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63 result(s) for "Baccini, Leonardo"
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The COVID-19 pandemic and the 2020 US presidential election
What is the effect of the COVID-19 pandemic on the 2020 US presidential election? Guided by a pre-analysis plan, we estimate the effect of COVID-19 cases and deaths on the change in county-level voting for Donald Trump between 2016 and 2020. To account for potential confounders, we include a large number of COVID-19-related controls as well as demographic and socioeconomic variables. Moreover, we instrument the numbers of cases and deaths with the share of workers employed in meat-processing factories to sharpen our identification strategy.We find that COVID-19 cases negatively affected Trump’s vote share. The estimated effect appears strongest in urban counties, in states without stay-at-home orders, in swing states, and in states that Trump won in 2016. A simple counterfactual analysis suggests that Trump would likely have won re-election if COVID-19 cases had been 5 percent lower. We also find some evidence that COVID-19 incidence had a positive effect on voters’ mobilization, helping Biden win the presidency.
المؤسسات الدولية والسياسة المحلية : هل تساعد \اتفاقيات التجارة التفضيلية\ القادة على تعزيز الإصلاح الاقتصادي ؟
توضح هذه الدراسة كيف تؤثر المؤسسات الدولية في السياسة المحلية وطرائق تأثر الآثار المؤسسية المتوقعة في القرار السياسي لمواصلة العضوية في هذه المؤسسات ووظفت الدراسة البيانات الخاصة بمفاوضات اتفاقيات التجارة التفضيلية مع الاتحاد الأوروبي / الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية لفحص إذا ما كان قادة الدول النامية يستخدمون هذه الاتفاقيات بصورة استراتيجية لتعزيز الإصلاح الاقتصادي في بلدانهم أو لا ويشارك القادة في المفاوضات حول اتفاقيات التجارة التفضيلية عندما يريدون الإصلاح في بلدانهم ولكنهم يصطدمون بالأطراف السياسية المحلية المعارضة لتلك الاتفاقيات.
The design of international trade agreements: Introducing a new dataset
Preferential trade agreements (PTAs) have been proliferating for the last twenty years. A large literature has studied various aspects of this phenomenon. Until recently, however, many large-N studies have paid only scant attention to variation across PTAs in terms of content and design. Our contribution to this literature is a new dataset on the design of trade agreements that is the most comprehensive in terms of both variables coded and agreements covered. We illustrate the dataset’s usefulness in re-visiting the questions if and to what extent PTAs impact trade flows. The analysis shows that on average PTAs increase trade flows, but that this effect is largely driven by deep agreements. In addition, we provide evidence that provisions that tackle behind-the-border regulation matter for trade flows. The dataset’s contribution is not limited to the PTA literature, however. Broader debates on topics such as institutional design and the legalization of international relations will also benefit from the novel data.
The Distributional Consequences of Preferential Trade Liberalization: Firm-Level Evidence
While increasing trade and foreign direct investment, international trade agreements create winners and losers. Our paper examines the distributional consequences of preferential trade agreements (PTAs) at the firm level. We contend that PTAs expand trade among the largest and most productive multinationals by lowering preferential tariffs. We examine data covering the near universe of US foreign direct investment and disaggregated tariff data from PTAs signed by the United States. Our results indicate that US preferential tariffs increase sales to the United States from the most competitive subsidiaries of multinational corporations operating in partner countries. We also find increases in market concentration in partner countries following preferential liberalization with the United States. By demonstrating that the gains from preferential liberalization are unevenly distributed across firms, we shed new light on the firm-level, economic sources of political mobilization over international trade and investment policies.
International Institutions and Domestic Politics: Can Preferential Trading Agreements Help Leaders Promote Economic Reform?
How do domestic politics influence the formation of international institutions, and how do international institutions shape domestic politics? These questions cannot be answered in isolation because national leaders form and join international institutions to advance their domestic interests. We illuminate the relationship between international institutions and domestic politics by analyzing whether preferential trading agreements (PTAs) promote liberal economic reform. In developing countries, leaders engage in PTA negotiations with major powers (European Union and United States) when these leaders want to implement reforms but cannot do so due to domestic political opposition and a lack of credible commitment. PTA negotiations promote economic reform by enabling credible commitment and allowing the leader to condition the implementation of the PTA on liberal policies.
Why do States Commit to International Labor Standards? Interdependent Ratification of Core ILO Conventions, 1948–2009
Ratifying core conventions adopted by the International Labor Organization (ILO) creates legal obligations to improve labor standards in the domestic economy, notably with regard to union rights, minimum age and discrimination in employment, and forced labor. Why and when do states choose to ratify them? Two influential theoretical approaches lead to the expectation that states are influenced by the ratification behavior of other states. Drawing on rationalist institutionalism, the authors expect states to use institutions such as the ILO to improve or consolidate their preferred standards domestically while reducing the risk of suffering competitive disadvantages in world markets. In this view, ILO conventions are devices for the prevention and mitigation of regulatory races to the bottom among trade rivals. Drawing on sociological institutionalism, they expect states to ratify ILO conventions if doing so conforms to a norm of appropriate behavior that is prevalent in a state's peer groups. This article develops observable implications of these hypotheses and tests them by applying spatial regression models to seven core ILO conventions and 187 countries between 1948 and 2009. The analysis yields strong evidence in support of both hypotheses.
The source of economic shocks matters for their political outcomes
Do different economic shocks favor different types of political leadership? Using a survey experiment conducted on 3500 American respondents, we offer causal evidence for an unexpected relation between different types of economic shocks and a demand for a radical political response. First, we show that individuals believe politicians have a role in preventing layoffs due to both offshoring and automation, compared to run-of-the-mill bankruptcies. Second, we find strong evidence that economic shocks due to offshoring lead to greater demands for leaders who display authoritarian traits, with no equivalent effect for layoffs due to automation. When presented with news of an offshoring event, respondents favor leaders who claim to be more willing to flout the rule of law, to implement divisive policies, and to employ force. By contrast, traits commonly associated with populism, such as siding with “the people” or preferring political outsiders, see no association with either offshoring or automation shocks. Our findings support the view that some economic shocks provide a greater opportunity for political candidates willing to turn to radical political solutions.
Gone For Good: Deindustrialization, White Voter Backlash, and US Presidential Voting
Globalization and automation have contributed to deindustrialization and the loss of millions of manufacturing jobs, yielding important electoral implications across advanced democracies. Coupling insights from economic voting and social identity theory, we consider how different groups in society may construe manufacturing job losses in contrasting ways. We argue that deindustrialization threatens dominant group status, leading some white voters in affected localities to favor candidates they believe will address economic distress and defend racial hierarchy. Examining three US presidential elections, we find white voters were more likely to vote for Republican challengers where manufacturing layoffs were high, whereas Black voters in hard-hit localities were more likely to vote for Democrats. In survey data, white respondents, in contrast to people of color, associated local manufacturing job losses with obstacles to individual upward mobility and with broader American economic decline. Group-based identities help explain divergent political reactions to common economic shocks.
The New Regionalism and Policy Interdependence
Since 1990, the number of preferential trade agreements has increased rapidly. The argument in this article explains this phenomenon, known as the new regionalism, as a result of competition for market access; exporters facing trade diversion because of their exclusion from a preferential trade agreement concluded by foreign countries push their governments into signing an agreement with the country in which their exports are threatened. The argument is tested in a quantitative analysis of the proliferation of preferential trade agreements among 167 countries between 1990 and 2007. The finding that competition for market access is a major driving force of the new regionalism is a contribution to the literature on regionalism and to broader debates about global economic regulation.