Explore the vast range of titles available.

Documents a study whose goals were to develop an understanding of commanders' information requirements for cultural and other \"soft\" factors in order to improve the effectiveness of combined arms operations, and to develop practical ways for commanders to integrate information and influence operations activities into combined arms planning/assessment in order to increase the usefulness to ground commanders of such operations.

Ongoing operations and emerging mission requirements place a heavy burden on Army resources, resulting in capability gaps that the Army is unable to fill by itself. One solution is to build the appropriate capabilities in allies and partner armies through focused security cooperation. To do this, Army planners need a more comprehensive understanding of the capability gaps and a process for matching those gaps with candidate partner armies.

The U.S. government is facing the dual challenge of building its own interagency capacity for conducting stability operations while simultaneously building partner capacity (BPC) for stability operations. This study finds that although BPC and stability operations are receiving a good deal of attention in official strategy and planning documents, insufficient attention is being paid to the details of an integrated strategy.

This report finds parallels in U.S. prisoner and detainee operations in World War II, Korea, Vietnam, and Iraq: underestimation of the number to be held, hasty scrambling for resources, and inadequate doctrine and policy. Later, attempts to educate and influence prisoners and detainees are often made. The authors recommend that detailed doctrine should be in place prior to detention and that detainees should be interviewed when first detained.

This report presents a framework for assessing U.S. Army International Activities (AIA). It also provides a matrix of eight AIA \"ends,\" derived from top-level national and Army guidance, and eight AIA \"ways,\" which summarize the various capabilities inherent in AIA programs. In addition, the report describes the new online AIA Knowledge Sharing System (AIAKSS) that is being used to solicit programmatic and assessment data from AIA officials in the Army's Major Commands.

Using a case study of Afghanistan, this study examines gender-specific impacts of conflict and post-conflict and the ways they may affect women differently than they affect men. It analyzes the role of women in the nation-building process and considers outcomes that might occur if current practices were modified. Recommendations are made for improving data collection in conflict zones and for enhancing the outcomes of nation-building programs.

The main hypothesis stated that a group's approach to conflict (resolve, avoid, or aggressive), combined with the decision rule (consensus or majority rule), would strongly impact the group final decision. The study proposed 4 types of decisions that these groups might make: dominant, subset, integrative, or deadlock. Small decision-making groups were studied in the context of crisis intervention using an experimental simulation. Participants included 296 students in 100-level basic communication courses at George Mason University. Three homogenous groups were built around each conflict approach (avoid, resolve, aggressive) and one diverse group included members from each conflict approach. Each group was divided between majority rule and consensus for a total of 8 groups of three people each. Groups were asked to decide whether or not to intervene in a fictional ethnic conflict in a neighboring country. The subjects answered a short questionnaire and tape-recorded their discussions. The main hypothesis was partially confirmed. A group's approach to conflict had a strong impact on the group final decision (F(3,3) = 25.31, p < .001). But the decision rule had no effect on the group final decision (F(1,3) = .03, p = .857). The type of group (resolver, aggressive, avoider, or diverse) did not determine the type of decision (dominant, integrative, deadlock, or subset). Most groups made dominant or low integrative types of decisions. However, 90% of the conflict resolver groups favored integrative types of decisions, as hypothesized. There was no difference between consensus and majority rule in the type of decision. However, consensus and majority rule did affect group process. For example, in a test of the group polarization effect at the .05 and .10 level of significance, aggressive and resolver groups in the consensus condition (t = 3.13, 70 df, p = .003; t = 1.83, 70 df, p = .07) and diverse groups in the majority rule condition (t = 1.99, 76 df, p = .05) became significantly more assured that their conflict roles were justified. This finding suggests that consensus causes extreme homogenous groups to become more extreme, but tempers opinions in groups with diverse views.