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The 2009 H1N1 pandemic (pdm09) lineage of influenza A virus (IAV) crosses interspecies barriers with frequent human-to-swine spillovers each year. These spillovers reassort and drift within swine populations, leading to genetically and antigenically novel IAV that represent a zoonotic threat. We quantified interspecies transmission of the pdm09 lineage, persistence in swine, and identified how evolution in swine impacted zoonotic risk. Human and swine pdm09 case counts between 2010 and 2020 were correlated and human pdm09 burden and circulation directly impacted the detection of pdm09 in pigs. However, there was a relative absence of pdm09 circulation in humans during the 2020–21 season that was not reflected in swine. During the 2020–21 season, most swine pdm09 detections originated from human-to-swine spillovers from the 2018–19 and 2019–20 seasons that persisted in swine. We identified contemporary swine pdm09 representatives of each persistent spillover and quantified cross-reactivity between human seasonal H1 vaccine strains and the swine strains using a panel of monovalent ferret antisera in hemagglutination inhibition (HI) assays. The swine pdm09s had variable antigenic reactivity to vaccine antisera, but each swine pdm09 clade exhibited significant reduction in cross-reactivity to one or more of the human seasonal vaccine strains. Further supporting zoonotic risk, we showed phylogenetic evidence for 17 swine-to-human transmission events of pdm09 from 2010 to 2021, 11 of which were not previously classified as variants, with each of the zoonotic cases associated with persistent circulation of pdm09 in pigs. These data demonstrate that reverse-zoonoses and evolution of pdm09 in swine results in viruses that are capable of zoonotic transmission and represent a potential pandemic threat.

Background The H1N1 pandemic (H1N1pdm09) lineage of influenza A viruses (IAV) emerged in North America in 2009. It spread rapidly due to efficient transmission and the limited immunity in humans, replacing the previous human seasonal H1. Human‐to‐swine transmission of H1N1pdm09 IAV has since contributed to genetic diversity in pigs. While most were not sustained, approximately 160 spillovers persisted in pigs in the United States for at least 1 year and reassorted with other endemic swine IAVs in most cases. Methods We sought to identify how transmission and reassortment with endemic IAV in swine impact virus traits and zoonotic risk in this study. We conducted a swine pathogenesis and transmission study using four swine H1N1pdm09 viruses derived from different human influenza seasons that had acquired different gene segment combinations after spillovers into swine. To assess antigenic evolution, we compared the selected swine H1N1pdm09 strains against each other and to five human seasonal H1 vaccine strains. Results Ongoing circulation and reassortment resulted in viruses with variable virulence, shedding, and transmission kinetics. The H1N1pdm09 viruses retained antigenic similarities with the human vaccine strain of the same season of incursion but showed increasing antigenic distances with human seasonal H1N1 vaccine strains from other seasons. Conclusions Human seasonal H1N1 viruses are capable of replicating and transmitting in swine, and there is potential for these human‐to‐swine spillovers to reassort with endemic swine IAV. Controlling IAV at the human‐swine interface has the benefit of reducing IAV burden in swine and subsequent zoonotic risk.

Influenza A virus (IAV) infection is initiated by hemagglutinin (HA), a glycoprotein exposed on the virion’s lipid envelope that undergoes cleavage by host cell proteases to ensure membrane fusion, entry into the host cells, and completion of the viral cycle. Transmembrane protease serine S1 member 2 (TMPRSS2) is a host transmembrane protease expressed throughout the porcine airway epithelium and is purported to play a major role in the HA cleavage process, thereby influencing viral pathogenicity and tissue tropism. Pigs are natural hosts of IAV and IAV disease causes substantial economic impact on the pork industry worldwide. Previous studies in mice demonstrated that knocking out expression of TMPRSS2 gene was safe and inhibited the spread of IAV after experimental challenge. Therefore, we hypothesized that knockout of TMPRSS2 will prevent IAV infectivity in the swine model. We investigated this hypothesis by comparing pathogenesis of an H1N1pdm09 virus challenge in wildtype (WT) control and in TMPRSS2 knockout ( TMPRSS2 −/− ) pigs. We demonstrated that TMPRSS2 was expressed in the respiratory tract in WT pigs with and without IAV infection. No differences in nasal viral shedding and lung lavage viral titers were observed between WT and TMPRSS2 −/− pigs. However, the TMPRSS2 −/− pig group had significantly less lung lesions and significant reductions in antiviral and proinflammatory cytokines in the lung. The virus titer results in our direct challenge model contradict prior studies in the murine animal model, but the reduced lung lesions and cytokine profile suggest a possible role for TMPRSS2 in the proinflammatory antiviral response. Further research is warranted to investigate the role of TMPRSS2 in swine IAV infection and disease.

Highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5N1 haemagglutinin clade 2.3.4.4b was detected in the USA in 2021. These HPAI viruses caused mortality events in poultry, wild birds and wild mammals. On 25 March 2024, HPAI H5N1 clade 2.3.4.4b was confirmed in a dairy cow in Texas in response to a multistate investigation into milk production losses 1 . More than 200 positive herds were identified in 14 US states. The case description included reduced feed intake and rumen motility in lactating cows, decreased milk production and thick yellow milk 2 , 3 . The diagnostic investigation revealed viral RNA in milk and alveolar epithelial degeneration and necrosis and positive immunoreactivity of glandular epithelium in mammary tissue. A single transmission event, probably from birds, was followed by limited local transmission and onward horizontal transmission of H5N1 clade 2.3.4.4b genotype B3.13 (ref.  4 ). Here we sought to experimentally reproduce infection with genotype B3.13 in Holstein yearling heifers and lactating cows. Heifers were inoculated by an aerosol respiratory route and cows by an intramammary route. Clinical disease was mild in heifers, but infection was confirmed by virus detection, lesions and seroconversion. Clinical disease in lactating cows included decreased rumen motility, changes to milk appearance and production losses. Infection was confirmed by high levels of viral RNA detected in milk, virus isolation, lesions in mammary tissue and seroconversion. This study provides the foundation to investigate additional routes of infection, pathogenesis, transmission and intervention strategies. A study describes the experimental infection of cattle with a highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1 clade 2.3.4.4b genotype B3.13 strain using an aerosol respiratory route for heifers and an intramammary route for lactating cows.

The Iowa State University Veterinary Diagnostic Laboratory detected nineteen human-to-swine reverse zoonoses of the 2022–2023 human seasonal H3N2 between November 2022 and November 2023. Cases from seven U.S. locations were detected: 3 Colorado, 1 Illinois, 1 Indiana, 2 Missouri, 7 North Carolina, 1 Ohio, and 1 Pennsylvania. One additional case was detected in Mexico and two cases were identified from Chile. Case samples were comprised of 4 nasal swabs and 15 oral fluids. Virus was successfully isolated from two of four nasal swab samples, but isolation from oral fluids was unsuccessful. The swine detections of H3 human viruses were classified to one of two human-seasonal H3 clades, 3C.2a1b.2a.2b and 3C.2a1b.2a.2a.1. Phylogenetic inference indicated at minimum 7 reverse zoonotic events occurred, with possible swine-to-swine transmission following the initial spillover. Twelve neuraminidase genes were sequenced, and nine were classified as human-seasonal H3N2 lineage: the remaining were endemic swine IAV NA genes from the N2.2002B, N2.1998, or the N1.Classical lineage, suggesting reassortment. The two viral isolates obtained from nasal swab samples were sequenced and were entirely human-lineage viruses. Seven swine samples with human seasonal H3 were sequenced and revealed co-detections with H1 1A.3.3.3 (gamma), with internal gene segments from both the triple reassortant internal gene (TRIG) and pandemic 2009 lineages. Serologic investigation of samples from swine production systems provided evidence for infection with human seasonal H3N2. One farm in the United States and four farms in Mexico had concurrent virologic evidence. The swine-isolated 3C.2a1b.2a.2b H3N2 was antigenically distinct from endemic 1990.4.A, 2010.1, and 2010.2 swine H3N2 lineages, but retained antigenic similarity to a recent human seasonal H3N2 (A/Darwin/6/2021). Pigs experimentally inoculated with a representative isolate demonstrated replication in the nose and lungs and minimal to mild macroscopic and microscopic lung lesions, but primary pigs did not transmit the virus to indirect contacts. If sustained in the pig population, this human seasonal H3 would represent the first new lineage detected in pigs the 2020 decade and present an emerging threat to swine health and production.

