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"Black, Tim"
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Kierkegaardian Inwardness and the Good Life in Jane Austen's Mansfield Park
Jane Austen's Mansfield Park can be read through the lens of a Kierkegaardian interpretive option that allows us to see the novel as endorsing inwardness, a choice for the internal over the external, for that which is identical to our selves over that which is distinct from our selves. There is freedom in choosing inwardness, Kierkegaard maintains. So, since Fanny Price, Mansfield Park's beleaguered protagonist, chooses a life lived in pursuit of inwardness, we can see her as securing her own emancipation: she is free, liberated, in a way that distinguishes her from other characters in Mansfield Park.
Journal Article
Zalabardo on Relativizing the Sensitivity Condition to Methods
EnScepticism and Reliable Belief, José L. Zalabardo busca una solución a los problemas escépticos en términos de una teoría del conocimiento que presenta una condición de sensitivas del tipo propuesto por Robert Nozick: la creencia deSde quepes sensitiva sólo en el caso queSno creería quepsipfuera falsa. Con todo, Zalabardo se distancia de Nozick cuando se llega al papel teórico que desempeñan los métodos de formación de creencias. Tales métodos desempeñan un papel prominente en la teoría de Nozick pero no despeñan papel alguno en la de Zalabardo. En este artículo argumento que Zalabardo rechaza demasiado rápidamente los métodos de formación de creencias y que hay una versión plausible de la condición de sensitividad que hace espacio para los métodos y, a la vez, es capaz de manejar las objeciones que que Zalabardo plantea en contra de las versiones metodizadas de la sensitividad.
InScepticism and Reliable Belief, José L. Zalabardo seeks a solution to skeptical problems in terms of a theory of knowledge that features a sensitivity condition of the sort proposed by Robert Nozick:S’s belief thatpis sensitive just in caseSwouldn’t believe thatpifpwere false. Yet Zalabardo parts ways with Nozick when it comes to the theoretical role played by belief-forming methods: methods play a prominent role in Nozick’s theory but no role in Zalabardo’s. I argue in this paper that Zalabardo is too quick in dismissing methods of belief formation, and that there is a plausible version of the sensitivity condition that both makes a place for methods and handles the objections that Zalabardo levels against methodized versions of sensitivity.
Journal Article
Solving the Problem of Easy Knowledge
Stewart Cohen argues that several epistemological theories fall victim to the problem of easy knowledge: they allow us to know far too easily that certain sceptical hypotheses are false and that how things seem is a reliable indicator of how they are. This problem is a result of the theories' interaction with an epistemic closure principle. Cohen suggests that the theories should be modified. I argue that attempts to solve the problem should focus on closure instead; a new and plausible epistemic closure principle can solve the problem of easy knowledge. My solution offers a uniform and more successful response to different versions of the problem of easy knowledge.
Journal Article
In Defense of Sensitivity
The sensitivity condition on knowledge says that one knows that P only if one would not believe that P if P were false. Difficulties for this condition are now well documented. Keith DeRose has recently suggested a revised sensitivity condition that is designed to avoid some of these difficulties. We argue, however, that there are decisive objections to DeRose's revised condition. Yet rather than simply abandoning his proposed condition, we uncover a rationale for its adoption, a rationale which suggests a further revision that avoids our objections as well as others. The payoff is considerable: along the way to our revision, we learn lessons about the epistemic significance of certain explanatory relations, about how we ought to envisage epistemic closure principles, and about the epistemic significance of methods of belief formation.
Journal Article
Classic Invariantism, Relevance and Warranted Assertability Manœuvres
Jessica Brown contends that Keith DeRose's latest argument for contextualism fails to rule out contextualism's chief rival, namely, classic invariantism. Still, even if their position has not been ruled out, classic invariantists must offer considerations in favour of their position if they are to show that it is superior to contextualism. Brown defends classic invariantism with a warranted assertability manœuvre that utilizes a linguistic pragmatic principle of relevance. I argue, however, that this manœuvre is not as effective as it might be. I propose a different warranted assertability manœuvre, which utilizes a pragmatic principle of strength, affords a more successful defence of classic invariantism, and helps to establish that classic invariantism is superior to contextualism.
Journal Article
What We Can Learn from the Skeptical Puzzle
There is reason to think that a familiar and frequently used epistemic closure principle is false. Given this, the relevant instance of that principle should be removed from a familiar skeptical argument, and replaced with an instance of a more plausible epistemic closure principle. Once this has been done, however, we see that even if the resulting skeptical argument is unsound, we need deny neither closure nor the claim that we know the things we ordinarily take ourselves to know. Nothing that the skeptic can do, at least with an argument that makes use of an epistemic closure principle, can ever force us to relinquish closure or the utterly vast stretches of knowledge that we ordinarily take ourselves to have. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT]
Journal Article
