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154 result(s) for "Bueno, Otávio"
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The Likelihood Ratio Measure and the Logicality Requirement
What sort of evidence can confer the strongest support to a hypothesis? A natural answer is that the evidence entails the hypothesis. Roush (Tracking Truth: Knowledge, Evidence, and Science, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2005) claims that the likelihood ratio measure of degree of incremental support can deliver this intuitively natural result, and regards it as unifying “[the] account of induction and deduction in the only way that makes sense” (p. 163). In this paper, we highlight a difficulty in the treatment of this case, and question the great significance that is attached to this measure and its alleged capacity to accommodate the logicality requirement. We contrast the likelihood ratio measure with other measures (such as the Kemeny–Oppenheim measure and the difference measure), and argue that problems still emerge in light of tensions with plausible requirements for confirmation measures more generally.
An Inferential Conception of the Application of Mathematics
A number of people have recently argued for a structural approach to accounting for the applications of mathematics. Such an approach has been called \"the mapping account\". According to this view, the applicability of mathematics is fully accounted for by appreciating the relevant structural similarities between the empirical system under study and the mathematics used in the investigation ofthat system. This account of applications requires the truth of applied mathematical assertions, but it does not require the existence of mathematical objects. In this paper, we discuss the shortcomings of this account, and show how these shortcomings can be overcome by a broader view of the application of mathematics: the inferential conception.
An anti-realist account of the application of mathematics
Mathematical concepts play at least three roles in the application of mathematics: an inferential role, a representational role, and an expressive role. In this paper, I argue that, despite what has often been alleged, platonists do not fully accommodate these features of the application of mathematics. At best, platonism provides partial ways of handling the issues. I then sketch an alternative, anti-realist account of the application of mathematics, and argue that this account manages to accommodate these features of the application process. In this way, a better account of mathematical applications is, in principle, available.
Evidence of tuberculosis treatment outcomes among people experiencing homelessness: a scoping review
Background Tuberculosis is an infectious, preventable and treatable disease that is socially determined. People experiencing homelessness represent a group that is highly vulnerable to this disease, presenting a challenge for its control and elimination. The aim of this review was to synthesize the existing scientific evidence on the outcomes of tuberculosis treatment in the context of the population experiencing homelessness. Methods This scoping review was conducted following JBI guidelines. Six databases were consulted: MEDLINE, Web of Science, Scopus, LILACS, CINAHL and EMBASE. Scientific literature with quantitative or mixed-method approaches may be included, published from 2015 onward, in English, Portuguese and Spanish, involving participants aged 15 years or older. The Rayyan application was used to facilitate the selection process, and a descriptive analysis of the findings was performed. Results Fourteen articles were included, comprising primarily cohort studies ( n= 6) and cross-sectional studies ( n= 5), along with two ecological studies and a systematic review. Eight articles were from South America (seven from Brazil), three from Europe and three from Asia. The rates of treatment success outcomes ranged from 89.7% to less than 30%, with nine studies reporting rates under 45%. The highest proportion of accumulated unsuccessful treatment outcomes was nearly 70%, with four studies indicating rates between 60% and 66%. Loss to follow-up was the most frequently reported negative outcome ( n= 9), reaching rates of 53.6%. The “failed” treatment outcome was reported in low proportions, often less than 1% ( n= 5) and “not evaluated” outcome was reported in half of the studies ( n= 7). The proportions observed in the systematic review were consistent with these findings. Furthermore, the results revealed significant differences compared with those of the global general population. While both groups exhibited low proportions of treatment failures, other outcomes for the homeless population were markedly poorer. Conclusions The homeless population experiences low success rates in tuberculosis treatment, with no study in this review meeting the international treatment success rate target. A comprehensive, collaborative and patient-centered care approach that addresses social determination of health is essential to improve outcomes and enhance health, social care, and educational services tailored to the needs of this population.
Modalism and theoretical virtues: toward an epistemology of modality
According to modalism, modality is primitive. In this paper, we examine the implications of this view for modal epistemology, and articulate a modalist account of modal knowledge. First, we discuss a theoretical utility argument used by David Lewis in support of his claim that there is a plurality of concrete worlds. We reject this argument, and show how to dispense with possible worlds altogether. We proceed to account for modal knowledge in modalist terms.
Putnam's indispensability argument revisited, reassessed, revived
Crucial to Hilary Putnam's realism in the philosophy of mathematics is to maintain the objectivity of mathematics without the commitment to the existence of mathematical objects. Putnam's indispensability argument was devised as part of this conception. In this paper, I reconstruct and reassess Putnam's argument for the indispensability of mathematics, and distinguish it from the more familiar, Quinean version of the argument. Although I argue that Putnam's approach ultimately fails, I develop an alternative way of implementing his form of realism about mathematics that, by using different resources than those Putnam invokes, avoids the difficulties faced by his view. Es esencial para el realismo de Putnam en filosofía de la matemática el poder mantener la objetividad de la matemática sin comprometerse con la existencia de objetos matemáticos. La versión de Putnam del argumento de la indispensabilidad se concibió desde esta concepción. En este artículo reconstruyo y re-evalúo la versión del argumento de Putnam, distinguiéndolo de la versión quineana. Muestro que la propuesta de Putnam fracasa, y desarrollo una forma alternativa de articular esta forma de realismo matemático. La alternativa propuesta utiliza recursos diferentes a los de Putnam y evita así las dificultades que la propuesta de Putnam enfrenta.
WHY IDENTITY IS FUNDAMENTAL
Identity is arguably one of the most fundamental concepts in metaphysics. Here, Bueno examines and defends several reasons why this is the case. He then investigates a challenge that has been raised against identity's fundamentality: one from the metaphysics of physics--based on a significant interpretation of non-relativist quantum mechanics--according to which certain quantum particles lack identity conditions. After responding to this challenge, he considers the nature of the commitment to identity, and argues that it turns out to be very minimal.
How Theories Represent
An account of scientific representation in terms of partial structures and partial morphisms is further developed. It is argued that the account addresses a variety of difficulties and challenges that have recently been raised against such formal accounts of representation. This allows some useful parallels between representation in science and art to be drawn, particularly with regard to apparently inconsistent representations. These parallels suggest that a unitary account of scientific and artistic representation is possible, and our article can be viewed as laying the groundwork for such an account—although, as we shall acknowledge, significant differences exist between these two forms of representation.