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123 result(s) for "Chenoweth, Erica"
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Can Structural Conditions Explain the Onset of Nonviolent Uprisings?
Despite the prevalence of nonviolent uprisings in recent history, no existing scholarship has produced a generalized explanation of when and where such uprisings are most likely to occur. Our primary aim in this article is to evaluate whether different available models—namely, grievance approaches, modernization theory, resource mobilization theory, and political opportunity approaches—are useful in explaining the onset of major nonviolent uprisings. We assemble a reduced list of correlates based on each model and use each model's out-of-sample area under the curve and logarithmic score to test each theory's explanatory power. We find that the political opportunity model performs best for both in- and out-of-sample cases, though grievance and resource mobilization approaches also provide some explanatory power. We use a culled model of the predicted probabilities of the strongest-performing variables from all models to forecast major nonviolent uprisings in 2011 and 2012. In this out-of-sample test, all models produce mixed results, suggesting greater emphasis on agency over structure in explaining these episodes.
A dynamic model of nonviolent resistance strategy
Why have some nonviolent revolutions succeeded even with modest participation numbers, while others have failed despite massive mobilization? We develop an agent-based model that predicts the outcomes of three well-known activism strategies. The first rapidly recruits a wide number of activists, which overwhelms the opponent’s support network and encourages large-scale defections. In the second, activists who have already mobilized remain committed to success and inspire other civilians to protest even when they are unable to protest themselves. In the third strategy, campaigns focus their energy and influence directly on the regime’s pillars of support. We find that this third strategy outperforms the others in generating defections, even when the size of the campaign is small. When activists have information about pillars’ levels of loyalty to the regime, they can target persuasion on the pillars most likely to defect. Importantly, for small or medium-sized movements, the strategy of focusing on pillars—especially the least loyal pillars—is more likely to yield success than relying on rapid mobilization and numerical advantage alone.
Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict
The historical record indicates that nonviolent campaigns have been more successful than armed campaigns in achieving ultimate goals in political struggles, even when used against similar opponents and in the face of repression. Nonviolent campaigns are more likely to win legitimacy, attract widespread domestic and international support, neutralize the opponent's security forces, and compel loyalty shifts among erstwhile opponent supporters than are armed campaigns, which enjoin the active support of a relatively small number of people, offer the opponent a justification for violent counterattacks, and are less likely to prompt loyalty shifts and defections. An original, aggregate data set of all known major nonviolent and violent resistance campaigns from 1900 to 2006 is used to test these claims. These dynamics are further explored in case studies of resistance campaigns in Southeast Asia that have featured periods of both violent and nonviolent resistance.
The Future of Nonviolent Resistance
Over the past fifty years, nonviolent civil resistance has overtaken armed struggle as the most common form of mobilization used by revolutionary movements. Yet even as civil resistance reached a new peak of popularity during the 2010s, its effectiveness had begun to decline—even before the covid-19 pandemic brought mass demonstrations to a temporary halt in early 2020. This essay argues that the decreased success of nonviolent civil resistance was due not only to savvier state responses, but also to changes in the structure and capabilities of civil-resistance movements themselves. Perhaps counterintuitively, the coronavirus pandemic may have helped to address some of these underlying problems by driving movements to turn their focus back to relationship-building, grassroots organizing, strategy, and planning.
A dynamic model of nonviolent resistance strategy
Why have some nonviolent revolutions succeeded even with modest participation numbers, while others have failed despite massive mobilization? We develop an agent-based model that predicts the outcomes of three well-known activism strategies. The first rapidly recruits a wide number of activists, which overwhelms the opponent’s support network and encourages large-scale defections. In the second, activists who have already mobilized remain committed to success and inspire other civilians to protest even when they are unable to protest themselves. In the third strategy, campaigns focus their energy and influence directly on the regime’s pillars of support. We find that this third strategy outperforms the others in generating defections, even when the size of the campaign is small. When activists have information about pillars’ levels of loyalty to the regime, they can target persuasion on the pillars most likely to defect. Importantly, for small or medium-sized movements, the strategy of focusing on pillars—especially the least loyal pillars—is more likely to yield success than relying on rapid mobilization and numerical advantage alone.
