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Understanding the factors that might intentionally influence the reception of global navigation satellite system (GNSS) signals can be a challenging topic today. The focus of this research is to evaluate the vulnerability of geodetic GNSS receivers under the use of a low-cost L1/E1 frequency jammer. A suitable area for testing was established in Slovenia. Nine receivers from different manufacturers were under consideration in this study. While positioning, intentional 3-minute jammings were performed by a jammer that was located statically at different distances from receivers. Furthermore, kinematic disturbances were performed using a jammer placed in a vehicle that passed the testing area at various speeds. An analysis of different scenarios indicated that despite the use of an L1/E1 jammer, the GLONASS (Russian: Globalnaya Navigatsionnaya Sputnikovaya Sistema) and Galileo signals were also affected, either due to the increased carrier-to-noise-ratio (C/N0) or, in the worst cases, by a loss-of-signal. A jammer could substantially affect the position, either with a lack of any practical solution or even with a wrong position. Maximal errors in the carrier-phase positions, which should be considered a concern for geodesy, differed by a few metres from the exact solution. The factor that completely disabled the signal reception was the proximity of a jammer, regardless of its static or kinematic mode.

Jamming is becoming a serious threat to various users of global navigation satellite systems (GNSS). Therefore, live monitoring tests are required to estimate the sensitivity range of GNSS receivers under jamming. This study analyses the response of some mass-market and professional-grade receivers to intentional interferences based on different 3D jammer positions. First, the vertical jamming was investigated, followed by a horizontal experiment where the receivers were placed at three locations while the jammer was moving within a triangular area. The aim was to determine a fingerprint of the influence of the L1/E1 chirp jammer on receivers used in the research. The results show that low-cost receivers are much more susceptible to interference, while the latest generation of GNSS geodetic receivers are much more resilient. It is encouraging that positioning in the presence of jamming could be achieved on a larger scale, especially by using professional receivers. An attempt to position the jammer will be left for trials when a more frequency stable device is applied.

Smartphones now dominate the Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) devices capable of collecting raw data. However, they also offer valuable research opportunities in intentional jamming, which has become a serious threat to the GNSS. Smartphones have the potential to locate jammers, but their robustness and sensitivity range need to be investigated first. In this study, the response of smartphones with dual-frequency, multi-constellation reception capability, namely, a Xiaomi Mi8, a Xiaomi 11T, a Samsung Galaxy S20, and a Huawei P40, to various single- and multi-frequency jammers is investigated. The two-day jamming experiments were conducted in a remote area with minimal impact on users, using these smartphones and two Leica GS18 and two Leica GS15 geodetic receivers, which were placed statically at the side of a road and in a line, approximately 10 m apart. A vehicle with jammers installed passed them several times at a constant speed. In one scenario, a person carrying the jammer was constantly tracked using a tacheometer to determine the exact distance to the receivers for each time stamp. The aim was, first, to determine the effects of the various jammers on the smartphones’ positioning capabilities and to compare their response in terms of the speed and quality of repositioning with professional geodetic receivers. Second, a method was developed to determine the position of the interference source by varying the signal loss threshold and the recovery time on the smartphone and the decaying carrier-to-noise ratio (CNR). The results indicate that GNSS observations from smartphones have an advantage over geodetic receivers in terms of localizing jammers because they do not lose the signal near the source of the jamming, but they are characterized by sudden drops in the CNR.

Robust autonomous driving, as long as it relies on satellite-based positioning, requires carrier-phase-based algorithms, among other types of data sources, to obtain precise and true positions, which is also primarily true for the use of GNSS geodetic receivers, but also increasingly true for mass-market devices. The experiment was conducted under line-of-sight conditions on a straight road during a period of no traffic. The receivers were positioned on the roof of a car travelling at low speed in the presence of a static jammer, while kinematic relative positioning was performed with the static reference base receiver. Interference mitigation techniques in the GNSS receivers used, which were unknown to the authors, were compared using (a) the observed carrier-to-noise power spectral density ratio as an indication of the receivers’ ability to improve signal quality, and (b) the post-processed position solutions based on RINEX-formatted data. The observed carrier-to-noise density generally exerts the expected dependencies and leaves space for comparisons of applied processing abilities in the receivers, while conclusions on the output data results comparison are limited due to the non-synchronized clocks of the receivers. According to our current and previous results, none of the GNSS receivers used in the experiments employs an effective type of complete mitigation technique adapted to the chirp jammer.

