Catalogue Search | MBRL
Are you sure you want to remove the book from the shelf?
{{itemTitle}}
80
result(s) for
"Bayne, Tim"
Sort by:
Thought : a very short introduction
\"In this lively Very Short Introduction, Tim Bayne explores the nature of thought. Drawing on research from philosophy, psychology, neuroscience, and anthropology, he examines what we know--and what we don't know--about one of the defining features of human nature: our capacity for thought.\"--P. [2] of cover.
Book
On the axiomatic foundations of the integrated information theory of consciousness
The integrated information theory (IIT) is one of the most influential scientific theories of consciousness. It functions as a guiding framework for a great deal of research into the neural basis of consciousness and for attempts to develop a consciousness meter. In light of these developments, it is important to examine whether its foundations are secure. This article does just that by examining the axiomatic method that the architects of IIT appeal to. I begin by asking what exactly the axiomatic method involves, arguing that it is open to multiple interpretations. I then examine the five axioms of IIT, asking: what each axiom means, whether it is indeed axiomatic and whether it could constrain a theory of consciousness. I argue that none of the five alleged axioms is able to play the role that is required of it, either because it fails to qualify as axiomatic or because it fails to impose a substantive constraint on a theory of consciousness. The article concludes by briefly sketching an alternative methodology for the science of consciousness: the natural kind approach.
Journal Article
The Case Against Organoid Consciousness
Neural organoids are laboratory-generated entities that replicate certain structural and functional features of the human brain. Most neural organoids are disembodied—completely decoupled from sensory input and motor output. As such, questions about their potential capacity for consciousness are exceptionally difficult to answer. While not disputing the need for caution regarding certain neural organoid types, this paper appeals to two broad constraints on any adequate theory of consciousness—the first involving the dependence of consciousness on embodiment; the second involving the dependence of consciousness on representations—to argue that disembodied neural organoids are not plausible candidates for consciousness.
Journal Article
الفكر : مقدمة بالغة الإيجاز
يقوم كتاب الفكر على عدد من الاختصاصات يتولى الفلاسفة استكشاف بنية الفكر المنطقية والعلاقة بين الأفكار وظواهر عقلية أخرى مثل الحالات الإدراكية والأحاسيس الجسدية أما علماء النفس فيدرسون العمليات التي تسند قدرتنا إلى التفكير وأساليب تعطيل هذه العمليات ويعكف علماء الأعصاب على معاينة الآلية العصبية للتفكير ويهتم علماء الجنس البشري بالتدقيق في التنوع الثقافي لأنماط التفكير أما اللغويون فيبادرون إلى معاينة العلاقة بين الفكر واللغة في حين يركز علماء السلوك (الحيواني) المعرفي على دراسة الفكر في الأجناس غير البشرية ويتوجه الباحثون الذين يعملون في علم الحاسوب والذكاء الاصطناعي نحو طرق إمكانية تحقيق التفكير بوساطة أجهزة غير حيوية.
Book
Not with a “zap” but with a “beep”: Measuring the origins of perinatal experience
•Consciousness may emerge after thalamocortical networks form at 26 weeks gestation.•A “local-global” approach suggests consciousness in newborns and 35 week fetuses.•Default mode network activity has been observed in fetuses from 37 weeks.•We propose that sensory perturbations may be used to infer perinatal consciousness.•This could be done using prediction errors to perturb perinatal brain networks.
When does the mind begin? Infant psychology is mysterious in part because we cannot remember our first months of life, nor can we directly communicate with infants. Even more speculative is the possibility of mental life prior to birth. The question of when consciousness, or subjective experience, begins in human development thus remains incompletely answered, though boundaries can be set using current knowledge from developmental neurobiology and recent investigations of the perinatal brain. Here, we offer our perspective on how the development of a sensory perturbational complexity index (sPCI) based on auditory (“beep-and-zip”), visual (“flash-and-zip”), or even olfactory (“sniff-and-zip”) cortical perturbations in place of electromagnetic perturbations (“zap-and-zip”) might be used to address this question. First, we discuss recent studies of perinatal cognition and consciousness using techniques such as functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), electroencephalography (EEG), and, in particular, magnetoencephalography (MEG). While newborn infants are the archetypal subjects for studying early human development, researchers may also benefit from fetal studies, as the womb is, in many respects, a more controlled environment than the cradle. The earliest possible timepoint when subjective experience might begin is likely the establishment of thalamocortical connectivity at 26 weeks gestation, as the thalamocortical system is necessary for consciousness according to most theoretical frameworks. To infer at what age and in which behavioral states consciousness might emerge following the initiation of thalamocortical pathways, we advocate for the development of the sPCI and similar techniques, based on EEG, MEG, and fMRI, to estimate the perinatal brain's state of consciousness.
