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We compared the extent to which people discounted positive and negative events in the future and in the past. We found that the tendency to discount gains more than losses (i.e., the sign effect) emerged more strongly for future than for past outcomes. We present evidence from six studies (total N = 1,077) that the effect of tense on discounting is tied to differences in the contemplation emotion of these events, which we assessed by measuring participants’ emotions while they either anticipated or remembered the event. We ruled out loss aversion, uncertainty, utility curvature, thought frequency, and connection to the future and past self as explanations for this phenomenon, and we discuss why people experience a distinct mixture of emotions when contemplating upcoming events.

People tend to view members of their own political group more positively than members of a competing political group. In this article, we demonstrate that political partisanship influences people's visual representations of a biracial political candidate's skin tone. In three studies, participants rated the representativeness of photographs of a hypothetical (Study 1) or real (Barack Obama; Studies 2 and 3) biracial political candidate. Unbeknownst to participants, some of the photographs had been altered to make the candidate's skin tone either lighter or darker than it was in the original photograph. Participants whose partisanship matched that of the candidate they were evaluating consistently rated the lightened photographs as more representative of the candidate than the darkened photographs, whereas participants whose partisanship did not match that of the candidate showed the opposite pattern. For evaluations of Barack Obama, the extent to which people rated lightened photographs as representative of him was positively correlated with their stated voting intentions and reported voting behavior in the 2008 Presidential election. This effect persisted when controlling for political ideology and racial attitudes. These results suggest that people's visual representations of others are related to their own preexisting beliefs and to the decisions they make in a consequential context.

Reactions to other people who get desirable outcomes should be a simple function of how much one desires those outcomes. Four studies (N = 4,978) suggest that one’s reactions depend on the temporal location of outcome acquisition: Observers care more (e.g., feel more envy) right before, versus right after, other people have identical experiences (Studies 1, 2a, and 2b). For example, participants’ envy in February rose as Valentine’s Day approached (as a peer’s enviable date loomed in the future) but abruptly plateaued come February 15 onward (after the date occurred). Further, the passing of time specifically assuaged the pain of comparison (whereas positive reactions, such as feeling inspired, remained high; Studies 3a, 3b, and 3c); therefore, taking a past perspective can be used to regulate negative emotions in the present (Study 4). Time asymmetrically shapes the experience of upward comparison, despite other people’s desirable outcomes indeed being achieved. Other people’s good lives sting less if they have already lived them.

Children and adults respond negatively to inequity. Traditional accounts of inequity aversion suggest that as children mature into adults, they become less likely to endorse all forms of inequity. We challenge the idea that children have a unified concern with inequity that simply becomes stronger with age. Instead, we argue that the developmental trajectory of inequity aversion depends on whether the inequity is seen as fair or unfair. In three studies (N = 501), 7to 8-year-olds were more likely than 4- to 6-year-olds to create inequity that disadvantaged themselves—a fair type of inequity. In findings consistent with our theory, 7- to 8-year-olds were not more likely than 4- to 6-year-olds to endorse advantageous inequity (Study 1) or inequity created by third parties (Studies 2 and 3)—unfair types of inequity. We discuss how these results expand on recent accounts of children's developing concerns with generosity and partiality.

A major challenge for accumulating knowledge in psychology is the variation in methods and participant populations across studies in a single domain. We offer a systematic approach to addressing this challenge and implement it in the domain of money priming. In three preregistered experiments (N = 4,649), participants were exposed to one of a number of money manipulations before completing self-report measures of money activation (Study 1); engaging in a behavioral-persistence task (Study 3); completing self-report measures of subjective wealth, self-sufficiency, and communion-agency (Studies 1-3); and completing demographic questions (Studies 1-3). Four of the five manipulations we tested activated the concept of money, but, contrary to what we expected based on the preponderance of the published literature, no manipulation consistently affected any dependent measure. Moderation by sociodemographic characteristics was sparse and inconsistent across studies. We discuss implications for theories of money priming and explain how our approach can complement recent efforts to build a reproducible, cumulative psychological science.

