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In human societies, individuals who violate social norms may be punished by third-party observers who have not been harmed by the violator; this study suggests that a reason why the observers are willing to punish is to be seen as more trustworthy by the community. Punishing schedule denotes trustworthiness Human societies appear to be unique in that individuals may be punished for violating social norms — even if the violator has not harmed the punisher and the punishment exerts a cost. Explaining the reasons why this behaviour has evolved has been problematic. These authors offer a model showing that 'third-party punishment' can be an honest signal of trustworthiness. Those who incur a cost by punishing wrongdoers are seen as trustworthy by the community, and behave in a more trustworthy way. But there's a catch: this signal becomes weaker when a more informative signalling mechanism is introduced. That is, when potential punishers have the chance to engage in costly helping, they are less likely to punish, and punishment is perceived as a weaker sign of trustworthiness. Either way, the costs of punishment may be recouped by the long-term reputational benefit of appearing to be trustworthy. Third-party punishment (TPP) 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 , 6 , 7 , in which unaffected observers punish selfishness, promotes cooperation by deterring defection. But why should individuals choose to bear the costs of punishing? We present a game theoretic model of TPP as a costly signal 8 , 9 , 10 of trustworthiness. Our model is based on individual differences in the costs and/or benefits of being trustworthy. We argue that individuals for whom trustworthiness is payoff-maximizing will find TPP to be less net costly (for example, because mechanisms 11 that incentivize some individuals to be trustworthy also create benefits for deterring selfishness via TPP). We show that because of this relationship, it can be advantageous for individuals to punish selfishness in order to signal that they are not selfish themselves. We then empirically validate our model using economic game experiments. We show that TPP is indeed a signal of trustworthiness: third-party punishers are trusted more, and actually behave in a more trustworthy way, than non-punishers. Furthermore, as predicted by our model, introducing a more informative signal—the opportunity to help directly—attenuates these signalling effects. When potential punishers have the chance to help, they are less likely to punish, and punishment is perceived as, and actually is, a weaker signal of trustworthiness. Costly helping, in contrast, is a strong and highly used signal even when TPP is also possible. Together, our model and experiments provide a formal reputational account of TPP, and demonstrate how the costs of punishing may be recouped by the long-run benefits of signalling one’s trustworthiness.

Why do people purchase objects that were once owned by celebrities, such as film stars or politicians, and also by despised individuals, such as serial killers and notorious dictators? The present studies examine three potential explanations: mere associations, market demands, and contagion (the belief that these objects contain some remnants of their previous owners). Results indicate that while market demands do play a role, contagion appears to be the critical factor affecting the valuation of celebrity possessions. Manipulating the degree of physical contact that a celebrity has with an object dramatically influences consumers’ willingness to purchase it, and individual differences in sensitivity to contagion moderate this effect. Additionally, the valuation of celebrity possessions is principally explained by measures of contagion, and subliminally activating the concept of contagion changes consumers’ willingness to purchase celebrity objects. Theoretical and practical implications of these findings are discussed.

Why do people judge hypocrites, who condemn immoral behaviors that they in fact engage in, so negatively? We propose that hypocrites are disliked because their condemnation sends a false signal about their personal conduct, deceptively suggesting that they behave morally. We show that verbal condemnation signals moral goodness (Study 1) and does so even more convincingly than directly stating that one behaves morally (Study 2). We then demonstrate that people judge hypocrites negatively—even more negatively than people who directly make false statements about their morality (Study 3). Finally, we show that \"honest\" hypocrites—who avoid false signaling by admitting to committing the condemned transgression—are not perceived negatively even though their actions contradict their stated values (Study 4). Critically, the same is not true of hypocrities who engage in false signaling but admit to unrelated transgressions (Study 5). Together, our results support a false-signaling theory of hypocrisy.