Journal Article
Hemispherotomy leads to persistent sleep-like slow waves in the isolated cortex of awake humans
Hemispherotomy is a neurosurgical procedure for treating refractory epilepsy, which entails disconnecting a significant portion of the cortex, potentially encompassing an entire hemisphere, from its cortical and subcortical connections. While this intervention prevents the spread of seizures, it raises important questions. Given the complete isolation from sensory-motor pathways, it remains unclear whether the disconnected cortex retains any form of inaccessible awareness. More broadly, the activity patterns that large portions of the deafferented cortex can sustain in awake humans remain poorly understood. We address these questions by exploring for the first time the electroencephalographic (EEG) state of the isolated cortex during wakefulness before and after surgery in 10 pediatric patients, focusing on non-epileptic background activity. Post-surgery, the isolated cortex exhibited prominent slow oscillations (<2 Hz) and a steeper broad-band spectral decay, reflecting a redistribution of power toward lower frequencies. This broad-band EEG slowing resulted in a marked decrease of the spectral exponent, a validated consciousness marker, reaching values characteristic of deep anesthesia and the vegetative state. When compared with a reference pediatric sample across the sleep–wake cycle, the spectral exponent of the contralateral cortex aligned with wakefulness, whereas that of the isolated cortex was consistent with deep NREM sleep. The findings of prominent slow oscillations and broad-band slowing provisionally support inferences of absent or reduced awareness in the isolated cortex. Moreover, the persistence of unihemispheric sleep-like patterns years after surgery provides unique insights into the long-term electrophysiological effects of cortical disconnections in the human brain.
Journal Article
Consciousness, Concepts, and Natural Kinds
We have various everyday measures for identifying the presence of consciousness, such as the capacity for verbal report and the intentional control of behavior. However, there are many contexts in which these measures are difficult (if not impossible) to apply, and even when they can be applied one might have doubts as to their validity in determining the presence/absence of consciousness. Everyday measures for identifying consciousness are particularly problematic when it comes to ‘challenging cases’—human infants, people with brain damage, nonhuman animals, and AI systems. There is a pressing need to identify measures of consciousness that can be applied to challenging cases. This paper explores one of the most promising strategies for identifying and validating such measures—the natural-kind strategy. The paper is in two broad parts. Part I introduces the natural-kind strategy, and contrasts it with other influential approaches in the field. Part II considers a number of objections to the approach, arguing that none succeeds.
Journal Article
Perception and the Reach of Phenomenal Content
The phenomenal character of perceptual experience involves the representation of colour, shape and motion. Does it also involve the representation of high-level categories? Is the recognition of a tomato as a tomato contained within perceptual phenomenality? Proponents of a conservative view of the reach of phenomenal content say 'No', whereas those who take a liberal view of perceptual phenomenality say 'Yes'. I clarify the debate between conservatives and liberals, and argue in favour of the liberal view that high-level content can directly inform the phenomenal character of perception.
Journal Article
Delusions as Doxastic States: Contexts, Compartments, and Commitments
While immersed in the classic arguments for global skepticism, the philosopher believes the conclusions of those arguments; when she is preparing the morning coffee, arguing with her husband, or cleaning out the refrigerator, she does not. Assuming this normative approach, do delusions qualify as beliefs or not? I doubt that delusions have the kind of unitary nature that would be needed in order for this question to have a determinate answer. [...] the normative view of things does not make it easier to answer the question of whether delusions are beliefs; indeed, it might even make it harder to answer such questions than the functional role approach does.
Journal Article