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SignificanceHuman memory is fallible and malleable. In forensic settings in particular, this poses a challenge because people may falsely remember events with legal implications that never actually happened. Despite an urgent need for remedies, however, research on whether and how rich false autobiographical memories can be reversed under realistic conditions (i.e., using reversal strategies that can be applied in real-world settings) is virtually nonexistent. The present study therefore not only replicates and extends previous demonstrations of false memories but, crucially, documents their reversibility after the fact: Employing two ecologically valid strategies, we show that rich but false autobiographical memories can mostly be undone. Importantly, reversal was specific to false memories (i.e., did not occur for true memories). False memories of autobiographical events can create enormous problems in forensic settings (e.g., false accusations). While multiple studies succeeded in inducing false memories in interview settings, we present research trying to reverse this effect (and thereby reduce the potential damage) by means of two ecologically valid strategies. We first successfully implanted false memories for two plausible autobiographical events (suggested by the students’ parents, alongside two true events). Over three repeated interviews, participants developed false memories (measured by state-of-the-art coding) of the suggested events under minimally suggestive conditions (27%) and even more so using massive suggestion (56%). We then used two techniques to reduce false memory endorsement, source sensitization (alerting interviewees to possible external sources of the memories, e.g., family narratives) and false memory sensitization (raising the possibility of false memories being inadvertently created in memory interviews, delivered by a new interviewer). This reversed the false memory build-up over the first three interviews, returning false memory rates in both suggestion conditions to the baseline levels of the first interview (i.e., to ∼15% and ∼25%, respectively). By comparison, true event memories were endorsed at a higher level overall and less affected by either the repeated interviews or the sensitization techniques. In a 1-y follow-up (after the original interviews and debriefing), false memory rates further dropped to 5%, and participants overwhelmingly rejected the false events. One strong practical implication is that false memories can be substantially reduced by easy-to-implement techniques without causing collateral damage to true memories.

The DRM method has proved to be a popular and powerful, if controversial, way to study 'false memories'. One reason for the controversy is that the extent to which the DRM effect generalises to other kinds of memory error has been neither satisfactorily established nor subject to much empirical attention. In the present paper we contribute data to this ongoing debate. One hundred and twenty participants took part in a standard misinformation effect experiment, in which they watched some CCTV footage, were exposed to misleading post-event information about events depicted in the footage, and then completed free recall and recognition tests. Participants also completed a DRM test as an ostensibly unrelated filler task. Despite obtaining robust misinformation and DRM effects, there were no correlations between a broad range of misinformation and DRM effect measures (mean r  = -.01). This was not due to reliability issues with our measures or a lack of power. Thus DRM 'false memories' and misinformation effect 'false memories' do not appear to be equivalent.

The primary function of episodic memory is to provide reliable information about reality that is essential for surviving and navigating in an environment. The communicative function of episodic memory “sits on top of” this basic function but does not, in itself, explain it in its totality (but may explain particular aspects such as its sensitivity to source credibility).

This article reviews and compares three cognitive process models that relate hindsight bias to changes in an underlying knowledge base as a result of outcome feedback. Two of these models, SARA (Selective Activation and Reconstructive Anchoring; Pohl, Eisenhauer, & Hardt, 2003) and RAFT (Reconstruction After Feedback with Take the Best; Hoffrage, Hertwig, & Gigerenzer, 2000), focus on memory processes involved in hindsight bias and have been implemented as computational models. The third, focusing on processes affecting hindsight probability judgments, is a new synthesis and elaboration of the influential work of several authors (e.g., Hawkins & Hastie, 1990; Pezzo, 2003; Roese & Olson, 1996), which we present here in a more systematic way under the name of causal model theory. We compare the three models with respect to their ranges of applicability, the types of postulated changes in the knowledge base, and the nature of the featured cognitive processes (e.g., unconscious/automatic versus conscious/flexible). Finally, we outline ways to combine the main processes featured in the models within an integrative theoretical framework and suggest testable hypotheses for future research. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT]

The main focus of Mazzoni and Vannucci's paper, however, is to systematically compare research paradigms and theorizing in the hindsight domain to two other areas that focus on the malleability of memories and beliefs, namely, the eyewitness misinformation effect and implanted autobiographical beliefs, concluding that the three paradigms have much more in common than has previously been acknowledged (e.g., a common emphasis on reconstruction processes). Taken together, the present special issue provides a thorough and scholarly review of the current state of research into an intriguing phenomenon, which may serve as an introductory text for readers not yet familiar with the topic, but also as a reference to the latest research on all aspects of hindsight bias.

