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"Chauchard, Simon"
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How prevalent is AI misinformation? What our studies in India show so far
A sample of roughly two million WhatsApp messages highlights urgent concerns about the spread and prevalence of AI-generated political content.
A sample of roughly two million WhatsApp messages highlights urgent concerns about the spread and prevalence of AI-generated political content.
Close-up of two men using a smartphone in Mumbai, India
Journal Article
Can Descriptive Representation Change Beliefs about a Stigmatized Group? Evidence from Rural India
Can descriptive representation for a stigmatized group change the beliefs and intentions of members of dominant groups? To address this question, I focus on quotas (reservations) that allow members of the scheduled castes to access key executive positions in India's village institutions. To measure the psychological effect of reservations, I combine a natural experiment with an innovative MP3-player-based self-administered survey that measures various beliefs and behavioral intentions. Results provide credible causal evidence that reservations affect the psychology of members of dominant castes. Even though villagers living in reserved villages continue to think poorly of members of the scheduled castes (stereotypes do not improve), reservation affects two other types of beliefs: perceived social norms of interactions and perceived legal norms of interactions. These changes in beliefs in turn appear to have far-reaching consequences for intercaste relations, as villagers’ discriminatory intentions also decrease under reservation.
Journal Article
Electoral Handouts in Mumbai Elections
Why do candidates give voters handouts during political campaigns? Drawing on qualitative data from Mumbai, this article argues that competitive elections prompt candidates to distribute handouts for strategic reasons. While they know handouts to be inefficient, candidates face a prisoner’s dilemma. Fearing that their opponents will distribute handouts, they distribute them themselves to counter, or neutralize, their opponents’ strategies.
Journal Article
Electoral Handouts in Mumbai Elections
Why do candidates give voters handouts during political campaigns? Drawing on qualitative data from Mumbai, this article argues that competitive elections prompt candidates to distribute handouts for strategic reasons. While they know handouts to be inefficient, candidates face a prisoner's dilemma. Fearing that their opponents will distribute handouts, they distribute them themselves to counter, or neutralize, their opponents' strategies.
Journal Article
USING MP3 PLAYERS IN SURVEYS: THE IMPACT OF A LOW-TECH SELF-ADMINISTRATION MODE ON REPORTING OF SENSITIVE ATTITUDES
This article introduces an inexpensive, low-tech Audio-Self-Administered Questionnaire that uses a basic MP3 player (MP3/ASAQ) and compares its performance in collecting data about sensitive attitudes with a number of alternatives, including a face-to-face survey. The paper compares five administration procedures in an experiment conducted in a survey on sensitive caste-related attitudes in rural India. Respondents in the MP3/ASAQ group listened to a prerecorded instrument that presented them with a number of first-person statements made by \"respondents like [them],\" entered their responses on an answer sheet using simple shapes and logos, and finally placed their form in a bolted ballot box. Like previous studies evaluating self-administration techniques, our study indicates that the MP3/ASAQ significantly increased socially undesirable answers, as compared with an equivalent face-to-face interview. Comparisons with additional administration procedures suggest that when self-administration is combined with the use of earphones the threat of bystander disapproval (as opposed to interviewer disapproval) is reduced by effectively isolating respondents from their social environment.
Journal Article
Getting Rich Too Fast? Voters’ Reactions to Politicians’ Wealth Accumulation
Asset declarations requiring politicians to disclose their financial information are becoming increasingly common across the world. The information contained in these disclosures frequently reveals that politicians rapidly accumulate wealth while in office, a fact that may raise suspicion among voters. However, little is known about the ways in which such information may affect voter behavior. To address this gap, we use original experimental and survey data from India to explore voters’ reactions to information about wealth and wealth accumulation. Results suggest that voters strongly disapprove of wealth accumulation in office and associate it with corruption and political violence. Further analyses suggest several mechanisms that may partly explain why many “wealth accumulators” win elections in India despite these negative reactions. Voters generally lack information about disclosures and many weigh wealth accumulation less than some other prominent concerns, such as performance in office or caste-based appeals.
Journal Article