The 2009 H1N1 pandemic (pdm09) lineage of influenza A virus (IAV) crosses interspecies barriers with frequent human-to-swine spillovers each year. These spillovers reassort and drift within swine populations, leading to genetically and antigenically novel IAV that represent a zoonotic threat. We quantified interspecies transmission of the pdm09 lineage, persistence in swine, and identified how evolution in swine impacted zoonotic risk. Human and swine pdm09 case counts between 2010 and 2020 were correlated and human pdm09 burden and circulation directly impacted the detection of pdm09 in pigs. However, there was a relative absence of pdm09 circulation in humans during the 2020–21 season that was not reflected in swine. During the 2020–21 season, most swine pdm09 detections originated from human-to-swine spillovers from the 2018–19 and 2019–20 seasons that persisted in swine. We identified contemporary swine pdm09 representatives of each persistent spillover and quantified cross-reactivity between human seasonal H1 vaccine strains and the swine strains using a panel of monovalent ferret antisera in hemagglutination inhibition (HI) assays. The swine pdm09s had variable antigenic reactivity to vaccine antisera, but each swine pdm09 clade exhibited significant reduction in cross-reactivity to one or more of the human seasonal vaccine strains. Further supporting zoonotic risk, we showed phylogenetic evidence for 17 swine-to-human transmission events of pdm09 from 2010 to 2021, 11 of which were not previously classified as variants, with each of the zoonotic cases associated with persistent circulation of pdm09 in pigs. These data demonstrate that reverse-zoonoses and evolution of pdm09 in swine results in viruses that are capable of zoonotic transmission and represent a potential pandemic threat.

Background: The H1N1 pandemic (H1N1pdm09) lineage of influenza A viruses (IAV) emerged in North America in 2009. It spread rapidly due to efficient transmission and the limited immunity in humans, replacing the previous human seasonal H1. Human-to-swine transmission of H1N1pdm09 IAV has since contributed to genetic diversity in pigs. While most were not sustained, approximately 160 spillovers persisted in pigs in the United States for at least 1 year and reassorted with other endemic swine IAVs in most cases. Methods: We sought to identify how transmission and reassortment with endemic IAV in swine impact virus traits and zoonotic risk in this study. We conducted a swine pathogenesis and transmission study using four swine H1N1pdm09 viruses derived from different human influenza seasons that had acquired different gene segment combinations after spillovers into swine. To assess antigenic evolution, we compared the selected swine H1N1pdm09 strains against each other and to five human seasonal H1 vaccine strains. Results: Ongoing circulation and reassortment resulted in viruses with variable virulence, shedding, and transmission kinetics. The H1N1pdm09 viruses retained antigenic similarities with the human vaccine strain of the same season of incursion but showed increasing antigenic distances with human seasonal H1N1 vaccine strains from other seasons. ConclusionsHuman seasonal H1N1 viruses are capable of replicating and transmitting in swine, and there is potential for these human-to-swine spillovers to reassort with endemic swine IAV. Controlling IAV at the human-swine interface has the benefit of reducing IAV burden in swine and subsequent zoonotic risk.

The 2009 H1N1 pandemic (pdm09) lineage of influenza A virus (IAV) crosses interspecies barriers with frequent human-to-swine spillovers each year. These spillovers reassort and drift within swine populations, leading to genetically and antigenically novel IAV that represent a zoonotic threat. We quantified interspecies transmission of the pdm09 lineage, persistence in swine, and identified how evolution in swine impacted zoonotic risk. Human and swine pdm09 case counts between 2010 and 2020 were correlated and human pdm09 burden and circulation directly impacted the detection of pdm09 in pigs. However, there was a relative absence of pdm09 circulation in humans during the 2020-21 season that was not reflected in swine. During the 2020-21 season, most swine pdm09 detections originated from human-to-swine spillovers from the 2018-19 and 2019-20 seasons that persisted in swine. We identified contemporary swine pdm09 representatives of each persistent spillover and quantified cross-reactivity between human seasonal H1 vaccine strains and the swine strains using a panel of monovalent ferret antisera in hemagglutination inhibition (HI) assays. The swine pdm09s had variable antigenic reactivity to vaccine antisera, but each swine pdm09 clade exhibited significant reduction in cross-reactivity to one or more of the human seasonal vaccine strains. Further supporting zoonotic risk, we showed phylogenetic evidence for 17 swine-to-human transmission events of pdm09 from 2010 to 2021, 11 of which were not previously classified as variants, with each of the zoonotic cases associated with persistent circulation of pdm09 in pigs. These data demonstrate that reverse-zoonoses and evolution of pdm09 in swine results in viruses that are capable of zoonotic transmission and represent a potential pandemic threat.Competing Interest StatementThe authors have declared no competing interest.