In an effort to continue the development of methods to understand social cognition, we adopt a technique called conjoint analysis that mathematically deduces preferences from the implied tradeoffs people make when choosing between sets of attributes at varying levels. We asked 101 students to make a series of choices between prospective teammates in a trivia contest who varied on three dimensions relevant to the decisions (education, IQ, experience) and one dimension that was irrelevant (body weight). Although participants stated explicitly that weight had little impact on their decisions, weight actually accounted for more than 25% of the variance in their revealed preferences. Additional analyses demonstrated that participants gave up about 11 IQ points to have a thin rather than overweight teammate. We suggest that conjoint analysis can be a valuable tool for detecting and quantifying the social costs of covert attitudes that are not in sync with overt values. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT]

To determine the appropriate punishment for a harmful action, people must often make inferences about the transgressor’s intent. In courtrooms and popular media, such inferences increasingly rely on video evidence, which is often played in “slow motion.” Four experiments (n = 1,610) involving real surveillance footage from a murder or broadcast replays of violent contact in professional football demonstrate that viewing an action in slow motion, compared with regular speed, can cause viewers to perceive an action as more intentional. This slow motion intentionality bias occurred, in part, because slow motion video caused participants to feel like the actor had more time to act, even when they knew how much clock time had actually elapsed. Four additional experiments (n = 2,737) reveal that allowing viewers to see both regular speed and slow motion replay mitigates the bias, but does not eliminate it. We conclude that an empirical understanding of the effect of slow motion on mental state attribution should inform the life-or-death decisions that are currently based on tacit assumptions about the objectivity of human perception.

People routinely remember events that have passed and imagine those that are yet to come. The past and the future are sometimes psychologically close (\"just around the corner\") and other times psychologically distant (\"ages away\"). Four studies demonstrate a systematic asymmetry whereby future events are psychologically closer than past events of equivalent objective distance. When considering specific times (e.g., 1 year) or events (e.g., Valentine's Day), people consistently reported that the future was closer than the past. We suggest that this asymmetry arises because the subjective experience of movement through time (whereby future events approach and past events recede) is analogous to the physical experience of movement through space. Consistent with this hypothesis, experimentally reversing the metaphorical arrow of time (by having participants move backward through virtual space) completely eliminated the past-future asymmetry. We discuss how reducing psychological distance to the future may function to prepare people for upcoming action.

Police departments use body-worn cameras (body cams) and dashboard cameras (dash cams) to monitor the activity of police officers in the field. Video from these cameras informs review of police conduct in disputed circumstances, often with the goal of determining an officer’s intent. Eight experiments (N = 2,119) reveal that body cam video of an incident results in lower observer judgments of intentionality than dash cam video of the same incident, an effect documented with both scripted videos and real police videos. This effect was due, in part, to variation in the visual salience of the focal actor: the body cam wearer is typically less visually salient when depicted in body versus dash cam video, which corresponds with lower observer intentionality judgments. In showing how visual salience of the focal actor may introduce unique effects on observer judgment, this research establishes an empirical platform that may inform public policy regarding surveillance of police conduct.

Adequate pain management is one of the biggest challenges of the modern healthcare system. Physician perception of patient subjective pain, which is crucial to pain management, is susceptible to a host of potential biases. Here we explore the timing of physicians’ work as a previously unrecognized source of systematic bias in pain management. We hypothesized that during night shifts, sleep deprivation, fatigue, and stress would reduce physicians’ empathy for others’ pain, leading to underprescription of analgesics for patient pain relief. In study 1, 67 resident physicians, either following a night shift or not, performed empathy for pain assessment tasks and simulated patient scenarios in laboratory conditions. As predicted, following a night shift, physicians showed reduced empathy for pain. In study 2, we explored this phenomenon in medical decisions in the field. We analyzed three emergency department datasets from Israel and the United States that included discharge notes of patients arriving with pain complaints during 2013 to 2020 (n = 13,482). Across all datasets, physicians were less likely to prescribe an analgesic during night shifts (compared to daytime shifts) and prescribed fewer analgesics than generally recommended by the World Health Organization. This effect remained significant after adjusting for patient, physician, type of complaint, and emergency department characteristics. Underprescription for pain during night shifts was particularly prominent for opioids. We conclude that night shift work is an important and previously unrecognized source of bias in pain management, likely stemming from impaired perception of pain. We consider the implications for hospitals and other organizations employing night shifts.