Although adults generally prefer helpful behaviors and those who perform them, there are situations (in particular, when the target of an action is disliked) in which overt antisocial acts are seen as appropriate, and those who perform them are viewed positively. The current studies explore the developmental origins of this capacity for selective social evaluation. We find that although 5-mo-old infants uniformly prefer individuals who act positively toward others regardless of the status of the target, 8-mo-old infants selectively prefer characters who act positively toward prosocial individuals and characters who act negatively toward antisocial individuals. Additionally, young toddlers direct positive behaviors toward prosocial others and negative behaviors toward antisocial others. These findings constitute evidence that the nuanced social judgments and actions readily observable in human adults have their foundations in early developing cognitive mechanisms.

Contagion is a form of magical thinking in which people believe that a person's immaterial qualities or essence can be transferred to an object through physical contact. Here we investigate how a belief in contagion influences the sale of celebrity memorabilia. Using data from three high-profile estate auctions, we find that people's expectations about the amount of physical contact between the object and the celebrity positively predicts the final bids for items that belonged to well-liked individuals (e.g., John F. Kennedy) and negatively predicts final bids for items that belonged to disliked individuals (e.g., Bernard Madoff). A follow-up experiment further suggests that these effects are driven by contagion beliefs: when asked to bid on a sweater owned by a well-liked celebrity, participants report that they would pay substantially less if it was sterilized before they received it. However, sterilization increases the amount they would pay for a sweater owned by a disliked celebrity. These studies suggest that magical thinking may still have effects in contemporary Western societies and they provide some unique demonstrations of contagion effects on real-world purchase decisions.

Do people know when, or whether, they have made a conscious choice? Here, we explore the possibility that choices can seem to occur before they are actually made. In two studies, participants were asked to quickly choose from a set of options before a randomly selected option was made salient. Even when they believed that they had made their decision prior to this event, participants were significantly more likely than chance to report choosing the salient option when this option was made salient soon after the perceived time of choice. Thus, without participants' awareness, a seemingly later event influenced choices that were experienced as occurring at an earlier time. These findings suggest that, like certain low-level perceptual experiences, the experience of choice is susceptible to \"postdictive\" influence and that people may systematically overestimate the role that consciousness plays in their chosen behavior.

There is burgeoning interest in the application of neuroscientific technology to facilitate meditation and lead to beneficial psychological outcomes. One popular approach is using consumer-grade neurofeedback devices to deliver feedback on brain targets during meditation (mindfulness-based neurofeedback). It is hypothesized that optimizing brain targets like alpha and theta band activity may allow meditators to experience deeper mindfulness and thus beneficial outcomes. This study aimed to systematically review and meta-analyze the impacts of consumer-grade mindfulness-based neurofeedback compared with control conditions. Included studies involved mindfulness practice operationalized as open monitoring or focused attention meditation. This study was preregistered. A total of 16 randomized controlled training trials, as well as 5 randomized within-participant designs were included, encompassing 763 and 167 unique participants, respectively. Effects were categorized outcomes (ie, psychological distress, cognitive function, and physiological health) and process variables (ie, state mindfulness and brain measures). Study risk of bias, reporting bias, and publication bias were assessed. Samples were typically small (n=30-50), and the majority of studies used mindfulness apps as controls. To deliver neurofeedback, most studies used the Muse device (11/16 randomized controlled trials [RCTs]). There was a modest effect for decreases in psychological distress compared with controls (k=11, g=-0.16, P=.03), and heterogeneity was low (I < 0.25). However, there was no evidence for improvements in cognition (k=7, g=0.07, P=.48), mindfulness (k=9, g=0.02, P=.83), and physiological health (k=7, g=0.11, P=.57) compared to controls. Mechanistic modulation of brain targets was not found in RCTs or within-participant designs. Sex (male or female), age, clinical status, study quality, active or passive controls, sample size, and neurofeedback duration did not moderate effects. There was some evidence for reporting bias, but no evidence of publication bias. Adverse effects were not assessed in 19 out of 21 studies and not found in the 2 studies that assessed them. Assertions that consumer-grade devices can allow participants to modulate their brains and deepen their meditations are not currently supported. It is possible that neurofeedback effects may rely on \"neurosuggestion\" (placebo effects of neurotechnology). Future research should examine more extensive calibration and individualization of devices, larger sample sizes, and gold-standard sham-controlled RCTs.