Social stereotypes impact how we remember people, but how stable is this influence? Inspired by the reversibility of the eyewitness misinformation effect through postwarnings about the planting of misinformation (‘enlightenment’), we explored if stereotype influence on person memory can be similarly reversed. Participants read person self-descriptions and subsequently answered memory test questions either with or without stereotype labels, establishing sizeable stereotype-induced memory distortion. One week later, the participants answered the same questions again, but half were enlightened about the earlier stereotype manipulation. This eliminated the stereotype effect and restored memory for the original information, whereas memory remained distorted without enlightenment. We discuss implications for memory distortion research and for (undermining) the self-perpetuation of stereotypes in society.

We present a new conceptualization of hindsight bias in terms of three separate hindsight components (foreseeability impressions, perceptions of necessity and memory distortions) and report three kinds of supporting evidence from an internet study (N=101) of the unsuccessful application of the City of Leipzig to host the Olympic Games: (1) strongly diverging hindsight effects, (2) low intercorrelations between the components, and (3) dissociative effects of third variables on them. Specifically, experiencing the failure of the application as personally negative (due to a pro‐application attitude and previous commitment), led to perceiving it as inevitable but also as unforeseeable. This surprising result helps to resolve seeming contradictions between previous findings (Louie, 1999; Mark et al., 2003; Tykocinski, 2001) by relating the opposite hindsight effects to differences in the nature and functions (dissonance reduction vs. coping with disappointment) of the foreseeability and necessity components.

False memories of autobiographical events can create enormous problems in forensic settings (e.g., false accusations). While multiple studies succeeded in inducing false memories in interview settings, we present research trying to reverse this effect (and thereby reduce the potential damage) by means of two ecologically valid strategies. We first successfully implanted false memories for two plausible autobiographical events (suggested by the students’ parents, alongside two true events). Over three repeated interviews, participants developed false memories (measured by state-of-the-art coding) of the suggested events under minimally suggestive conditions (27%) and even more so using massive suggestion (56%). We then used two techniques to reduce false memory endorsement, source sensitization (alerting interviewees to possible external sources of the memories, e.g., family narratives) and false memory sensitization (raising the possibility of false memories being inadvertently created in memory interviews, delivered by a new interviewer). This reversed the false memory build-up over the first three interviews, returning false memory rates in both suggestion conditions to the baseline levels of the first interview (i.e., to ∼15% and ∼25%, respectively). By comparison, true event memories were endorsed at a higher level overall and less affected by either the repeated interviews or the sensitization techniques. In a 1-y follow-up (after the original interviews and debriefing), false memory rates further dropped to 5%, and participants overwhelmingly rejected the false events. One strong practical implication is that false memories can be substantially reduced by easy-to-implement techniques without causing collateral damage to true memories.

The Forced Choice Test (FCT) can be used to detect malingered loss of memory or sensory deficits. In this test, examinees are presented with two stimuli, one correct and one incorrect, in regards to a specific event or a perceptual discrimination task. The task is to select the correct answer alternative, or guess if it is unknown. Genuine impairment is associated with test scores that fall within chance performance. In contrast, malingered impairment is associated with purposeful avoidance of correct information, resulting in below chance performance. However, a substantial proportion of malingerers intentionally randomize their responses, and are missed by the test. Here we examine whether a ‘runs test’ and a ‘within test response ‘bias’ have diagnostic value to detect this intentional randomization. We instructed 73 examinees to malinger red/green blindness and subjected them to a FCT. For half of the examinees we manipulated the ambiguity between answer alternatives over the test trials in order to elicit a response bias. Compared to a sample of 10,000 cases of computer generated genuine performance, the runs test and response bias both detected malingered performance better than chance.

There is an anomaly in the hindsight bias literature with respect to hindsight effects obtained after self-relevant negative event outcomes: Whereas some studies have reported reduced hindsight bias, others have shown increases. This article contrasts two explanations for the anomaly. The first points to an influence of perceived control over the event outcome: In hindsight, people decrease foreseeability (and hence, responsibility and blame) for controllable events, but they increase the perceived inevitability of uncontrollable events for coping reasons. The second explanation, derived from a reconception of hindsight bias in terms of separate components (Blank, Nestler, von Collani, & Fischer, 2008), traces the anomaly to differences in the observed hindsight components: Hindsight decreases are to be expected for foreseeability, whereas increases are restricted to the inevitability component. Our experiment ( N =210) manipulated controllability and the hindsight component orthogonally and showed strong support for the component explanation, but also some influence of perceived control.