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Nightwing. Volume 3, False starts
\"Dick Grayson, a.k.a. Nightwing, has grown out of the shadow of his mentor Batman and decided to forge a new destiny for himself in Gotham City's neighboring town, Bludhaven. Unfortunately, it seems that no matter where Dick goes, his hometown will always follow him. After seeing the devastation caused by a massive earthquake, Nightwing finds himself in the middle of a decimated Gotham teaming with his Bat-family to help its citizens. Then, even as he makes his way back to Bludhaven, a familiar face that's equally friend and foe shows up at his doorstep: The Huntress! Legendary writer Chuck Dixon (BATMAN: KNIGHTFALL) pens these classic tales of Dick Grayson in NIGHTWING VOL. 3. Collects issues #20-29, as well as the special #1,000,000\"-- Provided by publisher.
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National culture and corporate investment
We explore the relation between individualism and horizons and types of corporate investment, based on individualism's implications for risk taking. We find that firms in individualistic countries invest more in long-term (risky) than in short-term (safe) assets. Moreover, the effect of individualism on long-term investment hinges on R&D: firms in individualistic countries invest more in R&D projects but not more in physical assets. To test whether risk taking is the channel through which individualism works, we employ two-stage ordinary least squares and other analyses to nullify alternative explanations, such as: (1) uncontrolled institutions determine both individualism and R and (2) firms in individualistic countries invest more in R&D because they have higher investment efficiency, or pick less-risky R&D projects. We further find that individualistic firms tend to employ excess cash to increase R&D rather than increase dividends, and R&D decisions are less reliant on internal financing but more responsive to growth opportunities in individualistic countries.
Journal Article
National culture and dividend policy
This interdisciplinary study examines how national culture affects corporate dividend policies. The dividend puzzle is one of the most studied, yet unresolved, issues in financial economics. Prior theoretical and empirical research has suggested several explanations of the dividend puzzle that are rooted mainly in agency, asymmetric information, \"bird in hand\", and pecking order theories. The main intuition behind our analysis is that dividend policy may be determined not only by an objective assessment of the severity of agency and asymmetric information problems within a firm, but also by management's and investors' subjective perceptions of these problems, which hinge on their national culture. Using Schwartz's national culture dimensions, Conservatism and Mastery, we find that Conservatism is positively related and Mastery negatively related to dividend payouts for a sample of 27,462 firm-years from 21 countries between 1995 and 2007. These effects are robust to controls for a wide variety of other determinants of dividend policy -including investor protection, stock market performance, financial system configuration, tax advantage, economic development, and dividend catering premium -and to alternative culture proxies and sub-period windows. Our findings that national culture affects perceptions of and responses to agency and information asymmetry have important implications for policymakers and multinational enterprises.
Journal Article
National culture: The missing country-level determinant of corporate governance
It is well known that firm-level corporate governance practices vary mainly between rather than within countries, but country-level factors such as legal and financial institutions explain less than 50% of this cross-country variation. In this article we show that two dimensions of national culture - individualism and uncertainty avoidance - capture about 90% of the country fixed effects and outperform the country-level explanatory variables used in prior literature. We argue that culture works through a tradeoff between managerial expertise and certainty of control, a tradeoff largely overlooked by prior literature, that captures a country's preference for the Anglo-Saxon approach versus the direct control approach for governance. Consistent with this argument, we find that the effect of culture on corporate governance varies across firms with different needs for managerial expertise and certainty of control. We also find that culture interacts with other factors to determine firm-level governance.
Journal Article
Collectivism and corruption in bank lending
This paper examines how national culture, and collectivism in particular, influences corruption in bank lending. We hypothesize that interdependent self-construal and particularist norms in collectivist countries lead to a higher level of lending corruption through their influence both on the interactions between bank officers and bank customers and on the dynamics among bank colleagues. Using a sample covering 3835 firms across 38 countries, we find strong evidence that firms domiciled in collectivist countries perceive a higher level of lending corruption than firms domiciled in individualist countries. In terms of economic magnitude, the effect of collectivism is substantially larger than the effects of other cultural dimensions (uncertainty avoidance, masculinity, and power distance) and institutional factors identified in prior studies (bank supervision, bank competition, information sharing, and media monitoring). We further find that the positive relationship between collectivism and lending corruption is not driven by endogeneity, and that it is robust to different measures of bank corruption, different measures of collectivism, and different estimation methods. Finally, we find that the link between collectivism and lending corruption cannot be explained by the role of the government in the economy, political connections, biased responses from disgruntled borrowers, or relationship lending.
