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The Politics of European Competition Regulation provides an original and theoretically informed account of the political power struggles that have shaped the evolution of European competition regulation over the past six decades. Applying a critical political economy perspective, this book analyses the establishment and development of competition regulation at European Community and national level since the 1950s. It puts forth the central argument that competition regulation came to reflect the broader shift towards a neoliberal order since the 1980s. Buch-Hansen and Wigger argue that this shift, which took place against the background of the gradual transnationalisation of capitalist production and the economic crisis of the late 1970s, was driven by the European Commission in alliance with the emerging transnational capitalist class. The authors examine the political responses to the current global economic crisis in the fields of state aid, cartel prosecution and merger control and conclude that an alternative type of competition regulation, which forms part of a much broader transformation of the current socioeconomic order, is needed. This book will be of interest to students and scholars of (global) political economy, European integration and competition law.

The article analyses the evolution of European competition policy. It is argued that the content, form, and scope of competition regulation has undergone a major transformation over the past fifty years, which is related to broader socio-economic developments. Until the mid-1980s, competition policy formed part of the institutional nexus of the postwar order of 'embedded liberalism', underpinned by a Fordist accumulation regime and Keynesian welfare institutions. It exemplified strong neo-mercantilist and protectionist traits, allowing for significant distortions of competition, whenever justified for general reasons of industrial and social policy. Since the mid-1980s, gradually, a neoliberal 'competition only' vision came to dominate, giving rise to a more market-based competition regime, in which private rather than public actors prevail, and which seeks to create an ever-bigger 'level playing field' of free markets. This transformation is linked to the broader context of the disruption of the postwar social order and the rise of neoliberalism. A public-private alliance of transnational actors, consisting of the European Commission's DG Competition and transnational business elite networks, were the driving forces behind the 'neoliberalisation' of competition policy.

What kind of political agency is necessary to foster radical political-economic transformations towards ecological sustainability? Focusing on the radical ecopolitical project of degrowth, this article starts from the observation that a prerequisite for degrowth policies to materialise is political agency that is bold and visionary yet pragmatic; agency that seeks radical change yet does so based on what is already in existence. To capture the nature of the ideal-typical political agent that could exercise this sort of agency, this article builds on scholarship on policy entrepreneurship to develop the concept of the radical bricoleur. It proposes that an important key to ‘radicalising’ the bricoleur lies in putting greater emphasis on Levi-Strauss’ (1966) pre-modern, holistic understanding of what kind of order it is that the bricoleur is seeking to rebuild. Doing so opens the way for redefining the goal of the bricoleur from being the reinstatement of the current capitalist and non-sustainable societal order, to being the reinstatement of an order defined by a logic of balance and harmony between and within humans, as well as humans and nature.

The ecological footprint of the contemporary global political economy far exceeds the carrying capacity of the planet, resulting in environmental degradation and climate change. We start by discussing tensions between the reproduction principles of nature and of the capitalist mode of production as highlighted by Marx. We then consider the institutional variety of real-existing capitalisms and discuss some of the different faces of these structural tensions. We identify various streams of research that question whether economic growth and environmental sustainability can be reconciled. Such research in many cases engages with the field of ecological economics. We outline the post-growth vision of sustainable welfare and note some of the eco-social policies that could contribute to bring about such a system, focusing in particular on wealth and income caps. Utilizing insights from transnational historical materialism, we finally reflect upon some of the obstacles to a transition towards a smaller and more socially equitable global political economy.

The Politics of European Competition Regulation provides an original and theoretically informed account of the political power struggles that have shaped the evolution of European competition regulation over the past six decades. Applying a critical political economy perspective, this book analyses the establishment and development of competition regulation at European Community and national level since the 1950s. It puts forth the central argument that competition regulation came to reflect the broader shift towards a neoliberal order since the 1980s. Buch-Hansen and Wigger argue that this shift, which took place against the background of the gradual transnationalisation of capitalist production and the economic crisis of the late 1970s, was driven by the European Commission in alliance with the emerging transnational capitalist class. The authors examine the political responses to the current global economic crisis in the fields of state aid, cartel prosecution and merger control and conclude that an alternative type of competition regulation, which forms part of a much broader transformation of the current socioeconomic order, is needed. This book will be of interest to students and scholars of global political economy, European integration and competition law.

