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Attentional blink occurs when two target items, T1 and T2, are presented within brief moments of each other in a series of rapidly presented items and participants fail to report T2. The purpose of the present study was to examine the effect of characteristics of T2 on T2 reporting. Participants ( N = 67) completed 4 blocks of 40 trials. Each trial consisted of 15 images, two of which were designated as T1 and T2. T2 was manipulated in three ways: animacy (animate or inanimate), threat (threatening or nonthreatening), and lag (200 ms or 400 ms after T1). The results indicated that more T2s were reported at the longer lag and that animate objects were reported more often than inanimate objects at both lags. Threat did not have a significant effect on T2 reporting although it interacted with lag: threatening objects were reported more frequently than nonthreatening objects at lag 2 but this trend reversed at lag 4. The results were consistent with the animate monitoring hypothesis, which claims that animate objects, because of their importance in ancestral environments, attract attention more easily than inanimate objects. Animate objects appear to capture attention more easily than inanimate objects as second targets in a rapid serial visual presentation task. This result is similar to animacy advantages reported with other attention tasks and with memory tasks.

Fake news is a serious problem because it misinforms people about important issues. The present study examined belief in false headlines about election fraud after the 2020 U.S. presidential election. Belief in election fraud had dangerous consequences, including the deadly insurrection at the U.S. Capitol in January 2021. In the present study, participants rated the truthfulness of true and false headlines about the election, and then completed individual difference measures eight days after the election. Participants with more conservative ideology, greater presidential approval of the outgoing president, greater endorsement of general conspiracy narratives and poorer cognitive reflection demonstrated greater belief in false headlines about election fraud. Additionally, consuming more politically conservative election news was associated with greater belief in false headlines. Identifying the factors related to susceptibility to false claims of election fraud offers a path toward countering the influence of these claims by tailoring interventions aimed at decreasing belief in misinformation and decreasing conspiracy beliefs to those most susceptible.

The illusory truth effect occurs when the repetition of a claim increases its perceived truth. Previous studies have demonstrated the illusory truth effect with true and false news headlines. The present study examined the effects that different ratings made during initial exposure have on the illusory truth effect with news headlines. In two experiments, participants (total N  = 575) rated a set of news headlines in one of two conditions. Some participants rated how interesting they were, and others rated how truthful they were. Participants later rated the perceived accuracy of a larger set of headlines that included previously rated and new headlines. In both experiments, prior exposure increased perceived accuracy for participants who made initial interest ratings, but not for participants who made initial truthfulness ratings. The increase in perceived accuracy that accompanies repeated exposure was attenuated when participants considered the accuracy of the headlines at initial exposure. Experiment 2 also found evidence for a political bias: participants rated politically concordant headlines as more accurate than politically discordant headlines. The magnitude of this bias was related to performance on a cognitive reflection test; more analytic participants demonstrated greater political bias. These results highlight challenges that fake news presents and suggest that initially encoding headlines’ perceived truth can serve to combat the illusion that a familiar headline is a truthful one.

In the ultimatum game, one player proposes a split of money between him- or herself and another player, who can accept the offer (and both players keep the allocated money) or reject the offer (and both players get nothing). The present study examined predictors of accepting unfair ultimatum offers. In Study 1, 184 participants responded to an unfair ultimatum offer, completed a measure of cognitive reflection, and completed a self-report measure of rational and experiential thinking. Slightly more than half of the participants (54.3%) accepted the unfair offer, and cognitive reflection was positively correlated with accepting unfair offers. The rational and experiential thinking scales were not significantly correlated with ultimatum decisions. In Study 2, 306 participants responded to 20 ultimatum offers that varied in fairness and completed an expanded measure of cognitive reflection. Performance on the cognitive reflection measure predicted the number of ultimatum offers accepted. These results suggest that rejecting ultimatum offers is related to intuitive, heuristic-based thinking, whereas accepting offers is related to deliberate, analytic-based thinking.