Journal Article
International evidence on state ownership and trade credit
Recent events, most notably the Global Financial Crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic, have made it increasingly apparent that liquidity is synonymous with corporate survival. In this paper, we explore how governments can fulfill an important need as suppliers of liquidity. Building on the financing advantage view of state ownership, we theorize how state-owned enterprises (SOEs) may provide capital by offering trade credit to customer firms. The data indicate a positive relation between the level of state ownership and the provision of trade credit. Using an institution-focused framework, we further determine that the nation’s institutional environment systematically affects the opportunities and motivations for SOEs to grant trade credit. Specifically, we find that SOEs grant more trade credit in countries with less developed financial markets, weaker legal protection of creditors, less comprehensive information-sharing mechanisms, more collectivist societies, left-wing governments, and higher levels of unemployment. Firm-level factors also influence the credit-granting decisions of SOEs, with SOEs with lower levels of state ownership and higher extents of internationalization offering lower amounts of trade credit. Overall, our study offers novel insights regarding the important role of state-owned firms as providers of liquidity.
Journal Article
H1.0 induces paclitaxel‐resistance genes expression in ovarian cancer cells by recruiting GCN5 and androgen receptor
More than 90% of ovarian cancer deaths are due to relapse following development of chemoresistance. Our main objective is to better understand the molecular mechanism underlying paclitaxel resistance (taxol resistance, Txr) in ovarian cancer. Here, we observed that the linker histone H1.0 is upregulated in paclitaxel‐resistant ovarian cancer cells. Knockdown of H1.0 significantly downregulates the androgen receptor (AR) and sensitizes paclitaxel‐resistant SKOV3/Txr and 2774/Txr cell lines to paclitaxel. Conversely, ectopic expression of H1.0 upregulates AR and increases Txr in parental SKOV3 and MDAH2774 cells. Notably, H1.0 upregulation is associated with disease recurrence and poor survival in a subset of ovarian cancer subjects. Inhibition of PI3K significantly reduces H1.0 mRNA and protein levels in paclitaxel‐resistant cells, suggesting the involvement of the PI3K/AKT signaling pathway. Knockdown of H1.0 and AR also downregulates the Txr genes ABCB1 and ABCG2 in paclitaxel‐resistant cells. Our data show that H1.0 induces GCN5 expression and histone acetylation, thereby enhancing Txr gene transactivation. These findings suggest that Txr in ovarian cancer involves the PI3K/AKT pathway and leads to upregulation of histone H1.0, recruitment of GCN5 and AR, followed by upregulation of a subgroup of Txr genes that include ABCB1 and ABCG2. This study is the first report describing the relationship between histone H1.0 and GCN5 that cooperate to induce AR‐dependent Txr in ovarian cancer cells. To better understand the molecular mechanism underlying taxol resistance (Txr), we explored the axis PI3K/AKT/H1.0 recruiting GCN5 and AR to upregulate Txr genes, ABCB1 and ABCG2. This study is the first report describing the relationship between histone H1.0 and GCN5 which cooperate to induce AR‐dependent Txr in ovarian cancer cells.
Journal Article
The MNC as an Agent of Change for Host-Country Institutions: FDI and Corruption
Most empirical research examines how the institutional environment of corruption shapes the behavior of multinational corporations (MNCs). In this study, we would like to highlight the other side of the picture: how the presence of MNCs may shape the institutional environment of corruption over time. We propose three avenues through which the MNCs may have an impact on its host institutions: regulatory pressure effect, demonstration effect, and professionalization effect. Based on extensive data on foreign direct investment and corruption for a large sample of countries over the last 30 years, the empirical results are generally consistent with our hypothesis. Such findings provide a glimmer of hope for the future of the host country where corruption is prevalent.
Journal Article
The 2020 AIB curriculum survey: The state of internationalizing students, faculty, and programs
Twenty years after the prior survey, the seventh international business curriculum survey was conducted in 2020 under the sponsorship of the Academy of International Business (AIB) and the Association to Advance Collegiate Schools of Business (AACSB). This paper reports the survey’s findings and makes relevant comparisons with the results of the two previous curriculum surveys. This study is not only an update but also explores new directions of international business (IB) integration into the business schools’ programs. Although the percentage of matrix structures and separate IB departments is higher in the 2020 survey than earlier, the majority of IB faculty are still scattered across functional departments without IB recognition. Essentially, with few exceptions, we found that European schools are consistently more international than their counterparts elsewhere. Business school deans also consider experiential learning very effective in equipping students with IB knowledge and are generally quite satisfied with the overall progress of their internationalization efforts. The survey findings contribute to understanding how IB is integrated into business schools and offer insights for identifying future opportunities.
Journal Article
National culture and privatization: The relationship between collectivism and residual state ownership
Using a large hand-collected database of 605 privatized firms from 48 countries, we examine the relationship between the collectivism measure of culture and residual state ownership in privatized firms. We find that the continued role of government in privatized firms is positively related to collectivism. This result is robust to using alternative measures of collectivism and government control, as well as when we address the endogeneity of collectivism. Finally, we examine the economic outcomes of culture at the firm level, focusing primarily on performance, efficiency, risk-taking, and valuation measures. We report that privatized firms with high residual state ownership exhibit lower performance, valuation, efficiency, and risk-taking in collectivist societies. Our results suggest that formal institutions are not, as sustained by previous studies, the main/exclusive constraints on the privatization reform.
Journal Article