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"Chemero, Anthony"
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Radical Embodied Cognitive Science
A proposal for a new way to do cognitive science argues that cognition should be described in terms of agent-environment dynamics rather than computation and representation.While philosophers of mind have been arguing over the status of mental representations in cognitive science, cognitive scientists have been quietly engaged in studying.
eBook
Human social motor solutions for human–machine interaction in dynamical task contexts
Multiagent activity is commonplace in everyday life and can improve the behavioral efficiency of task performance and learning. Thus, augmenting social contexts with the use of interactive virtual and robotic agents is of great interest across health, sport, and industry domains. However, the effectiveness of human–machine interaction (HMI) to effectively train humans for future social encounters depends on the ability of artificial agents to respond to human coactors in a natural, human-like manner. One way to achieve effective HMI is by developing dynamical models utilizing dynamical motor primitives (DMPs) of human multiagent coordination that not only capture the behavioral dynamics of successful human performance but also, provide a tractable control architecture for computerized agents. Previous research has demonstrated how DMPs can successfully capture human-like dynamics of simple nonsocial, single-actor movements. However, it is unclear whether DMPs can be used to model more complex multiagent task scenarios. This study tested this human-centered approach to HMI using a complex dyadic shepherding task, in which pairs of coacting agents had to work together to corral and contain small herds of virtual sheep. Human–human and human–artificial agent dyads were tested across two different task contexts. The results revealed (i) that the performance of human–human dyads was equivalent to those composed of a human and the artificial agent and (ii) that, using a “Turing-like” methodology, most participants in the HMI condition were unaware that they were working alongside an artificial agent, further validating the isomorphism of human and artificial agent behavior.
Journal Article
Herd Those Sheep: Emergent Multiagent Coordination and Behavioral-Mode Switching
Effectively coordinating one's behaviors with those of others is essential for successful multiagent activity. In recent years, increased attention has been given to understanding the dynamical principles that underlie such coordination because of a growing interest in behavioral synchrony and complex-systems phenomena. Here, we examined the behavioral dynamics of a novel, multiagent shepherding task, in which pairs of individuals had to corral small herds of virtual sheep in the center of a virtual game field. Initially, all pairs adopted a complementary, search-and-recover mode of behavioral coordination, in which both members corralled sheep predominantly on their own sides of the field. Over the course of game play, however, a significant number of pairs spontaneously discovered a more effective mode of behavior: coupled oscillatory containment, in which both members synchronously oscillated around the sheep. Analysis and modeling revealed that both modes were defined by the task's underlying dynamics and, moreover, reflected context-specific realizations of the lawful dynamics that define functional shepherding behavior more generally.
Journal Article
Constraints on Localization and Decomposition as Explanatory Strategies in the Biological Sciences
Several articles have recently appeared arguing that there really are no viable alternatives to mechanistic explanation in the biological sciences (Kaplan and Bechtel; Kaplan and Craver). We argue that mechanistic explanation is defined by localization and decomposition. We argue further that systems neuroscience contains explanations that violate both localization and decomposition. We conclude that the mechanistic model of explanation needs to either stretch to now include explanations wherein localization or decomposition fail or acknowledge that there are counterexamples to mechanistic explanation in the biological sciences.
Journal Article
Radical embodiment in two directions
Radical embodied cognitive science is split into two camps: the ecological approach and the enactive approach. We propose that these two approaches can be brought together into a productive synthesis. The key is to recognize that the two approaches are pursuing different but complementary types of explanation. Both approaches seek to explain behavior in terms of the animal–environment relation, but they start at opposite ends. Ecological psychologists pursue an ontological strategy. They begin by describing the habitat of the species, and use this to explain howaction possibilities are constrained for individual actors. Enactivists, meanwhile, pursue an epistemic strategy: start by characterizing the exploratory, self-regulating behavior of the individual organism, and use this to understand howthat organism brings forth its animal-specific umwelt. Both types of explanation are necessary: the ontological strategy explains how structure in the environment constrains how the world can appear to an individual, while the epistemic strategy explains how the world can appear differently to different members of the same species, relative to their skills, abilities, and histories. Making the distinction between species habitat and animal-specific umwelt allows us to understand the environment in realist terms while acknowledging that individual living organisms are phenomenal beings.
