fact associated with higher patenting activity. Consistently with our theoretical argument, the magnitude of this empirical relationship is seen to be relatively larger in those sectors where the human capital contribution to production is higher. Implications for the analysis of economic institutions and for legal policy making are proposed.

Proponents of minority shareholder protection state that national legal institutions protecting small investors boost stock markets and, in turn, the long-term performance of countries. In this paper we empirically challenge this argument. We perform three-stage least squares estimation on a sample of 48 countries during 1993—2006 and find that countries with stronger shareholder protection tend to have larger market capitalisation but also lower innovative activity. We cope with stock market endogeneity and industry heterogeneity, and circumvent omitted variables bias, so that this finding is unlikely to be driven by misspecification problems. The estimation results are interpreted, arguing that stronger shareholder protection may depress rather than encourage the most valuable corporate productions, because it enables small and diversified shareholders to play opportunistic actions against undiversified stockholders, after specific investments are undertaken by the company; innovative activity, largely based on specific investing, is particularly exposed to this problem.

Like land before the industrial revolution, in the present global economy much knowledge is being enclosed in private hands. In this paper we argue that these enclosures have become a major factor in specialization among firms and among countries: both are forced to specialize in the fields that are not restricted by the enclosures of the others. We use data on 26 OECD countries over the 1978-2006 period. We estimate the effect of patents endowments of countries on their investment specialization across sectors and show that knowledge enclosures involve self-reinforcing innovation patterns. Moreover, we perform a structural change analysis and find that the TRIPs agreement has significantly strengthened the relationship between countries' patents specialization and investment specialization. We conclude by suggesting that stronger international patent protection may restrict global investment opportunities, and this may be one of the factors contributing to the present crisis.

We investigate whether workplace voice through institutionalized forms of employee representation (ER) affects the design of firm hierarchies. We look at the role of ER within a knowledge-based view of hierarchies, where the firm's choice of hierarchical layers depends on the trade-off between communication and knowledge acquisition costs. Using a sample of more than 20,000 private-sector firms in 32 countries, we find that the presence of ER is positively associated with the number of organizational layers, though the relationship is tempered by firm size. ER positively correlates with job training, skill development and enhanced internal communication via staff meetings. The analysis of managers' perceptions suggests the higher frequency of meetings in firms with ER does not lead to more delays in the implementation of organizational changes. Taken together, our findings point to ER as facilitating the flow of information to top decision-makers and hence reducing communication costs. This may enable the firm to economize scarce cognitive resources without retarding the accumulation of new shop-floor capabilities. We contribute to recent literature on organizational design by suggesting ER institutions as possibly relaxing the trade-off between communication and knowledge acquisition costs within firms.

University students' drop-out is a crucial issue for the universities' efficiency evaluation and funding. In this paper, we analyze the drop-out rate of the Economics and Business faculty of Sapienza University of Rome. We use administrative data on 9,725 undergraduates students enrolled in three-years bachelor programs from 2001 to 2007 and perform a Generalized Linear Mixed Model. Our aim is to improve the general understanding of the students' withdrawing focusing on personal characteristics of students rather than on institutional aspects of the university. The empirical analysis unveils the statistically significant effect of students' characteristics, like citizenship and income, while the main findings relate a high drop-out probability to a high secondary school final mark and a low individual students' performance. (HRK / Abstract übernommen).

We investigate the political determinants of liberalization in OECD network industries, performing a panel estimation over 30 years, through the largest and most updated sample available. Our results contrast with the traditional wisdom according to which right-wing governments do promote market-oriented policies more intensively than left-wing ones. Our findings reveal a neglected role of the so-called neoliberalism in promoting left-wing market-oriented policy. As a result, we claim that ideological cleavages ceased to act as determinants of the liberalization wave observed in network industries. This result is confirmed when controlling for the existing regulatory conditions that executives find when elected. Furthermore, we find that the country’s exposure to other countries’ policy initiatives acts as a positive stimulus for liberalization policies.

One question that still remains open in the political economy research agenda is whether the global diffusion of the neo-liberal policies constitutes a definitive trespassing of traditional ideological cleavages, thus the decline of ideological division itself. Belloc and Nicita examine neoliberalism, partisanship and public policy making and argue that a comprehensive theoretical framework is needed in order to understand the economic and political rationale, respectively, for right-wing and left-wing parties to hinder or promote liberalization policy in network industries.