The “surprisingly popular” method (SP) of aggregating individual judgments has shown promise in overcoming a weakness of other crowdsourcing methods—situations in which the majority is incorrect. This method relies on participants’ estimates of other participants’ judgments; when an option is chosen more often than the average metacognitive judgments of that option, it is “surprisingly popular” and is selected by the method. Although SP has been shown to improve group decision making about factual propositions (e.g., state capitals), its application to future outcomes has been limited. In three preregistered studies, we compared SP to other methods of aggregating individual predictions about future events. Study 1 examined predictions of football games, Study 2 examined predictions of the 2018 US midterm elections, and Study 3 examined predictions of basketball games. When applied to judgments made by objectively assessed experts, SP performed slightly better than other aggregation methods. Although there is still more to learn about the conditions under which SP is effective, it shows promise as a means of crowdsourcing predictions of future outcomes.

Inattentional blindness is the failure to notice unexpected objects in a visual scene while engaging in an attention-demanding task. We examined the effects of animacy and perceptual load on inattentional blindness. Participants searched for a category exemplar under low or high perceptual load. On the last trial, the participants were exposed to an unexpected object that was either animate or inanimate. Unexpected objects were detected more frequently when they were animate rather than inanimate, and more frequently with low than with high perceptual loads. We also measured working memory capacity and found that it predicted the detection of unexpected objects, but only with high perceptual loads. The results are consistent with the animate-monitoring hypothesis, which suggests that animate objects capture attention because of the importance of the detection of animate objects in ancestral hunter–gatherer environments.

The deliberation-without-attention effect occurs when better decisions are made when people experience a period of distraction before a decision than when they make decisions immediately or when they spend time reflecting on the alternatives. This effect has been explained (e.g., Dijksterhuis, 2004) by the claim that people engage in unconscious deliberation when distracted and that unconscious thought is better suited for complex decisions than conscious thought. Experiments 1, 2A, and 2B in this study included a dominant alternative and failed to find evidence for this effect. Experiment 3 removed the dominant alternative and manipulated mode of thought within-subjects to eliminate alternative explanations for the failed replication. In all experiments participants did not make better decisions after unconscious thought; decisions were consistently better than chance when made immediately after the encoding of information. Encouraging people not to think about complex decisions appears to be unwarranted.

When faced with a decision, people generally show a bias toward heuristic processing, even if it leads to the incorrect decision, such as in the base-rate neglect task. The crucial question is whether people know that they are biased. Recently, the three-stage model (Pennycook, Fugelsang, & Koehler, 2015) suggested that detecting this bias (conflict detection) is imperfect and a consistent source of bias because some people do not recognize that they are making biased decisions. In Experiment 1, participants completed a base-rate neglect task as replication of Pennycook et al. (2015). In Experiment 2, a conditional reasoning task was added as an extension to test the boundary conditions of the model. Results in Experiment 1 indicated that detection failures were a significant source of bias. However, results in Experiment 2 on the conditional reasoning task indicated that the three-stage model may be incompatible with a complex task such as conditional reasoning, an issue explored in detail in the General discussion.

The misinformation effect occurs when a witness views an event, is exposed to misleading post-event information, and remembers some misleading details as having occurred in the original event. The present study examined the effect of receiving post-event information and being tested in different languages on bilingual participants’ susceptibility to the misinformation effect. English-Spanish bilingual participants (N = 234; 78% claimed English was their dominant language) watched a video, read a post-event narrative in English or in Spanish, and then were tested on details of the video in English or in Spanish. Regardless of the language in which participants read the post-event narrative, participants who were tested in English correctly recognized more true details and falsely recognized fewer misinformation details than those tested in Spanish. These results suggest that bilingual participants are more susceptible to the misinformation effect in their less proficient language, a finding that has important implications for interviewing bilingual witnesses. Even when witnesses claim to be fluent in two languages, testing their memory in their less fluent language may result in fewer true memories and more false memories.