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To overcome the limits on traditional monetary policy imposed by the effective lower bound on short-term interest rates, in recent years the Federal Reserve and other advanced-economy central banks have deployed new policy tools. This lecture reviews what we know about the new monetary tools, focusing on quantitative easing (QE) and forward guidance, the principal new tools used by the Fed. I argue that the new tools have proven effective at easing financial conditions when policy rates are constrained by the lower bound, even when financial markets are functioning normally, and that they can be made even more effective in the future. Accordingly, the new tools should become part of the standard central bank toolkit. Simulations of the Fed’s FRB/US model suggest that, if the nominal neutral interest rate is in the range of 2–3 percent, consistent with most estimates for the United States, then a combination of QE and forward guidance can provide the equivalent of roughly 3 percentage points of policy space, largely offsetting the effects of the lower bound. If the neutral rate is much lower, however, then overcoming the effects of the lower bound may require additional measures, such as a moderate increase in the inflation target or greater reliance on fiscal policy for economic stabilization.

Economists both failed to predict the global financial crisis and underestimated its consequences for the broader economy. Focusing on the second of these failures, this paper makes two contributions. First, I review research since the crisis on the role of credit factors in the decisions of households, firms, and financial intermediaries and in macroeconomic modeling. This research provides broad support for the view that credit market developments deserve greater attention from macroeconomists, not only for analyzing the economic effects of financial crises but in the study of ordinary business cycles as well. Second, I provide new evidence on the channels by which the recent nancial crisis depressed economic activity in the United States. Although the deterioration of household balance sheets and the associated deleveraging likely exacerbated the initial economic downturn and the slowness of the recovery, I find that the unusual severity of the Great Recession was due primarily to the panic in funding and securitization markets, which disrupted the supply of credit. This finding helps to justify the government’s extraordinary efforts to stem the panic in order to avoid greater damage to the real economy.

Monetary policy affects financial markets and the broader economy in part by changing the risk appetite of investors. This article provides new evidence for this so-called risk-taking channel of monetary policy by revisiting and extending event-study analysis of Federal Open Market Committee announcements. We document significant effects of unexpected monetary policy changes on risk indicators drawn from equity, fixed-income, credit, and foreign exchange markets. We develop a new index of risk appetite based on the common component of these indicators. Surprise monetary easing leads to strong and persistent increases in our index, and vice versa for tightening surprises, consistent with the view that monetary policy affects asset prices in large part through its effects on risk appetite. We discuss the implications of the risk-taking channel for monetary policy transmission, optimal monetary policy, and financial stability.

This article revisits the thesis of Bernanke (1983) that the disruption of private credit markets induced by deflation and falling nominal incomes helps to explain the depth and persistence of the Great Depression. This new look is motivated by economists' increased attention to the role of financial frictions in economic fluctuations as well as recent empirical research on the Depression and other episodes of disrupted credit. Overall, considerable evidence now exists that the financial distress of both borrowers (farmers, households, and businesses) and lenders (nonbanks as well as banks) significantly depressed credit flows, spending, and economic activity in the 1930s. Indeed, judging by their policy choices and the accompanying rationales, political leaders of the period evidently viewed the normalization of credit flows as a top priority in their fight against the Depression.

Can monetary policy committees, accustomed to describing their plans and actions in terms of the level of a short-term nominal interest rate, find effective means of conducting and communicating their policies when that rate is zero or close to zero? The very low levels of interest rates in Japan, Switzerland, and the US in recent years have stimulated much interesting research on this question and have led some central banks to make changes in their operating procedures and communications strategies. This paper gives a brief overview of current thinking on the conduct of monetary policy when short-term interest rates are very low or even zero.

The ‘credit channel’ theory of monetary policy transmission holds that informational frictions in credit markets worsen during tight-money periods. The resulting increase in the external finance premium--the difference in cost between internal and external funds--enhances the effects of monetary policy on the real economy. The authors document the responses of GDP and its components to monetary policy shocks and describe how the credit channel helps explain the facts. They discuss two main components of this mechanism, the balance sheet and bank lending channels. The authors argue that forecasting exercises using credit aggregates are not valid tests of this theory.

In the postcrisis period, some foreign policymakers accused the Federal Reserve of engaging in \"currency wars\" and inadvertently creating \"financial spillovers,\" arguing that these were especially consequential given the dominant role of the U.S. dollar in international trade and finance. This lecture analyzes these critiques, and argues: (1) little support exists, either theoretical or empirical, for the currency wars claim; (2) the United States and its trading partners should use nonmonetary tools for dealing with spillovers; and (3) the benefits of the dollar standard to the United States and the world are considerably more symmetric than in the Bretton Woods era.

Few periods in history compare to the Great Depression. Stock market crashes, bread lines, bank runs, and wild currency speculation were worldwide phenomena--all occurring with war looming in the background. This period has provided economists with a marvelous laboratory for studying the links between economic policies and institutions and economic performance. Here, Ben Bernanke has gathered together his essays on why the Great Depression was so devastating. This broad view shows us that while the Great Depression was an unparalleled disaster, some economies pulled up faster than others, and some made an opportunity out of it. By comparing and contrasting the economic strategies and statistics of the world's nations as they struggled to survive economically, the fundamental lessons of macroeconomics stand out in bold relief against a background of immense human suffering. The essays in this volume present a uniquely coherent view of the economic causes and worldwide propagation of the depression.

This paper analyzes the impact of changes in monetary policy on equity prices, with the objectives of both measuring the average reaction of the stock market and understanding the economic sources of that reaction. We find that, on average, a hypothetical unanticipated 25‐basis‐point cut in the Federal funds rate target is associated with about a 1% increase in broad stock indexes. Adapting a methodology due to Campbell and Ammer, we find that the effects of unanticipated monetary policy actions on expected excess returns account for the largest part of the response of stock prices.

In recent years, a number of industrialized countries have adopted a strategy for monetary policy known as ‘inflation targeting.’ The authors describe how this approach has been implemented in practice and argue that it is best understood as a broad framework for policy, which allows the central bank ‘constrained discretion,’ rather than as an ironclad policy rule in the Friedman sense. They discuss the potential of the inflation-targeting approach for making monetary policy more coherent and transparent and for increasing monetary policy discipline. The authors' final section addresses some additional practical issues raised by this approach.