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This book shows the effects and implications of regulation on how the market functions, with an emphasis on how regulation affects economic actors in other parts of the economy. It focuses on how re-allocation of resources due to real change versus artificial change caused by regulation affects the choice situation of individual actors.

Entrepreneur-promoters, or the pioneers of economic improvement, provide an essential market function which economics cannot do without. Yet Ludwig von Mises maintains that this function lies beyond what can be defined with praxeological rigor. This paper attempts to find a praxeological subcategory of entrepreneurship that conforms with Mises’s indeterminate references to the entrepreneur-promoter in Human Action. Rather than relying on the evenly rotating economy, which is commonly used for analyzing entrepreneurship, the imaginary construction of a specialization deadlock is employed, adapted from Per Bylund’s Problem of Production. This construction allows for the derivation of a praxeological subcategory of entrepreneurship, distinct from the general function of uncertainty bearing, which suggests a theoretical explanation for what constitutes the driving force of the market process.

We produce a definition and argument for explicitly adopting value subjectivism in entrepreneurship research. While the field has progressively shifted toward subjectivism over the past decades, we remain saddled with positivist baggage in our theories’ definitions of key variables, including the concept of value. Although modern scholars readily admit that value is subjective, what is generally meant by this is that it is idiosyncratically determined. We argue that value is more appropriately defined, atop pure subjectivism, as an increase in subjective satisfaction or well-being. We develop and elaborate on this definition and explore its implications for entrepreneurship theory and policy.

Whereas most countries in the COVID-19 pandemic imposed shutdowns and curfews to mitigate the contagion, Sweden uniquely pursued a more voluntarist approach. In this article, our interest is primarily on how and why Sweden's approach to the pandemic was so unique. There are two parts to this research question: (1) why did virtually all other nations follow a radical lockdown protocol despite limited evidence to its effectiveness and (2) why did Sweden not follow this same protocol despite strong political pressures? The answers to these questions lie within typical government technocracy versus Sweden's constitutional separation of government and technocracy. We review the history of the responses to the pandemic and show how the \"tyranny of experts\" was severe within the typical technocratic policy response, and attenuated in Sweden's. Thus, the recent pandemic offers empirical evidence and insights regarding the role of Hayekian knowledge problems in engendering a technocratic \"tyranny of experts\" and how such effects can be structurally mitigated.

Kirzner (2019) develops an Austrian perspective to critique Friedman’s universal ethic for profit, specifically for not including a rationale for entrepreneurial discovery of pure profit. In this article, I assess Kirzner’s argument, drawing from the theory originally developed by Carl Menger in his groundbreaking Principles of Economics. I specifically contrast Kirzner’s perspective with Menger’s theory regarding the concept of economic good, which offers insights into how and by whom goods are valued and the implications for the Austrian theory of entrepreneurship and production. Following my assessment and critique, I leverage Menger’s economic theory to draft a uniquely Austrian ethic for the free enterprise system. JEL codes: B53, L26, P1.

Frank H. Knight's magnum opus Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit, published in 1921, is widely recognized for introducing and establishing the distinction between risk and uncertainty. It is also known for developing a novel theory of the firm and business profit based on entrepreneurial judgment. However, the work's relevance for institutionalism has only rarely been addressed or even acknowledged. This introduction to the special issue organized to celebrate the centenary of Knight's tome briefly summarizes the work's institutionalist implications and the articles that comprise the special issue.

In this issue, Elert and Henrekson observe that Austrian economic theory is lacking with respect to explaining formal governance in the economy, and suggest drawing from, if not incorporating, re-cent work on the collaborative innovation bloc. This, they argue, would make Austrian economics more relevant to policy. I elaborate on and specify the theory space they address, and agree that it is a nascent and still underdeveloped area of theorizing in Austrian theory. However, recognizing the complexity of coordination and how it is prevalent on all institutional levels of economic analysis, I question the wisdom of adopting a single case over producing a universal Austrian theory of organizing and governance.

Formal economic models of entrepreneurship have two characteristics: they model entrepreneurship as an allocation of resources, and they identify common factors affecting this allocation. These common factors are represented as parameters of optimization models, and they are evaluated at the market level. We argue that although these models are useful, they are incomplete because certain aspects of entrepreneurial behavior, such as judgment, alertness, or innovativeness, cannot be easily transformed into allocative problems. Moreover, entrepreneurial acts involve idiosyncratic elements, which limit the applicability of the market-level analysis to individual cases. Thus, the traditional economic methods have to be complemented by approaches highlighting the role of individual and historical specificity. The study of entrepreneurship, therefore, requires a synthesis of both general theory and historicist approaches, as envisioned a century ago by Frank Knight.

This article explains firm emergence and the role of firms in the market structure using the productive power of specialization. Based on productivity efficiencies through technological specialization, a model for firm emergence is drafted alongside Coasean transaction cost theory. I find that transaction costs cannot explain firm emergence, but the entrepreneurial specialization perspective here adopted provides a promising approach to understanding the firm’s function to the entrepreneur and its internal organization and capabilities. It suggests a foundational framework for studying the creation of capabilities and the interplay between markets, firms, and entrepreneurs.