Phylogeography of sugar kelp: Northern ice‐age refugia in the Gulf of Alaska
Many Northeast (NE) Pacific fishes and invertebrates survived Pleistocene glaciations in northern refugia, but the extent that kelps survived in northern areas is uncertain. Here, we test the hypothesis that populations of sugar kelp (Saccharina latissima) persisted in the Gulf of Alaska during ice‐age maxima when the western margin of the Cordilleran ice sheet covered coastal areas around the NE Pacific Ocean. We estimated genetic diversities within and phylogeographical relationships among 14 populations along 2,800 km in the NE Pacific and Bering Sea with partial sequences of mitochondrial DNA 5′‐cytochrome oxidase subunit I (COI, bp = 624, n = 543), chloroplast DNA ribulose‐1,5‐bisphosphate carboxylase large subunit‐3′ (rbcL, bp = 735, n = 514), and 11 microsatellite loci. Concatenated sequences of rbcL and COI showed moderate levels of within‐population genetic diversity (mean h = 0.200) but substantial differences among populations (ΦST = 0.834, p < .0001). Microsatellites showed moderate levels of heterozygosity within populations (mean HE = 0.391). Kelps in the same organellar lineage tended to cluster together, regardless of geographic origins, as indicated in a principal coordinate analysis (PCoA) of microsatellite genotypes. The PCoA also showed evidence of nuclear hybridizations between co‐occurring organellar lineages. Individual admixture plots with population clusters of K = 2, 6, and 9 showed increasing complexity with considerable historical admixture between some clusters. A time‐calibrated phylogeny placed divergences between rbcL‐COI lineages at 1.4 million years at most. The time frames of mutation in the rbcL‐COI lineages and microsatellite population clusters differed among locations. The existence of ancient lineages in the Gulf of Alaska, moderate levels of genetic diversity, and the absence of departures from neutrality are consistent with northern refugia during multiple Croll‐Milankovitch climate cycles in the Pleistocene Epoch. Organellar COI and rbcL sequences and 11 microsatellite loci were assayed in over 500 plants from 14 localities to test the hypothesis that populations survived Pleistocene ice ages in northern refugia. The substantial genetic diversity and chaotic distribution of genetic markers among populations indicated the likely survival in multiple northern refugia.
Democratic Competition and Terrorist Activity
Why is terrorist activity more prevalent in democracies than in nondemocracies? I argue that the main motivation for terrorist attacks in democracies is intergroup dynamics, with terrorist groups of various ideologies competing with one another for limited political influence. I conduct a cross-national, longitudinal analysis of 119 countries for the period 1975–97, using political competition as the key independent variable and the number of transnational terrorist incidents originating in the country as the dependent variable. I find preliminary support for the hypothesis that intergroup competition, motivated by the competition of the political regime, explains an increase in terrorist incidents originating in a state. Evidence also reveals a positive relationship between political competition and the number of terrorist groups that emerge within a state and a positive relationship between the density of domestic interest group participation and terrorist activity. Officials should consider intergroup dynamics to predict terrorist activities and derive effective counterterrorism policies.
Moving Beyond Deterrence: The Effectiveness of Raising the Expected Utility of Abstaining from Terrorism in Israel
Rational choice approaches to reducing terrorist violence would suggest raising the costs of terrorism through punishment, thereby reducing the overall expected utility of terrorism. In this article, we argue that states should also consider raising the expected utility of abstaining from terrorism through rewards. We test effects of repressive (or punishing) and conciliatory (or rewarding) actions on terrorist behavior using the newly developed GATE-Israel dataset, which identifies events by Israeli state actors toward Palestinian targets on a full range of counterterrorism tactics and policies from 1987 to 2004. Results show that repressive actions are either unrelated to terror or related to subsequent increases in terror, and conciliatory actions are generally related to decreases in terror, depending on the tactical period. Findings also reveal the importance of understanding the role of terrorists' constituencies for reducing violence.