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New waves in philosophy of science
\"This book captures the diverse array of issues in the rapidly developing area of philosophy of science by bringing together a pool of talented young philosophers from across the globe to debate the field and show where it's heading\"--Provided by publisher.
Book
Nudging in Public Health Lifestyle Interventions: A Systematic Literature Review and Metasynthesis
Nudging is increasingly used in public health interventions in Western societies to produced health-promoting behavior changes; however, there is lack of clarity as to what constitutes a nudge, scant knowledge of the effectiveness of nudging techniques in public health lifestyle interventions and a number of ethical and value-based concerns. The aim of this review is to address these research lacunae and identify the characteristics of nudges in empirical research on public health interventions intended to induce healthy lifestyle changes, including whether they are effective. We conducted systematic searches for relevant articles published between January 2008 and April 2019 in three databases, PubMed, CINAHL and PsycINFO, and combined this with a metasynthesis to construct interpretative explanations. A total of 66 original studies met the inclusion criteria. The findings of the systematic review showed that most nudging interventions involved diet/nutrition, most were carried out as single experiments, and the majority had the intended effects. Specific nudging techniques were identified with respect to the broader nudging categories of accessibility, presentation, using messages and pictures, technology-supported information, financial incentives, affecting the senses, and cognitive loading; several studies included more than one nudging technique. Although many nudging techniques had the intended effects, it is unclear whether they would work outside the study setting. The synthesis revealed that the studies lacked critical reflection on the assumptions about health that were implicit in nudging interventions, the cultural acceptability of nudges, the context-free assumptions of nudging theory, and the implications of these aspects for the public health context.
Journal Article
Artificial Intelligence and Patient-Centered Decision-Making
Advanced AI systems are rapidly making their way into medical research and practice, and, arguably, it is only a matter of time before they will surpass human practitioners in terms of accuracy, reliability, and knowledge. If this is true, practitioners will have a prima facie epistemic and professional obligation to align their medical verdicts with those of advanced AI systems. However, in light of their complexity, these AI systems will often function as black boxes: the details of their contents, calculations, and procedures cannot be meaningfully understood by human practitioners. When AI systems reach this level of complexity, we can also speak of black-box medicine. In this paper, we want to argue that black-box medicine conflicts with core ideals of patient-centered medicine. In particular, we claim, black-box medicine is not conducive for supporting informed decision-making based on shared information, shared deliberation, and shared mind between practitioner and patient.
Journal Article
Should scientific realists be platonists?
Enhanced indispensability arguments (EIA) claim that Scientific Realists are committed to the existence of mathematical entities due to their reliance on Inference to the best explanation (IBE). Our central question concerns this purported parity of reasoning: do people who defend the EIA make an appropriate use of the resources of Scientific Realism (in particular, IBE) to achieve platonism? (§2) We argue that just because a variety of different inferential strategies can be employed by Scientific Realists does not mean that ontological conclusions concerning which things we should be Scientific Realists about are arrived at by any inferential route which eschews causes (§3), and nor is there any direct pressure for Scientific Realists to change their inferential methods (§4). We suggest that in order to maintain inferential parity with Scientific Realism, proponents of EIA need to give details about how and in what way the presence of mathematical entities directly contribute to explanations (§5).
Journal Article
Can the new indispensability argument be saved from Euclidean rescues?
The traditional formulation of the indispensability argument for the existence of mathematical entities (IA) has been criticised due to its reliance on confirmational holism. Recently a formulation of IA that works without appeal to confirmational holism has been defended. This recent formulation is meant to be superior to the traditional formulation in virtue of it not being subject to the kind of criticism that pertains to confirmational holism. I shall argue that a proponent of the version of IA that works without appeal to confirmational holism will struggle to answer a challenge readily answered by proponents of a version of IA that does appeal to confirmational holism. This challenge is to explain why mathematics applied in falsified scientific theories is not considered to be falsified along with the rest of the theory. In cases where mathematics seemingly ought to be falsified it is saved from falsification, by a so called 'Euclidean rescue'. I consider a range of possible answers to this challenge and conclude that each answer fails.