Competition regulation constitutes one of the core policy areas of the European Union (EU). Already in the preamble of the Treaty of Rome of 1957, establishing the European Economic Community (EEC, here referred to as EC), competition regulation received a strong constitutional status, laying the legal basis for 'a system ensuring that competition in the internal market is not distorted' (Article 3(f)). The actual competition provisions came to comprise the areas of cartels and restrictive business practices, abuse of dominant position, public undertakings and state aid, stipulated in Articles 85 to 94, which after the renumbering through the Treaty of Amsterdam and later the Treaty of Lisbon became Articles 101 to 109 (for the sake of simplicity, the article numbers of the Lisbon Treaty will be used henceforth). Shortly after its inauguration, the Commission's Directorate General (DG) for Competition was entrusted with far-reaching investigatory and decisional powers in the enforcement of competition laws, and in 1989 these powers were further extended to the field of merger control. To date, there is no comparable Community policy in which the European Commission enjoys similar wide-ranging competences, and in which the member states and the European Parliament have so little to say.

Capitalist production and accumulation transnationalised at an unprecedented pace throughout the 1990s. This fundamental transformation of the context in which competition rules were enforced took shape through a massive increase of cross-border mergers and intercompany agreements, which in turn were facilitated through various neoliberal forms of regulation. The neoliberal counter-project to the social order of embedded liberalism and concomitantly to centre-left, national and Euro-mercantilist ideas and practices gained the discursive upper hand both in the competition units and in the broader ensembles of regulation in the course of the 1990s. It served to promote the superiority of free market forces and competition-driven mechanisms above state-regulated social and economic organisation. Section one looks into the changes of capitalism and capitalist power relations since the 1990s, whilst section two discusses the consolidation of neoliberalism as a general hegemonic discourse. Section three explains how the neoliberal discourse became hegemonic in the EC competition unit of regulation, while section four and five deal with the Commission's cartel and state aid prosecution, privatisation directives and merger control. Section six addresses the wider repercussions of EC level neoliberal practices on national level regulatory developments.

This chapter explains the development of European competition units of regulation in the 1960s and 1970s. It argues that national and EC level competition regulation formed part of the institutionalised nexus of the broader post-war hegemonic order of state-organised capitalism known as 'embedded liberalism', and the responses to the 'American challenge'. Although European competition units continued to be shaped by the neoliberal and national mercantilist discourses, elements of centre-left and Euro-mercantilist discourses were incorporated into the formation of competition rules and their enforcement. The resulting regulation of competition was politically legitimised with references to social inclusion, full employment goals and inter-class solidarity, thereby reflecting the wider class compromise between organised labour and industrial capital fractions of the mixed economies of Europe. The first two sections outline the broader socioeconomic context. The third section focuses on the development of national competition regulation, particularly regarding the content and form of the merger subunits of regulation that appeared in the UK, Germany and France in this period. Section four and five examine the development and enforcement of EC competition regulation during this phase and section six explains the failure to reach agreement in the 1970s on an EC level merger control regulation.

This chapter exposes the political struggles that led to the establishment of a European level competition unit of regulation. It explains why competition rules were included in the 1951 Treaty of Paris, which established the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and in the 1957 Treaty of Rome, which led to the European Economic Community (referred to as the EC in the remainder). The chapter argues that, similar to the developments at national level, the supranational competition units were given shape on the basis of two discourses of regulation, namely the neoliberal and national mercantilist discourses. Section one discusses the adoption of the Schuman Declaration that preceded the ECSC Treaty, while sections two and three analyse the political controversies in the run-up to the ECSC Treaty and the content, form and scope of the resulting competition unit of regulation. Section four examines the political disputes that led to the establishment of the EC competition unit, while section five focuses on the content, form and scope it was eventually given. In section six, the adoption of Regulation 17/62 which further fleshed out the statutory rules for the enforcement of the Treaty's competition rules receives special attention.

Alongside the constructive and consolidating moments of the neoliberal discourse of regulation, the Commission's DG Competition in alliance with the emerging transnational capitalist class surfaced as a driving force behind a range of bilateral and multilateral competition agreements in the 1990s. Competition regulation was no longer restricted to 'Brussels' and the national level, but formed part of the broader political project of establishing global free markets, free from public and private barriers inhibiting competition. This chapter analyses the political struggles that shaped the globalisation of competition regulation. The first three sections examine the politics underpinning the bilateral competition agreements between the EC and the US competition authorities against the background of enhanced commercial cross-border transactions affecting the transatlantic market place, the emerging transnational capitalist class and its quest for more regulatory convergence. Section four explains the proposal for global competition rules at WTO on the basis of the underlying social power relations, whilst section five analyses the politics of contestation that led to its downfall. Section six explains why the International Competition Network and the bilateral agreements concluded under the 2006 agenda 'Global Europe - Competing in the World' were chosen as alternative routes to proclaim the convergence of competition rules around the world.