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How many people should decide monetary policy? In this article, we take an empirical perspective on this issue and analyze the relationship between the number of monetary policy decision makers and monetary policy outcomes. Using a new data set that characterizes central bank monetary policy committees (MPCs) in more than 30 countries from 1960 through 2006, we find a U-shaped relationship between MPC size and inflation; our results suggest that the lowest level of inflation is reached at MPCs with an intermediate size of about five to nine members. Similar results are obtained for inflation variability. Other MPC characteristics also matter for monetary policy outcomes, though to a smaller degree. For instance, the membership composition of the MPC as well as the frequency of MPC membership turnover appears to affect economic variables.

This paper contributes to the debate on the role of money in monetary policy by analyzing the information content of money in forecasting euro-area inflation. We compare the predictive performance within and among various classes of structural and empirical models in a consistent framework using Bayesian and other estimation techniques. We find that money contains relevant information for inflation in some model classes. Money-based New Keynesian DSGE models and VARs incorporating money perform better than their cashless counterparts. But there are also indications that the contribution of money has its limits. The marginal contribution of money to forecasting accuracy is often small, money adds little to dynamic factor models, and it worsens forecasting accuracy of partial equilibrium models. Finally, non-monetary models dominate monetary models in an all-out horserace.

Global excess liquidity is sometimes believed to limit sovereign monetary policy even in large economies, including the euro area. There is much discussion about what constitutes global excess liquidity and our approach adjusts liquidity for longer-term interest rate and output effects. We find that especially excess liquidity in the U.S. leads developments in euro area liquidity. U.S. excess liquidity also enters consistently positive as a determinant of euro area inflation. There is some evidence that this result may be related to a weakening of the effectiveness of monetary policy in the euro area during times of excessive U.S. liquidity.

After significant progress as an immediate result of the euro crisis, the drive to complete Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) has decelerated. While there is a broad consensus in Europe that EMU needs further development, the exact nature and timing of the reform agenda remains controversial. This paper makes an analytical contribution to the ongoing discussion about the euro area’s institutional setup. An in-depth look at the remaining gaps in the euro’s architecture, and the trade-offs that repairing them would present, suggests the need for long-run progress along three mutually supportive tracks. The first is more fiscal risk sharing, which will help enhance the credibility of the sovereign “no-bailout” rule. The second is complementary financial sector reforms to delink sovereigns and banks. And the third is more effective rules to discourage moral hazard. Helpfully, this evolution would ensure that financial markets provide more incentives for fiscal discipline than they do now. Introducing more fiscal union comes with myriad legal, technical, operational, and political problems, however, raising questions well beyond the domain of economics. These difficulties notwithstanding, without decisive progress to foster fiscal risk sharing, EMU will continue to face existential risks.

Just like private companies depend crucially on their ability to reach customers, policymakers must communicate with private agents to be successful—and much of this communication is channeled through the media. This is especially true for central banks, which need to build credibility among the general public. This paper analyses how favorably the print media report about the European Central Bank's (ECB) monetary policy decisions. Favorableness is, inter alia, influenced by the amount of information communicated by the ECB. There are, however, also indications of a critical monitoring role of the media, which reports more negatively when inflation exceeds the inflation target.

This paper analyzes empirically differences in the size of central bank boards across countries. Defining a board as the body that changes monetary instruments to achieve a specified target, we discuss the possible determinants of a board's size. The empirical relevance of these factors is examined using a new dataset that covers the de jure membership size of 84 central bank boards at the end of 2003. We find that larger and more heterogeneous countries, countries with stronger democratic institutions, countries with floating exchange rate regimes, and independent central banks with more staff tend to have larger boards.

Monetary policy in the euro area is conducted within a multicountry, multicultural, and multilingual context involving multiple central banking traditions. How does this heterogeneity affect the ability of economic agents to understand and to anticipate monetary policy by the European Central Bank (ECB)? Using a database of surveys of professional ECB policy forecasters in 24 countries, we find remarkable differences in forecast accuracy, and show that they are partly related to geography and clustering around informational hubs, as well as to country-specific economic conditions and traditions of independent central banking in the past. In large part, this heterogeneity can be traced to differences in forecasting models. While some systematic differences between analysts have been transitional and are indicative of learning, others are more persistent.

After significant progress as an immediate result of the euro crisis, the drive to complete Europe's Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) has decelerated. While there is a broad consensus in Europe that EMU needs further development, the exact nature and timing of the reform agenda remains controversial. This paper makes an analytical contribution to the ongoing discussion about the euro area's institutional setup. An in-depth look at the remaining gaps in the euro's architecture, and the trade-offs that repairing them would present, suggests the need for long-run progress along three mutually supportive tracks. The first is more fiscal risk sharing, which will help enhance the credibility of the sovereign \"no-bailout\" rule. The second is complementary financial sector reforms to delink sovereigns and banks. And the third is more effective rules to discourage moral hazard. Helpfully, this evolution would ensure that financial markets provide more incentives for fiscal discipline than they do now. Introducing more fiscal union comes with myriad legal, technical, operational, and political problems, however, raising questions well beyond the domain of economics. These difficulties notwithstanding, without decisive progress to foster fiscal risk sharing, EMU will continue to face existential risks.

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Five years after the onset of the global financial crisis, Europe's economy is still fragile. Notwithstanding recent positive signs amid calmer financial markets, medium-term growth is likely to remain frail owing to continuing weaknesses and vulnerabilities at the country level and in the fabric of European institutions and banks, especially in the euro area. In addition, unemployment in many countries has reached very high levels. The IMF research collected in this volume provides a number of guideposts that offer an opportunity for stronger and better-balanced growth and employment in Europe after what has been a long and dismal period of crisis.