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Background This theoretical paper offers an ecofeminist analysis and critique of a specific conception of energy. The hypothesis is that, at least in the Western context, there is a characteristic socio-economic understanding of energy as a resource and commodity for human needs and the development of human societies. This conception corresponds to a cultural understanding that is both different from and broader than the scientific notion of energy. Such a conception has become part of several narratives, including energy policy. Our research question is: does this conception of energy as a commodity and resource affect the relation between humans and nature? And if so, how? Results Drawing on the work of Val Plumwood, and Greta Gaard, we argue that conceiving of energy as a resource and commodity for human needs and the socio-economic development of human societies reinforces and mediates the hierarchical and oppressive dualism “human-nature”, thus contributing to backgrounding, excluding, incorporating, and instrumentalizing some parts of nonhuman nature as well as some human groups. Conclusions The idea of energy as a commodity shapes public debates and policies, worsening existing environmental issues. This dominant perspective affects how people respond to environmental challenges and crises, both individually and collectively. This article aims to encourage more critical and open discussions about energy. It suggests that researchers and policymakers adopt more radical and less oppressive approaches in their academic work, benefiting both the human and non-human world.

Existing predominant approaches within virtue ethics (VE) assume humans as the typical agent and virtues as dispositions that pertain primarily to human–human interpersonal relationships. Similarly, the main accounts in the more specific area of environmental virtue ethics (EVE) tend to support weak anthropocentric positions, in which virtues are understood as excellent dispositions of human agents. In addition, however, several EVE authors have also considered virtues that benefit non-human beings and entities (e.g., environmental or ecological virtues). The latter correspond to excellent character dispositions that would extend moral consideration and care for the benefit of non-human beings, entities, or entire ecosystems. In this direction, a few authors have argued that EVE could be considered non-anthropocentric insofar as it could: (a) promote non-human ends, well-being, and the flourishing of non-human beings and entities; (b) involve significant relations to non-humans. Drawing from different traditions, including ecofeminism and care ethics, we argue for a broader notion of self and a decentered notion of virtues. The broader notion of selfhood corresponds to the “ecological self”, one that can be enacted by both human and non-human beings, is embedded in a network of relations, and recognizes the more-than-human world as fundamental and yet indispensable otherness. We suggest that this broader notion of agency allows for an expansive understanding of virtues that includes a-moral functional ecological virtues, which can be exercised not only by humans but also by certain non-human beings. This alternative understanding of selfhood and ecological virtues within EVE could have several theoretical and practical implications, some of which may enable different types of agencies and transform collective action.