Modern swine production facilitates indoor respiratory contact between human employees and pigs in their care, creating conditions for interspecies transmission of influenza A virus (IAV). Sow vaccination is routinely practiced in the U.S. to transfer maternal derived antibodies (MDA) to piglets. Weaning is a highly stressful period for piglets that requires increased human interaction. This study investigates the effect of maternal antibodies on the susceptibility of weaned piglets to a human-origin H3N2 IAV. Weaned piglets often possess mixed immunity from MDA, which may be antigenically matched or mismatched to circulating viruses. Given the repeated spillover of human seasonal H3N2 into swine, we specifically examined how matched and mismatched MDA, acquired from vaccinated sows, influenced piglet susceptibility. Additionally, we assessed the impact of weaning-related stress on the outcome of viral challenge. The H3N2 virus was generated by reverse genetics to mimic the 2010.1 H3N2 introduction from humans to swine. Challenged seeder piglets were divided by immune and weaning status. Two days post inoculation, naïve direct contact pigs were placed with seeders. IAV qRT-PCR and virus titration were performed on nasal swabs and bronchoalveolar lavage fluid to evaluate shedding and transmission kinetics. Matched MDA were effective in reducing shedding in challenged pigs and minimizing transmission to contacts. There was an increase in shedding and transmission in weaned pigs compared to littermates that remained on the sow. These results identify critical control points in production where changing practices could mitigate human-to-swine and swine-to-swine transmission to prevent establishment of novel lineages in pig populations. Defining the factors that increase the susceptibility of pigs to infection with human influenza A viruses (IAV) is critical to understand why those viruses transmit to the new host. IAV is frequently detected in nursing pigs, where it was shown that maternal derived antibodies (MDA) may reduce clinical signs but may not prevent infection and transmission. Infected weaned piglets can then move viruses from the sow farm to offsite nurseries, where they can cause outbreaks with clinical disease as MDA wanes. Determining management practices that can be modified to reduce interspecies transmission of viruses to pigs is economically beneficial to the swine industry and could help define measures to prevent new spillover events. Reducing spillover of human IAV into pig populations also benefits public health by reducing genomic and phenotypic diversity in swine and the subsequent potential for zoonotic transmission.

The increased detection of H3 C-IVA (1990.4.a) clade influenza A viruses (IAV) in U.S. swine in 2019 was associated with a reassortment event to acquire an H1N1pdm09 lineage nucleoprotein (pdmNP) gene, replacing a TRIG lineage NP (trigNP). We hypothesized that acquiring the pdmNP conferred a selective advantage over prior circulating H3 viruses with a trigNP. To investigate the role of the NP reassortment in transmission, we identified two contemporary 1990.4.a representative strains (NC/19 and MN/18) with different evolutionary origins of the NP gene. A reverse genetics system was used to generate wild-type (wt) strains and to swap the pdm and TRIG lineage NP genes, generating four viruses: wtNC/19-pdmNP, NC/19-trigNP, wtMN/18-trigNP, MN/18-pdmNP. Pathogenicity and transmission of the four viruses were compared in pigs. All four viruses infected 10 primary pigs and transmitted to 5 indirect contact pigs per group. Pigs infected via contact with MN/18-pdmNP shed virus two days earlier than pigs infected with wtMN/18-trigNP. The inverse did not occur for wtNC/19-pdmNP and NC/19-trigNP. These data suggest that reassortment to acquire a pdmNP gene improved transmission efficiency in the 1990.4.a, but this is likely a multigenic trait. Replacing a trigNP gene alone may not diminish the transmission of a wild-type virus sampled from the swine population. This study demonstrates how reassortment and subsequent evolutionary change of internal genes can result in more transmissible viruses that impact the detection frequency of specific HA clades. Thus, rapidly identifying novel reassortants paired with dominant HA/NA may improve prediction of strains to include in vaccines. Influenza A viruses (IAV) are composed of eight non-continuous gene segments that can reassort during coinfection of a host, creating new combinations. Some gene combinations may convey a selective advantage and be paired together preferentially. A reassortment event was detected in swine in the United States that involved the exchange of two lineages of nucleoprotein (NP) genes (trigNP to pdmNP) that became a predominant genotype detected in surveillance. Using a transmission study, we demonstrated that exchanging the trigNP for a pdmNP caused the virus to shed from the nose at higher levels and transmit to other pigs more rapidly. Replacing a pdmNP with a trigNP did not hinder transmission, suggesting that transmission efficiency depends on interactions between multiple genes. This demonstrates how reassortment alters IAV transmission and that reassortment events can provide an explanation for why genetically related viruses with different internal gene combinations experience rapid fluxes in detection frequency.