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Previous studies in Psychology have identified Psychological Entitlement (PE) as an important variable that affects a wide variety of attitudes and behaviors in humans. PE is an individual-level character trait that describes a tendency to expect unwarranted and unearned rewards. In this paper, we build on existing research in Psychology and we investigate the effect of PE on foreign policy attitudes. Theoretically, we expect that those who score high on PE will score higher on American exceptionalism and—as a result—they will have more negative attitudes toward international law. We test our hypotheses on a nationally representative sample of the United States adult population. Respondents were asked a number of questions designed to tap into their PE scores, foreign policy attitudes, and general demographic characteristics. Our models provide broad support for our theoretical expectations. An experimental follow-up analysis (in which entitlement levels were manipulated) corroborates our findings.

This research note evaluates the claim that referenda can serve as useful commitment devices in international negotiations. More specifically, we relied on individual-level survey data to test the claim that governments can successfully “tie their hands” to policy choices by calling referenda on political issues. Our empirical analysis relied on original survey data collected in April 2019 in Belize. In so doing, we took advantage of an unusual political event. On 8 May (shortly after our survey), Belizean citizens participated in a countrywide plebiscite. During this vote, they decided to send their country’s territorial dispute with Guatemala for adjudication to the International Court of Justice. From a research perspective, this event allowed us to assess the effect of disregarded referendum results in a highly salient political environment. Our experimental analysis suggested that individuals do reprimand their governments for failing to implement a majority vote (a) even if this choice precipitates a person’s favored substantive outcome, and (b) irrespective of an individual’s preferred party.

Confronting a more powerful rival can be a risky proposition. This paper integrates prospect theory into the growing Neoclassical Realist (NCR) literature to identify the conditions under which decision makers are most likely to accept foreign policy risks. I argue that decision makers governing regimes with low levels of political counterframing are more likely to settle into a dominant loss frame when their external security environment erodes. This increases the probability that they will initiate disputes with more powerful adversaries. To assess this proposition, I conduct a test of weaker state confrontation grounded in a NCR framework that utilizes the insights from prospect theory. Data come from the postwar era and support my hypothesis. Loss frames exert influence over the decision to initiate risky foreign policy strategies in regimes in which political counterframing is absent.

Abstract This paper analyzes public attitudes about the International Court of Justice (ICJ). We explore two questions: (1) Why are some people in favor of submitting their country's disputes to the ICJ while others are opposed? (2) How can we explain variations in public support for compliance with a costly ICJ ruling? We argue that individual-level attitudes about both issues are driven by different psychological dynamics. While we expect that cost–benefit calculations and cosmopolitan social identity will affect attitudes in both contexts, people's views on compliance should also be shaped by their level of social dominance orientation (SDO). Our statistical analysis is based on original survey data, collected in Belize in April 2019. We obtain three main findings. First, people's ex ante beliefs about the costs of an ICJ ruling have tangible effects on attitudes toward ICJ adjudication. As predicted, higher expected costs lead to decreased support for adjudication. Second, cosmopolitanism is positively associated with support for adjudication, but it has no effect on attitudes about compliance with international court rulings. Third, high-SDO respondents are less likely to favor the implementation of a costly ICJ verdict. However, SDO only reduces support for compliance in individuals with narrow social identity attachments.

Argues that international relations ought to be anchored in realistic models of human decision making. The field of international relations is only now beginning to take notice of cognitive models of decision making. Arguing against the trend of adopting formalistic depictions of human choice, Berejikian suggests that international relations and realistic models of human decision making go hand-in-hand. The result is a set of interconnected propositions that provide compelling new insights into state behavior. Utilizing this framework, he discusses the behavior of the United States and Europe in negotiating the Montreal Protocol, a landmark international agreement designed to save the earth’s protective ozone shield.

Why do states make disingenuous treaty commitments? Under what conditions will countries refrain from entering cooperative agreements with which they do not expect to comply? This article addresses these questions by analyzing how states that are pursuing nuclear weapons treat the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). The authors develop a distinction between two types of noncooperative behavior. The first is cheating while part of the NPT (predation) and the second is pursuing nuclear weapons outside of the treaty (abstention). The authors' argument is that democratic proliferators are more likely to abstain because executives in democracies are domestically constrained to a greater degree than authoritarian leaders. Statistical tests in a sample of all countries with active nuclear weapons programs from 1968 to 2004 provide evidence in favor of our argument. Controlling for confounding variables and the factors that motivate states to pursue nuclear weapons, the results show that states with greater constraints on executive authority are less likely to choose predation. Yet, electoral mandates do not appear to dissuade governments from making disingenuous treaty commitments. These findings have important implications for nuclear proliferation, the credibility of international commitments, and efforts to link domestic political institutions with international outcomes.

This article draws upon recent findings from the field of neuroscience to explore how loss aversion affects foreign policy resolve. We theorize that U.S. policy makers are more resolute in pursuing preventive policies that seek to avoid losses than they are in pursuing promotive policies that seek to acquire new gains. To test our theory, we conduct the first large-n analysis of foreign policy hypotheses derived from the neuroscience of loss aversion using data from 100 cases of U.S.-initiated Section 301 trade disputes. The results provide strong support for the loss-aversion-based theory, revealing that American policy makers are willing to fight harder and hold out longer in trade disputes with preventive objectives than they are in cases with promotive ones. Our study demonstrates that hypotheses de rived from neuroscientific findings can be tested using large-n techniques in study of foreign policy, revealing a new avenue of inquiry within the field.

Prospect theory is an empirical model of choice that stands as the leading alternative to rationality for explaining decisions under conditions of risk. While many still defend the assumption of rationality as an appropriate starting point for the construction of international relations theory -- deterrence theory especially -- there is growing support for models of international politics grounded in the actual capacities of real-world decisionmakers. This article accepts that standard depictions of deterrence incentives capture much of the essential character of deterrent relationships. However, it substitutes cognitive assumptions in place of traditional rational choice. Using prospect theory, the article reconsiders three typical deterrence games. The new model of military deterrence put forth unearths a set of conditions that are required for successful deterrence and uncovers a set of causes for deterrence failures that run counter to conventional understanding.

Despite the growing call for new models of politics grounded in the capacities of real-world decision-makers, much international relations theory still incorporates rationalist assumptions. Scholars defend such assumptions as the best way to produce parsimonious theoretical structures. Recent attempts to deploy prospect theory in the study of international politics are consistent with the call for empirically grounded models of political behavior. However, past attempts have often emphasized individualized comparisons of prospect theory with rational choice at the expense of building deductive theory. The analysis here demonstrates that prospect theory can produce deductive models for empirical comparison with those already manufactured under rational choice. The result is a new set of propositions concerning international politics securely anchored to the actual capacities of human actors.

The field of international relations is only now beginning to take notice of cognitive models of decision making. Arguing against the trend of adopting formalistic depictions of human choice, Berejikian suggests that international relations and realistic models of human decision making go hand-in-hand. The result is a set of interconnected propositions that provide compelling new insights into state behavior. Utilizing this framework, he discusses the behavior of the United States and Europe in negotiating the Montreal Protocol, a landmark international agreement designed to save the earth's protective ozone shield.