Journal Article
Biodiversity reporting in Denmark
Purpose - This paper aims to suggest that companies have ethical reasons to report about biodiversity issues and to investigate whether companies act on these reasons by examining the extent of biodiversity reporting in Denmark. Design/methodology/approach - For the first purpose, desk research was conducted using consequentialist ethics, while for the second purpose, data were gathered from the 2009-2011 annual reports, CSR-type reports and homepages of 24 Danish large-cap companies. Findings - Philosophically, it is shown that biodiversity preservation and reporting is an ethical issue, even on the assumption that biodiversity does not possess intrinsic value. Empirically, it is shown that Danish companies score poorly overall, both quantitatively and qualitatively, with regards to reporting on biodiversity. Research limitations/implications - Even though the importance of biodiversity can be justified on different assumptions, biodiversity reporting is under-researched offering potential for future research on a globally important issue. Practical implications - Justifying the preservation of biodiversity from an instrumental viewpoint might convince accounting audiences that are sceptical of normative ethical argumentation based on intrinsic value. The relative lack of biodiversity reporting in Denmark shows the need for the State and accounting standard setters to address this issue together with business and other stakeholders. Originality/value - Few studies theorize on why there is a need for environmental reporting. Those that do are based on non-instrumental considerations. This paper gives philosophical arguments for biodiversity reporting normally outside the scope of accounting. It emphasizes how even those who deny that biodiversity has intrinsic value are morally obliged to account for biodiversity. The argument also provides novel reasons for why thinking about discount rates should be governed by pure preference considerations. Empirically, this is only the second paper examining biodiversity reporting and the first about the Danish context.
Journal Article
Further Insights on Fake-Barn Cases and Intuition Variation
Studies in experimental philosophy claim to document intuition variation. Some studies focus on demographic group-variation; Colaço et al., for example, claim that age generates intuition variation regarding knowledge attribution in a fake-barn scenario. Other studies claim to show intuition variation when comparing the intuition of philosophers to that of non-philosophers. The main focus has been on documenting intuition variation rather than uncovering what underlying factor(s) may prompt such a phenomenon. We explore a number of suggested explanatory hypotheses put forth by Colaço et al., as well as an attempt to test Sosa's claim that intuition variance is a result of people ‘filling in the details’ of a thought experiment differently from one another. We show (i) that people respond consistently across conditions aimed at ‘filling in the details’ of thought experiments, (ii) that risk attitude does not seem relevant to knowledge ascription, (iii) that people's knowledge ascriptions do not vary due to views about defeasibility of knowledge. Yet, (iv) we find no grounds to reject that a large proportion of people appear to adhere to so-called subjectivism about knowledge, which may explain why they generally have intuitions about the fake-barn scenario that vary from those of philosophers.
Journal Article
The Indispensability Argument for Mathematical Realism and Scientific Realism
Confirmational holism is central to a traditional formulation of the indispensability argument for mathematical realism (IA). I argue that recent strategies for defending scientific realism are incompatible with confirmational holism. Thus a traditional formulation of IA is incompatible with recent strategies for defending scientific realism. As a consequence a traditional formulation of IA will only have limited appeal.
Journal Article
Exclusion Criteria in Experimental Philosophy
When experimental philosophers carry out studies on thought experiments, some participants are excluded based on certain exclusion criteria, mirroring standard social science vignette methodology. This involves excluding people that do not pay attention or who miscomprehend the scenario presented in thought experiments. However, experimental philosophy studies sometimes exclude an alarmingly high number of participants. We argue that this threatens the external and internal validity of the conclusions being drawn and we show how a simple visualization of thought experiments can reduce exclusion rates significantly. Furthermore, we argue that focus should not merely be on how many are excluded, but also why they are excluded, and we highlight the role of comprehension questions in this regard. Philosophical thought experiments often rely on the acceptance of certain key premises that may be regarded contestable, and asking comprehension questions involving such key assumptions could be problematic as that may result in some participants being inadvertently excluded from the study, potentially creating a selection bias.
Journal Article
Dealing with Uncertainties in Sustainable Consumer Product Designs
To address the growing environmental problems and rising social inequality, many manufacturers and designers are engaging in making more sustainable consumer products. However, launching the wrong sustainable designs may lead to negative consequences. To steer clear of this risk, we need to consider the uncertainties involved in launching sustainable consumer products and avoid launching products with a significant probability of causing harmful effects. To support this task, the paper clarifies the uncertainties associated with sustainable consumer product design. More specifically, the paper defines the concept of sustainability uncertainty in consumer product designs, identifies four types of \"product uncertainties\" and eight types of \"consumer uncertainties,\" and discusses how to address sustainability uncertainty in these twelve dimensions. Furthermore, the paper provides a set of empirical examples to support the relevance of identified the twelve sustainability uncertainty dimensions.
Journal Article