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Infringement actions and EU values – constitutional backsliding in Hungary and Poland – the role of the Court of Justice – judicial independence and Article 19 TEU – the Charter of Fundamental Rights – the toolkit to protect EU values – political and judicial mechanisms – a bottom-up approach

While trying to defend their salaries from austerity measures, a group of Portuguese judges may have accidentally stumbled upon a way to judicially safeguard the rule of law and the independence of the judiciary throughout the European Union. Referred from Lisbon to Luxembourg, where it was decided by the Court of Justice of the European Union, the case discussed in this contribution may have its most significant impact in Warsaw and perhaps also in Budapest, capitals of the two Member States most often accused of threatening the basic values of the EU in recent years.

No cooperative scheme in EU law has displayed bigger tensions between mutual trust and fundamental rights protection than the EAW system. Despite the requirement developed by the CJEU for national courts to trust each other and recognise each other’s arrest warrants, the reality on the ground has shown high levels of distrust between national courts regarding Member States’ alignment with core EU values. In this contribution, we analyze how the CJEU has managed such tensions in the EAW system. To that effect, we first put the Court’s EAW case law into context by examining the broader language of mutual trust used by the Court in other fields of EU law. In doing so, we point out how the Court has espoused different levels of lawful distrust to be exercised in different circumstances under the scope of application of mutual trust. Given that broader context, it is contradictory for the Court to mainly view mutual trust as a requirement rather than a reality in need of permanent and continuing justification between national authorities. The latter conception of mutual trust is more apt to be the basis of EU horizontal cooperation, which must be value-based and sincere according to the Treaties. Therefore, we propose a bidimensional account of mutual trust as a legal principle, one that accommodates both trust and distrust as tools for managing the uncertainty and dynamic nature of trust-based cooperation. Finally, we explore how such account of mutual (dis)trust can be concretised by the Court and other political institutions.

In December 2020, the EU institutions finally approved the new Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation after a controversial legislative process. The new Regulation allows the Commission and the Council to suspend EU funds in case of breaches to the rule of law that have negative effects on the EU budget and financial interests. This article analyses the new Regulation against the background of the rise of conditionality as a tool of EU governance. It argues, in contrast to some of the first analyses of the new Regulation, that the amendments adopted during the legislative process cannot simply be seen as a watered-down compromise, but were crucial to ensure the legality of the new instrument. At the same time, the EU’s growing reliance on conditionality continues to raise profound constitutional questions that still needs to be adequately addressed in the institutional and academic debate.

This Article introduces the Special Section \"Usual and Unusual Suspects: New Actors, Roles and Mechanisms to Protect EU Values\" which collects four Articles originally presented at the NOVA workshop \"EU Democracy and the Rule of Law\" in June 2021. The four Articles all reflect of how the EU institutions may protect and promote the common values in the Member States, in particular in the context of the ongoing constitutional crises in Hungary and Poland, but looking also at the medium and long-term efforts the EU is called to put in place to prevent new crises and promote a stronger rule of law culture in the Member States and civil society. This Article serves to place the considerations offered in those four contributions against two backgrounds: the current and evolving state of affairs, in which democratic and rule of law questions seem to emerge more and more strongly; and the institutional and academic debate that has taken place in the last decade. We argue that the Articles of this Special Section bring an original and innovative perspective to the debate, showing that the EU response must be based on a combination of political, judicial and financial tools, and that the EU needs to both try to respond to ongoing crisis and construct a stronger toolkit for the future.

(Series Information) European Papers - A Journal on Law and Integration, 2022 7(2), 507-525 | European Forum Insight of 25 July 2022 | (Table of Contents) I. Introduction. - II. The background. - III. The Court of Justice's judgments. - III.1. Legal basis. - III.2. The circumvention of Article 7 TEU. - III.3. Legal certainty. - IV. Bold but careful: On the Court's approach in the judgments. - IV.1. \"The European Union must be able to defend those values...\". - IV.2. \"...within the limits of its powers as laid down by the Treaties\". - V. Conclusion and the next steps. | (Abstract) In two parallel decisions delivered in February 2022, the Court of Justice has rejected the actions for annulment brought by Hungary and Poland against the new \"Budgetary Conditionality Regulation\". The Court has confirmed that the institutions used the correct legal basis (art. 322(1)(a) TFEU), that the Regulation does not circumvent the procedures of art. 7 TEU, and that it adequately guarantees legal certainty. The judgments of the Court use bold and explicit constitutional language, stating for example that the rule of law and art. 2 TEU values form the very identity of the Union. At the same time, the Court is much more careful when it analyses the more concrete questions on the legality of the Regulation. This shows the continuous mismatch between the constitutional relevance of the values of art. 2 TEU in the EU legal and political structure, and the concrete powers the EU and its institutions have to protect those values. Still very often, the institutions are forced to rely on indirect mechanisms to defend the values, as is the case with the Regulation under discussion, which is to be considered a budgetary tool rather than an explicit rule of law mechanism.

One of the concerns that led to the introduction of Article 4(2) TEU was the growing interference of EU law into areas traditionally reserved to the Member States. In particular, Article 4(2) TEU was seen as a way to better shield matters of ‘retained competences’, where EU institutions have not been conferred legislative competences, and to possibly create no-go areas for EU law. Yet, this article argues that in practice, the national identity clause has not worked as a limit to EU competences and the scope of EU law. The case law of the Court of Justice in the decade after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, and in particular a set of recent decisions in sensitive areas such as religion, family and nationality analysed in this article, allow to conclude that reliance on Article 4(2) TEU does not limit the scope of application of EU law, though it may contribute to reach results that show deference to national preferences and leave room for national diversity. The article thus suggests a weaker reading of the national identity clause: not as a fully blown limit to EU competence, but as one of the many clauses that stand for, and guarantee, national diversity. National identity, constitutional identity, Lisbon Treaty, EU competences, European integration