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Personal data is ubiquitous in the digital world, can be highly valuable in aggregate, and can lead to unintended intrusions for the data creator. However, individuals’ expressions of concern about exposure of their personal information are generally not matched by their behavioural caution. One reason for this mismatch could be the varied and intangible value of personal data. We present three studies investigating the potential association between personal data value and privacy behaviour, assessing both individual and cross-cultural differences in personal data valuation, comparing collectivist and individualistic cultures. Study 1a, using a representative UK sample, found no relationship between personal data value and privacy behaviour. However, Study 1b found Indian (collectivist) participants’ privacy behaviour was sensitive to personal data value, unlike US (individualist) participants. Study 2 showed that in a UK sample, privacy behaviour was sensitive to personal data value but only for individuals who think of themselves as more similar to others (i.e., self-construe as similar, rather than different). We suggest those who prioritise group memberships are more sensitive to unintentional disclosure harm and therefore behave in accordance with personal data valuations—which informs the privacy concern-behaviour relationship. Our findings can suggest approaches to encourage privacy behaviours.

Eye movements in Sally-Anne false-belief tasks appear to reflect the ability to implicitly monitor the mental states of other individuals (theory of mind, or ToM). It has recently been proposed that an early-developing, efficient, and automatically operating ToM system subserves this ability. Surprisingly absent from the literature, however, is an empirical test of the influence of domain-general executive processing resources on this implicit ToM system. In the study reported here, a dual-task method was employed to investigate the impact of executive load on eye movements in an implicit Sally-Anne false-belief task. Under no-load conditions, adult participants displayed eye movement behavior consistent with implicit belief processing, whereas evidence for belief processing was absent for participants under cognitive load. These findings indicate that the cognitive system responsible for implicitly tracking beliefs draws at least minimally on executive processing resources. Thus, even the most low-level processing of beliefs appears to reflect a capacity-limited operation.

Here, we report a novel social orienting response that occurs after viewing averted gaze. We show, in three experiments, that when a person looks from one location to an object, attention then shifts towards the face of an individual who has subsequently followed the person's gaze to that same object. That is, contrary to ‘gaze following’, attention instead orients in the opposite direction to observed gaze and towards the gazing face. The magnitude of attentional orienting towards a face that ‘follows’ the participant's gaze is also associated with self-reported autism-like traits. We propose that this gaze leading phenomenon implies the existence of a mechanism in the human social cognitive system for detecting when one's gaze has been followed, in order to establish ‘shared attention’ and maintain the ongoing interaction.

A fundamental task of the cognitive system is to prioritize behaviourally relevant sensory inputs for processing at the expense of irrelevant inputs. In a study of neurotypical participants ( n  = 179), we utilized a brief flanker interference task while varying the perceptual load of the visual display. Typically, increasing perceptual load (i.e., with greater numbers of search items) reduces interference from a competing peripheral distractor. We show that individuals who score above average on the Autism Spectrum Quotient (AQ) show stronger interference at high perceptual load than individuals with below-average AQ scores. This is consistent with recent findings in individuals with autism spectrum conditions, and supports the idea that the cognitive style of the autistic brain is reflected in a broader phenotype across the population.

When we see another person look somewhere, we automatically attend to the same location in space. This joint attention emerges early in life and has a great impact on social interactions in development and in everyday adult life. The direction of another's gaze indicates what object is of current interest, which may be the target for a subsequent action. In this study, we found that objects that are looked at by other people are liked more than objects that do not receive the attention of other people (Experiment 1). This suggests that observing averted gaze can have an impact on the affective appraisals of objects in the environment. This liking effect was absent when an arrow was used to cue attention (Experiment 2). This underlines the importance of other people's interactions with objects for generating our own impressions of such stimuli in the world.

Perceiving another individual's actions activates the human motor system. We investigated whether this effect is stronger when the observed action is relevant to the observer's task. The mu rhythm (oscillatory activity in the 8- to 13-Hz band over sensorimotor cortex) was measured while participants watched videos of grasping movements. In one of two conditions, the participants had to later report how many times they had seen a certain kind of grasp. In the other condition, they viewed the identical videos but had to later report how many times they had seen a certain colour change. The colour change and the grasp always occurred simultaneously. Results show mu rhythm attenuation when watching the videos relative to baseline. This attenuation was stronger when participants later reported the grasp rather than the colour, suggesting that the motor system is more strongly activated when the observed grasping actions were relevant to the observer's task. Moreover, when the graspable object disappeared after the offset of the video, there was subsequent mu rhythm enhancement, reflecting a post-stimulus inhibitory rebound. This enhancement was again stronger when making judgments about the grasp than the colour, suggesting that the stronger activation is followed by a stronger inhibitory rebound.