Journal Article
LLMs differ from human cognition because they are not embodied
Large language models (LLMs) are impressive technological creations but they cannot replace all scientific theories of cognition. A science of cognition must focus on humans as embodied, social animals who are embedded in material, cultural and technological contexts.
Journal Article
Task dynamics define the contextual emergence of human corralling behaviors
Social animals have the remarkable ability to organize into collectives to achieve goals unobtainable to individual members. Equally striking is the observation that despite differences in perceptual-motor capabilities, different animals often exhibit qualitatively similar collective states of organization and coordination. Such qualitative similarities can be seen in corralling behaviors involving the encirclement of prey that are observed, for example, during collaborative hunting amongst several apex predator species living in disparate environments. Similar encirclement behaviors are also displayed by human participants in a collaborative problem-solving task involving the herding and containment of evasive artificial agents. Inspired by the functional similarities in this behavior across humans and non-human systems, this paper investigated whether the containment strategies displayed by humans emerge as a function of the task’s underlying dynamics, which shape patterns of goal-directed corralling more generally. This hypothesis was tested by comparing the strategies naïve human dyads adopt during the containment of a set of evasive artificial agents across two disparate task contexts. Despite the different movement types (manual manipulation or locomotion) required in the different task contexts, the behaviors that humans display can be predicted as emergent properties of the same underlying task-dynamic model.
Journal Article
A Demonstration of the Transition from Ready-to-Hand to Unready-to-Hand
The ideas of continental philosopher Martin Heidegger have been influential in cognitive science and artificial intelligence, despite the fact that there has been no effort to analyze these ideas empirically. The experiments reported here are designed to lend empirical support to Heidegger's phenomenology and more specifically his description of the transition between ready-to-hand and unready-to-hand modes in interactions with tools. In experiment 1, we found that a smoothly coping cognitive system exhibits type positively correlated noise and that its correlated character is reduced when the system is perturbed. This indicates that the participant and tool constitute a self-assembled, extended device during smooth coping and this device is disrupted by the perturbation. In experiment 2, we examine the re-organization of awareness that occurs when a smoothly coping, self-assembled, extended cognitive system is perturbed. We found that the disruption is accompanied by a change in attention which interferes with participants' performance on a simultaneous cognitive task. Together these experiments show that a smoothly coping participant-tool system can be temporarily disrupted and that this disruption causes a change in the participant's awareness. Since these two events follow as predictions from Heidegger's work, our study offers evidence for the hypothesized transition from readiness-to-hand to unreadiness-to-hand.
Journal Article
General ecological information supports engagement with affordances for 'higher' cognition
In this paper, we address the question of how an agent can guide its behavior with respect to aspects of the sociomaterial environment that are not sensorily present. A simple example is how an animal can relate to a food source while only sensing a pheromone, or how an agent can relate to beer, while only the refrigerator is directly sensorily present. Certain cases in which something is absent have been characterized by others as requiring 'higher' cognition. An example of this is how during the design process architects can let themselves be guided by the future behavior of visitors to an exhibit they are planning. The main question is what the sociomaterial environment and the skilled agent are like, such that they can relate to each other in these ways. We argue that this requires an account of the regularities in the environment. Introducing the notion of general ecological information, we will give an account of these regularities in terms of constraints, information and the form of life or ecological niche. In the first part of the paper, we will introduce the skilled intentionality framework as conceptualizing a special case of an animal's informational coupling with the environment namely skilled action. We will show how skilled agents can pick up on the regularities in the environment and let their behavior be guided by the practices in the form of life. This conceptual framework is important for radical embodied and enactive cognitive science, because it allows these increasingly influential paradigms to extend their reach to forms of 'higher' cognition such as long-term planning and imagination.
Journal Article