This paper presents a unique 200-day dataset of raw GNSS single-frequency L1 receiver measurements collected aboard a research vessel during a continuous Antarctic expedition from October 7, 2024, to April 24, 2025. The dataset comprises daily-segmented binary UBX files containing multi-constellation L1-band observations, including position and time (UBX-NAV-PVT), satellite metadata (UBX-NAV-SAT), RF front-end diagnostics (UBX-MON-RF), FFT results of the received signal spectrum (UBX-MON-SPAN), raw satellite pseudorange and carrier-phase data (UBX-RXM-MEASX), and intermittent Galileo SAR return-link messages (UBX-RXM-RLM). Files are organized by UTC date to streamline batch parsing and maintain file sizes under  ≈ 600 MB. Synchronized receiver state metrics and high-resolution spectrum waterfalls allow for a detailed characterization of multipath propagation, the consequences of unintentional interference from ground systems, and intentional jamming conditions in all types of maritime environments, from Mediterranean to polar regions. This dataset facilitates GNSS performance modeling, enables diverse radio-frequency interference analysis, and allows for antenna performance characterization in harsh marine environments. Furthermore, it aids in resilient PNT algorithm development for autonomous vessels and assists in benchmarking Real-Time Kinematic (RTK) positioning in low signal-to-noise and dynamic motion scenarios.

This paper presents the results of a vulnerability test of several geodetic Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) receivers in case of intentional signal interference in the frequency L1 for GPS (Global Positioning System). Nine instruments from different manufacturers (i.e., Leica Geosystems AG, Trimble Inc., Javad GNSS) were tested. The test was based on static and kinematic jamming. A static scenario with three-minute interruptions was followed by experiments with a stationary jammer located at distances from 10 m to 160 m from the receivers. For short-term kinematic interference, the jammer was installed in the vehicle, which passed the GNSS instruments at different speeds. An analysis of different scenarios showed that the jammer interrupted GPS but not GLONASS signals in certain situations. Since Galileo was not nominally operational at the time of the July 2019 measurements, only GPS and GLONASS were eligible for the study. The geodetic GNSS instruments reacted to the interruptions with a decreased signal-to-noise-ratio (SNR) and either with a complete inability to determine the code/phase position or with an incorrect calculation of phase ambiguities (initialization), which also affected the quality of the positioning. The proximity of the jammer played the most significant role in the complete inability to receive the signal; however, for the incorrect positioning longer duration of jamming was also a reason.

This paper presents the results of a vulnerability test of several geodetic Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) receivers in case of intentional signal interference in the frequency L1 for GPS (Global Positioning System). Nine instruments from different manufacturers (i.e., Leica Geosystems AG, Trimble Inc., Javad GNSS) were tested. The test was based on static and kinematic jamming. A static scenario with three-minute interruptions was followed by experiments with a stationary jammer located at distances from 10 m to 160 m from the receivers. For short-term kinematic interference, the jammer was installed in the vehicle, which passed the GNSS instruments at different speeds. An analysis of different scenarios showed that the jammer interrupted GPS but not GLONASS signals in certain situations. Since Galileo was not nominally operational at the time of the July 2019 measurements, only GPS and GLONASS were eligible for the study. The geodetic GNSS instruments reacted to the interruptions with a decreased signal-to-noise-ratio (SNR) and either with a complete inability to determine the code/phase position or with an incorrect calculation of phase ambiguities (initialization), which also affected the quality of the positioning. The proximity of the jammer played the most significant role in the complete inability to receive the signal; however, for the incorrect positioning longer duration of jamming was also a reason.

KLJUČNE BESEDE GNSS, namerno motenje signala, motilnik L1, prekinitev signala, razmerje signal-šum ABSTRACT This paper presents the results of a vulnerability test of several geodetic Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) receivers in case of intentional signal interference in the frequency L1 for GPS (Global Positioning System). An analysis of different scenarios showed that the jammer interrupted GPS but not GLONASS signals in certain situations. Since Galileo was not nominally operational at the time of the July 2019 measurements, only GPS and GLONASS were eligible for the study. The geodetic GNSS instruments reacted to the interruptions with a decreased signal-to-noise-ratio (SNR) and either with a complete inability to determine the code/phase position or with an incorrect calculation of phase ambiguities (initialization), which also affected the quality of the positioning. KEY WORDS GNSS, intentional signal interference, jammer L1, signal interruptions, signal-to-noise ratio (ProQuest: ... denotes formulae omitted.) 1 UVOD Pri vsakodnevni uporabi in zanašanju na tehnologijo globalnega pozicioniranja enega ali već globalnih satelitskih navigacijskih sistemov (angl.