Background Autistic individuals commonly show circumscribed or “special” interests: areas of obsessive interest in a specific category. The present study investigated what impact these interests have on attention, an aspect of autistic cognition often reported as altered. In neurotypical individuals, interest and expertise have been shown to result in an automatic attentional priority for related items. Here, we examine whether this change in salience is also seen in autism. Methods Adolescents and young adults with and without autism performed a personalized selective attention task assessing the level of attentional priority afforded to images related to the participant’s specific interests. In addition, participants performed a similar task with generic images in order to isolate any effects of interest and expertise. Crucially, all autistic and non-autistic individuals recruited for this study held a strong passion or interest. As such, any differences in attention could not be solely attributed to differing prevalence of interests in the two groups. In both tasks, participants were asked to perform a central target-detection task while ignoring irrelevant distractors (related or unrelated to their interests). The level of distractor interference under various task conditions was taken as an indication of attentional priority. Results Neurotypical individuals showed the predicted attentional priority for the circumscribed interest images but not generic items, reflecting the impact of their interest and expertise. Contrary to predictions, autistic individuals did not show this priority: processing the interest-related stimuli only when task demands were low. Attention to images unrelated to circumscribed interests was equivalent in the two groups. Conclusions These results suggest that despite autistic individuals holding an intense interest in a particular class of stimuli, there may be a reduced impact of this prior experience and expertise on attentional processing. The implications of this absence of automatic priority are discussed in terms of the behaviors associated with the condition.

Research shows that humans spontaneously follow another individual’s gaze. However, little remains known on how they respond when multiple gaze cues diverge across members of a social group. To address this question, we presented participants with displays depicting three (Experiment 1 ) or five (Experiment 2 ) agents showing diverging social cues. In a three-person group, one individual looking at the target (33% of the group) was sufficient to elicit gaze-facilitated target responses. With a five-person group, however, three individuals looking at the target (60% of the group) were necessary to produce the same effect. Gaze following in small groups therefore appears to be based on a quorum-like principle, whereby the critical level of social information needed for gaze following is determined by a proportion of consistent social cues scaled as a function of group size. As group size grows, greater agreement is needed to evoke joint attention.

Observing averted gaze results in a reflexive shift of attention to the gazed‐at location. In two experiments, participants scoring high and low on the Autism‐Spectrum Quotient questionnaire (AQ; Baron‐Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, Martin, & Clubley, 2001) observed arrow and gaze cues to investigate cueing effect magnitude as a function of the context in which peripheral targets could appear. While identical cueing effects were found with gaze and arrow cues, the more striking results concerned target stimuli. In Experiment 1, targets could appear on a peripheral face, or on scrambled face parts. Overall, greater cueing effects were found when the target appeared on a face. However, this face bias was only observed in participants with low AQ scores, whereas high AQ scorers oriented more to scrambled features. Experiment 2 found equal cueing to targets appearing on tools, as compared with tool parts. However, individual differences were again observed, where low AQ scorers showed larger cueing towards tools, while high scorers oriented more to scrambled parts, as in Experiment 1. These results support the idea that low AQ individuals orient strongly to objects attended by others. However, since the same results were found for arrow cues, this effect may generalize to all central cues to attention. High AQ scorers possessing many more autistic‐like traits tended to orient more to scrambled shapes, perhaps reflecting a bias for orienting to local details.

Although following another person's gaze is essential influent social interactions, the reflexive nature of this gaze-cuing effect means that gaze can be used to deceive. In a gaze-cuing procedure, participants were presented with several faces that looked to the left or right. Some faces always looked to the target (predictive-valid), some never looked to the target (predictive-invalid), and others looked toward and away from the target in equal proportions (nonpredictive). The standard gaze-cuing effects appeared to be unaffected by these contingencies. Nevertheless, participants tended to choose the predictive-valid faces as appearing more trustworthy than the predictive-invalid faces. This effect was negatively related to scores on a scale assessing autistic-like traits. Further, we present tentative evidence that the \"deceptive\" faces were encoded more strongly in memory than the \"cooperative\" faces. These data demonstrate the important interactions among attention, gaze perception, facial identity recognition, and personality judgments.